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Philos 1850, Autumn 2015
Professor Joráti
FINAL EXAM (TAKE-HOME)
Due date:
December 15th, at noon [upload your file any time before this deadline]
Submission: Please upload a MS-Word-compatible file (or, if that is not possible, a PDF file) with your
answers to the designated Carmen dropbox. Do not put your name in the document!
Rules:
You are not allowed to work together on this, or receive help from anybody. You are,
however, allowed to consult your notes, the assigned readings, and the slides. You do not
need to use any other sources (such as optional readings or literature that you found
elsewhere), and in fact, it’s better if you don’t. And avoid direct quotations as much as you
can. Whenever possible, explain things in your own words to show that you understand
the material. You must use quotation marks (“ ”) whenever you are quoting word-by-word
from any source, and you must say where the quotation comes from. If you are merely
paraphrasing someone else’s arguments or ideas, don’t use quotation marks, but you must
nevertheless cite the source. It should always be clear which ideas are yours and which
ones are not yours. Likewise, if an idea is not yours, it should be clear whose idea it is. For
the assigned and optional readings, you don’t need to provide the bibliographic
information; it’s okay, for instance, to say “As Zagzebski says on p. 123 …”. If you use
additional sources (which, again, I do not recommend), provide a bibliography. If you
have questions about these rules and policies, please email the instructor or the grader.
PART A [up to 5 points per question]: Answer each of the following four questions. Each answer
should be 100–150 words long. Label each answer (1, 2, 3, and 4) so that it’s clear which question it
answers.
1) What is the problem of evil, and what is the difference between the logical and the evidential
version of the problem of evil?
2) What is the doctrine of karma, and is it a satisfactory solution to the problem of evil? (Say what
the doctrine is, how it might solve the problem of evil, and why you do or do not think that karma
is a satisfactory solution to the problem. No need to explain the problem of evil again, since you’ve
already done so in response to question 1.)
3) Is it possible for a human person to survive the death of his/her body? Describe one theory of
what a person is. (It has to be one of the theories we discussed in class). Next, explain whether
and how, according to that theory, a human person might be able to survive his or her biological
death. Note any special difficulties that the theory has in making room for the possibility of an
afterlife. [Do not mention near-death experiences; they are not relevant here.]
4) Many of our readings touched on the relation between faith and reason (e.g. Pascal, Kierkegaard,
Zagzebski, Clifford, Shapiro). Having read and discussed all of these different perspectives, what
is your own view on the relation between faith and reason? Your own view can, but does not have
to, be one of the views we encountered in class. Be as precise as you can in describing your view.
Then say whether on your view there are any situations in which reason and faith come into
conflict and in which it is necessary to choose between them. If you believe that there are such
situations, give an example; if you don’t, explain why not.
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Philos 1850, Autumn 2015
Professor Joráti
PART B [up to 20 points]: Read the text at the end of this document and then answer the following
questions in your own words (no direct quotations, please). Each answer should be 50–100 words long.
[Note that one goal of this part of the exam is similar to the goal of the short writing assignments: you are
supposed to demonstrate your ability to understand and accurately describe a philosophical text. To do
well, you need to read the text very carefully, more than once. Another goal of this section is the following:
you are supposed to show that you can observe and discuss connections between new material and
material we covered in the course.]
1)
In the first paragraph, the author announces that he will defend what he calls “friendly
atheism.” In the last paragraph, the author uses the term ‘paradoxical’ to describe friendly
atheism. What, ultimately, is the author’s position toward friendly atheism, and why?
2)
According to this author, is it possible to be rationally justified in believing something that is
false? Explain why the author does or does not think this.
3)
How does this text relate to the distinction between exclusivism and inclusivism that we
discussed this semester? And how would you classify the author’s position, using the
terminology we learned (e.g. ‘exclusivism about truth,’ ‘exclusivism about rationality,’ etc.)
4)
How does this text relate to the article about reasonable religious disagreement by Richard
Feldman that we discussed this semester? Does the author of the passage below completely
agree or completely disagree with Feldman, or does he partially agree with Feldman? Explain
why you think this. If you think that he partially agrees with Feldman, specify the respects in
which these two philosophers do and do not agree. Make sure to state what Feldman’s view
is.
“If one is persuaded by the argument for
atheism, as I find myself to be, how might one
best view the position of the theist? Of course,
he will view the theist as having a false belief, just
as the theist will view the atheist as having a false
belief. But what position should the atheist take
concerning the rationality of the theist’s belief?
There are three major positions an atheist might
take, positions which we may think of as some
varieties of atheism. First, the atheist may believe
that no one is rationally justified in believing that
the theistic God exists. Let us call this position
‘unfriendly atheism.’ Second, the atheist may
hold no belief concerning whether any theist is
or isn’t rationally justified in believing that the
theistic God exists. Let us call this view
‘indifferent atheism.’ Finally, the atheist may
believe that some theists are rationally justified in
believing that the theistic God exists. This view
we shall call ‘friendly atheism.’ … I propose to
discuss and defend the position of friendly
atheism.
If no one can be rationally justified in
believing a false proposition then friendly
atheism is a paradoxical, if not incoherent
position. But surely the truth of a belief is not a
necessary condition of someone’s being rationally
justified in having that belief. So in holding that
someone is rationally justified in believing that
the theistic God exists, the friendly atheist is not
committed to thinking that the theist has a true
belief. What he is committed to is that the theist
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Philos 1850, Autumn 2015
Professor Joráti
has rational grounds for his belief, a belief the
atheist rejects and is convinced he is rationally
justified in rejecting. But is this possible? Can
someone, like our friendly atheist, hold a belief,
be convinced that he is rationally justified in
holding that belief, and yet believe that someone
else is equally justified in believing the opposite?
Surely this is possible. Suppose your friends see
you off on a flight to Hawaii. Hours after takeoff they learn that your plane has gone down at
sea. After a twenty-four hour search, no
survivors have been found. Under these
circumstances they are rationally justified in
believing that you have perished. But it is hardly
rational for you to believe this, as you bob up
and down in your life vest, wondering why the
search planes have failed to spot you. Indeed, to
amuse yourself while awaiting your fate, you
might very well reflect on the fact that your
friends are rationally justified in believing that
you are now dead, a proposition you disbelieve
and are rationally justified in disbelieving. So, too,
perhaps an atheist may be rationally justified in
his atheistic belief and yet hold that some theists
are rationally justified in believing just the
opposite of what he believes.
What sort of grounds might a theist have for
believing that God exists? Well, he might
endeavor to justify his belief by appealing to one
or more of the traditional arguments: Ontological,
Cosmological, Teleological, Moral, etc. Second,
he might appeal to certain aspects of religious
experience, perhaps even his own religious
experience. Third, he might try to justify theism
as a plausible theory in terms of which we can
account for a variety of phenomena. Although an
atheist must hold that the theistic God does not
exist, can he not also believe, and be justified in
so believing, that some of these ‘justifications of
theism’ do actually rationally justify some theists
in their belief that there exists a supremely good,
omnipotent, omniscient being? It seems to me
that he can.
If we think of the long history of theistic
belief and the special situations in which people
are sometimes placed, it is perhaps as absurd to
think that no one was ever rationally justified in
believing that the theistic God exists as it is to
think that no one was ever justified in believing
that human being would never walk on the moon.
But in suggesting that friendly atheism is
preferable to unfriendly atheism, I don’t mean to
rest the case on what some human beings might
reasonably have believed in the eleventh or
thirteenth century. The more interesting question
is whether some people in modern society,
people who are aware of the usual grounds for
belief and disbelief and are acquainted to some
degree with modern science, are yet rationally
justified in accepting theism. Friendly atheism is a
significant position only if it answers this
question in the affirmative.
It is not difficult for an atheist to be friendly
when he has reason to believe that the theist
could not reasonably be expected to be
acquainted with the grounds for disbelief that he
(the atheist) possesses. For then the atheist may
take the view that some theists are rationally
justified in holding to theism, but would not be
so were they to be acquainted with the grounds
for disbelief—those grounds being sufficient to
tip the scale in favor of atheism when balanced
against the reasons the theist has in support of
his belief.
Friendly atheism becomes paradoxical,
however, when the atheist contemplates
believing that the theist has all the grounds for
atheism that he, the atheist, has, and yet is
rationally justified in maintaining his theistic
belief. But even so excessively friendly a view as
this perhaps can be held by the atheist if he also
has some reason to think that the grounds for
theism are not as telling as the theist is justified in
taking them to be.”
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