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Both Epicenter and Periphery
U.S. Interests in Central Asia
Introduction
The strategic landscape of Eurasia is rapidly changing, and Central Asia is literally at its
geographical epicenter. 1 More than twenty years past the collapse of the Soviet Union, one can
agree with Vladimir Putin’s recent pronouncement that the “post-Soviet era is over” in Eurasia.
This period was marked by a reluctant Russian strategic retreat, and geopolitical competition that
was usually framed as Russian interests contesting those of the United States and the West in a
modern version of the nineteenth-century “Great Game.” A new and wider set of emerging
powers in Eurasia contends with U.S. and Western interests, and the regional states have matured
as independent states themselves. Further, a new generation of elites is coming to the fore in
Central Asia whose memory partners and institutions they will view as most efficacious in
promoting their national interests are very uncertain today. What is clear at this point is that all
five Central Asian states are pursuing various forms of multi-vectorism in their foreign relations,
and although Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are fragile states, all five Central Asian nations after
more than twenty years of sovereignty more confidently assert their interests with others.
The collapse of the Soviet Union more than twenty years ago also ushered in a new era in
Eurasian geopolitics. Covering a vast landmass and rich in resources, the newly independent
Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have
presented successive U.S. administrations a variety of foreign policy challenges. Efforts to
promote market democratic reforms have been met with entrenched resistance from authoritarian
rulers. Ethnic clashes, endemic corruption, and economic crises have rendered the region fragile
and volatile. There is also tremendous diversity economically, politically, socially, and culturally
from relatively wealthy Kazakhstan to impoverished Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which makes
devising a coherent Central Asian strategy more difficult. While greater regional integration
would likely provide economic and security benefits, deep distrust, ethnic conflicts, and a
heightened sense of sovereignty in the wake of more than a hundred years of tsarist Russian and
Soviet policies of integration present major roadblocks to cooperation. Nevertheless, the region’s
strategic location at the crossroads of rapidly growing Eurasian powers including China, India,
Russia, Turkey, and Iran, its mineral and energy wealth, and its proximity to Afghanistan have
forced U.S. policy makers to spend much time developing strategies to deal with the region.
The inflection point in U.S. policy toward Central Asia was 9/11 and America’s war on
terror, which embedded it in the region vis-à-vis the war in Afghanistan. The Central Asian
nations emerged as geostrategic partners in the war by providing military bases and other
assistance. Later they provided additional crucial logistical support as key partners in the
Northern Distribution Network (NDN) and are now important players in devising a regional
long-term strategy on Afghanistan. Robert Blake, former assistant secretary for South and
Central Asian affairs, outlined in January 2011 the Obama administration’s priorities in engaging
Central Asian partners as key to the long-term strategy in Afghanistan: “Cultivating broad and
long-lasting relationships with the Central Asian countries is the only way to ensure a common
understanding and gain their long-term support for our efforts in Afghanistan.”
Since the announcement in December 2010 of a gradual drawdown of U.S. military
forces in Afghanistan by 2014, the Central Asian political elites have been and remain very
nervous about the return of the Taliban to Afghanistan and growing terrorist threats and
instability crossing their borders, as they region, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, share
a long and porous border with Afghanistan, and broader regional cooperation will be essential to
achieve any success in longer-term stabilization of Afghanistan. Violence in Kyrgyzstan in 2010
demonstrated that regional security organizations, including the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), are very limited in their capacity to guarantee
regional security.
U.S. tensions with Pakistan and Iran are high, placing greater importance on the Central
Asian countries in stabilizing Afghanistan, particularly its northern regions. This also gives the
Central Asian countries greater leverage in dealing with Washington. India, Turkey, and China
are becoming increasingly important players as well. This emerging multipolarity in the region
will necessitate a deft and strategic multi-vectored U.S. policy approach that emphasizes longterm support for the region, as a December 2010 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report
stated: “The U.S. role in Afghanistan is changing, but Washington should repeatedly stress that
its engagement is not ending.” 3 Budgetary pressures in Washington as well as the Obama
administration’s new defense strategy calling for greater focus on the Asia-Pacific, however,
naturally send regional elites the message of U.S. retreat. To counter this, Washington must
effectively engage Central Asian states’ desire for U.S. and Western cooperation to heighten
their sovereignty and balance Chinese, Russian, and other interests. The 2014 deadline makes
achieving progress on regional security, political cooperation, and economic cooperation an
urgent priority; the dismal recent historical record in Central and South Asia on this score fuels
the growing chorus of naysayers and skeptics in and outside the United States who doubt that
much success can be achieved.
In May 2012 the United States, after long negotiations, reached a Strategic Partnership
Agreement with Afghanistan, which commits Afghanistan to provide U.S. personnel access to
and use of Afghan facilities through 2014 and beyond. The agreement provides for the
possibility of U.S. forces in Afghanistan after 2014, for the purposes of training Afghan forces
and targeting the remnants of al-Qaeda, and commits the United States and Afghanistan to
initiate negotiations on a Bilateral Security Agreement to supersede our current Status of Forces
Agreement. The United States will also designate Afghanistan a “major non-NATO ally” to
provide a long-term framework for security and defense cooperation. This agreement was a step
in the right direction, but it also left many points ambiguous, such as the number of U.S. military
to remain in Afghanistan after 2014 and the level of future assistance. 4 The United States and
Afghanistan successfully negotiated a Bilateral Security Agreement in 2013, but despite the
landslide approval of the agreement at a December 2013 Loya Jirga, President Karzai refused to
sign it, the spring of 2014). This extended uncertainty has frustrated the Obama administration
and further complicates the implementation of the post-2014 U.S. presence in Afghanistan.
But it is impossible to discount the deep fatigue in U.S. policy-making circles with
Afghanistan. Regardless of rhetorical promises and partnership agreements, even the most
optimistic observers—and there are few optimists left regarding Afghanistan—must realize that
Washington’s commitment to Afghanistan could drop off dramatically in the coming years.
Regional Security Architecture: NATO, the SCO, and the CSTO
NATO’s emphasis on security in Central Asia since 2001 has provided the opportunity
for more cooperation in the region. The Central Asian states’ logistical support through bases
and overflight rights beginning in the fall of 2001 have been crucial to NATO’s mission in
Afghanistan. However, U.S. needs for basing and logistical support for the Afghan war make
these bilateral relationships much more transactional than strategic. More recently, since early
2009, the most significant contribution made by the Central Asian states has been in facilitating
the NDN. The value of the NDN was highlighted in November 2011, when Islamabad cut off
transit through Pakistan for several months in response to a U.S. drone strike that resulted in
twenty-four deaths. 5 The existence of the NDN also made President Obama’s decision to deploy
secret forces to take out Osama Bin Laden in May 2011 less risky from the standpoint of
continuous supplies for U.S. forces.
At its peak in 2011–2012, the NDN transported about 40 percent of all cargo for
operations in Afghanistan (more than 50 percent of nonlethal supplies), and about 70 percent of
the NDN freight enters through Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan has been critical because of its rail
network that extends to the Afghan border, infrastructure relied upon in the 1980s by the Soviets
to support their troop presence in Afghanistan. This transit corridor has made Uzbekistan a key
partner of the U.S. and NATO mission in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan became a U.S. strategic
partner in 1995 and has had a tumultuous relationship with the United States since then. The
U.S.-Uzbekistan Strategic Partnership Document was signed in 2002 expanding military,
security, economic, and humanitarian cooperation, and U.S. military forces were granted access
to the Karshi Khanabad base. 6 Later, after the United States harshly condemned the Andijan
crisis, the Uzbeks expelled the United States from the Karshi Khanabad military base in 2005. 7
After 9/11 the relationship has changed but continues to be shaky, mainly due to human rights
concerns in Washington. The Uzbek support for the NDN was announced by Karimov in 2008
and has been the pivot for further cooperation between the two nations based on mutual interests.
Despite these concerns, in January 2012 the United States extended the Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) waiver for military sales to Uzbekistan.
Kyrgyzstan and the history of the Manas air base/transit center epitomize the
considerable domestic and foreign pressures. Kyrgyzstan is also the only Central Asian country
to host both a Russian and U.S. base, often using one as leverage against the other. The Manas
facility, established in 2001 during Askar Akaev’s tenure, has been central to U.S. operations in
Afghanistan. Following the ousting of Akaev, the Bakiev government in 2005 sought to
renegotiate the basing agreement. Condemning the leasing agreements as fraught with
corruption, Bakiev issued sharp criticism of the way revenues from leasing were surreptitiously
divided among the ruling elite. The rhetoric was partly an attempt to garner support for his
fragile regime, which was seeking legitimacy among the public. 8 This was taking place around
the same time that the United States was struggling with policies in Uzbekistan, thus
strengthening Bakiev’s leverage with Washington. Bakiev was successful in closing a new deal
at more than three times the previous rent, but several years later, in 2009, when the Russians
sought to entice him with a $2 billion assistance package to deny U.S. access to Manas and
failed, he was also overthrown amidst a great deal of controversy over Manas. The U.S. presence
in Manas and the many controversies over corrupt contracting procedures over the past decade
united diverse political factions in Kyrgyzstan to oppose its continued operation, and finally in
2013 the United States agreed reluctantly to shut down its operation in 2014 as the U.S. troop
withdrawal runs its course.
Tajikistan, the most vulnerable and fragile of all Central Asian states, allows the use of
Dushanbe international airport for refueling needs, provides a transit point for the NDN, and has
been partnering with NATO in developing programs to strengthen its counternarcotic and
counterterrorism capability. Russia has historically held military privilege in Tajikistan by
deploying soldiers along the Tajik-Afghan border, but has never paid rent for the base they
occupy. Now there has been pressure from the Tajiks, perhaps taking a cue from their Kyrgyz
counterparts, to extract revenue from Russia for the use of the base. In October 2012 the Russian
and Tajik governments agreed to extend the Russian lease for thirty years. However, the
ratification process stalled as Tajikistan worked to negotiate better terms. 9 The October 2012
agreement allowed Russia to maintain its presence practically rent-free; 10 in return, the
Russians would extend their visa policy to the large numbers of Tajik immigrant workers in
Russia 11 and abolish duties on 1 million tons of imported oil products from Russia per year. 12
Tajikistan was largely unsuccessful in negotiating more favorable terms. The final agreement,
ratified by the Tajik parliament in October 2013, maintained Moscow’s military presence—and
low rent figure—through 2042 and includes, in addition to the two concessions listed above,
support for additional training and assistance for the Tajik military and increased transfers of
military equipment.
Kazakhstan, the most Western-leaning among the Central Asian states, is a key partner in
the NDN, provides overflight rights, and is also instrumental in the Kazakhstan–Kyrgyzstan–
Tajikistan (KKT) route, which transits through Kazakhstan—are viable. Apart from the crucial
transit and transport assistance, Kazakhstan has increased economic and humanitarian
cooperation with Afghanistan in the last few years. The two nations signed several agreements in
late 2011 covering trade, education, mining, transport, and humanitarian aid. Of all the Central
Asian states, Kazakhstan has the most robust humanitarian engagement in Afghanistan,
providing educational opportunities for young Afghans, training to develop human resources,
constructing hospitals and schools, and investing in domestic infrastructure development.
Afghanistan’s mineral wealth has tremendous revenue-generating potential but is in dire need of
appropriate development investments. To that end, the involvement of CAREC countries in
developing infrastructure swiftly can bring significant economic benefits to the Afghan
economy. 14 Kazakh expertise in developing mineral resources can help catalyze the process,
especially in developing the oil and gas resources. Additionally, the north-south railway
initiative, which involves Central Asian states, could potentially bring benefits to the Afghan
economy by means of wider integration.
Turkmenistan’s “neutral” foreign policy is reflected in its limited engagement with
NATO, the United States, and regional security structures like the CSTO. The Ashgabat airport
facility allows tax-free refuelling of NATO jets as a part of the Partnership for Peace (PfP)
program but has not provided land transport facilities into Afghanistan. Turkmenistan has also
allowed a quota of overflight rights, and a majority of the fuel for Afghanistan ships through
Turkmenistan in a “don’t ask, don’t tell” arrangement. 15 Given the extensive border that
Turkmenistan shares with Afghanistan, and the strategic proximity to Iran, it provides ideal land
routes for NATO and U.S. interests. Although Turkmenistan is not a significant contributor to
the NDN, talks have been floating around about U.S. Central Command’s plans to extend the
network to use Turkmen routes. 16 There has been little communication from the Turkmen side
on this matter, but the imminent withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan might cause a shift
in that position.
U.S. policy makers have long grappled with the question of how to engage the two other
leading multilateral security organizations, the CSTO and the SCO. To date, U.S. policy has
been to rely on bilateral agreements. Both organizations have included all the Central Asian
countries except defiantly neutral Turkmenistan, but in June 2012 Uzbekistan announced that it
was suspending its CSTO membership. Since joining the organization in 2006, Uzbekistan had
been a rather reluctant member. For example, Tashkent never signed onto the KSOR rapid
reaction force that Moscow has been pushing. The basic problem with the CSTO, however, is
that the organization is viewed principally as an extension of Russian power, which is often at
odds with the Uzbekistan.
The decision taken by the CSTO in 2011 to create a regional forum that necessitates
consensus on foreign military presence in the region raised concerns about the future of U.S.
military presence. 17 However, the CSTO secretary general Nikolay Bordyuzha has frequently
voiced willingness to hold talks with NATO but has received no response from that organization.
18 CSTO member countries have sought to advance a partnership with NATO, recognizing that
a weakened military presence in Afghanistan will sooner or later put the CSTO’s capabilities to
the test. All member states unanimously backed the initiative to cooperate with NATO at the
April 2012 ministerial meeting and unfolded the plan to create a joint peacekeeping force that
would operate “both within and outside the CSTO area,” signaling a shift in the goals and
objectives of the organization in becoming both a regional and global actor. 19 In addition to the
access/logistics agreements noted above, U.S.-Central Asia military-to-military ties continue to
evolve, especially on border management, counterterrorism, and training.
And while Russia’s desire for a U.S. military presence in the region is mixed at best,
China has been more reticent about regional security cooperation with the United States. 20
China’s interest and presence in the region are consistent with its policy to avoid political and
military intervention on foreign land while it pursues a robust economic agenda in the region.
China’s principal concern with Afghanistan and Central Asia stems from potential political
instability in its western Xinjiang Province. From the founding of the Shanghai Five in 1996 to
its development into the SCO in 2001, the security dimension of the organization has been
intrinsically linked to the situation in Afghanistan, although China remains cautious about direct
intervention in domestic Afghan politics. The presence of International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) troops has made it easier for China to avoid deeper involvement in Afghanistan by
mitigating serious escalation of the Taliban’s powers, which could create a precarious situation
for China’s domestic security. Now, however, the imminent withdrawal of troops and
speculation about the future of Afghanistan’s governance have heightened Chinese concerns to
foster dialogue on the security dimension of the SCO. But privately, Chinese analysts express
frustration with Russia’s objections to the SCO playing a greater role in regional security
cooperation. The China-Afghanistan strategic and cooperative partnership, signed on the
sidelines of the June 2012 SCO summit, is an indication of China’s growing interest in the
region’s security issues.
On the economic side, China has successfully exploited the Central Asian consumer
market and has rooted itself in the energy sector by investing in Kazakh oil and Turkmen gas for
the energy needs of its burgeoning economy. In its search for additional energy corridors, China
has invested in Pakistan’s Gwadar port, and potential investment in the Iran–Pakistan pipeline is
catalyzing cooperation between the two countries, which signed a free trade agreement in 2006.
China remains wary of the growing instability within two major pipelines: an oil pipeline with
Kazakhstan, and a natural gas pipeline bringing Turkmen gas to China through Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan.
The evolving relationship between China and Pakistan also stems from speculations
about the connection that the East Turkistan Islamic Movement may have with the region of
Pakistan-occupi …
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