Expert answer:Understanding and Conducting a Vulnerability Analy
Solved by verified expert:Primary Task Response: Within the Discussion Board area, write 600 – 800 words that respond to the following questions with your thoughts, ideas, and comments. This will be the foundation for future discussions by your classmates. Be substantive and clear, and use examples to reinforce your ideas.Note: There are 2 parts to this assignment. Include the questions, but should not count toward the wordsPart 1For this Discussion Board assignment, complete the following:Based upon the network that you have selected (TRANSPORTATION SECTOR AVIATION SUBSECTOR) to study this term, explain whether it is a scale-free or small-world network. Your network will not be both. Start with understanding how these each operate and how they differ. Identify your network, and answer the following:Is your network scale free or small world? How do you know? Which principles of scale-free or small-world networks apply to your selected network and the interdependencies between and among its assets, nodes, and links?Is your network also a cascading network? Specifically, why do you believe it is or is not?How does understanding the difference between scale-free and small-world networks help to plan protective measures more successfully?How can understanding your type of network potentially impact your vulnerability and risk analyses?Provide at least 2 examples of how understanding your network better in this respect helps you understand potential vulnerabilities and defend against them.Part 2On August 1, 2007, the I-35W Bridge in Minneapolis, Minnesota collapsed, killing 13 people and injuring 121. The U.S. Fire Administration, an entity within the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), produced a technical report covering the response, recovery activities, and lessons learned regarding this catastrophic event.This report is available for download by clicking here.Under the M.U.S.E. offerings for this Phase, look for the item titled “FEMA Report on MN Bridge Collapse.” Review and study this presentation before answering the following questions. You may also conduct external research, but if you do, be sure to select professional source documents such as FEMA after action reports, engineering records, and lessons. Be sure to answer the following questions:What potential vulnerabilities can be associated with the I-35W bridge collapse?Consider this type of list an organized form of brainstorming. Think of vulnerabilities as gaps in security or protection, structural flaws, or the likelihood of something bad happening. Do not limit the list of vulnerabilities at first; it can be reduced to the most likely or most potentially costly items at a later time.How does the environment impact which vulnerabilities are most likely or even possible?As you contemplate potential vulnerabilities, use the 360-degree analysis this course continues to reinforce. Notice how the vulnerabilities expand, contract, change, or are eliminated based on various changing conditions. In this case, such a view should include assessing environments comprised of natural, manmade, and combined conditions. For example, think about the time of day and time of year it was when the bridge collapsed. An example question might be: Does the season impact the degree or depth of a vulnerability to this bridge? Or, how much greater might the loss of life had been if the collapse occurred in the winter?Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities, what potential costs or consequences might result from each?After listing the vulnerabilities and questions, reduce the list to the most likely possibilities, and consider the potential costs or consequences of each vulnerability. Again, think in a 360-degree way of what might constitute costs or consequences. Do not get stuck on what the actual outcome resulted in, but also consider how much worse or how differently it might have turned out.How do you select the most likely vulnerabilities from a list of many?ReferenceU.S fire administration releases report on I-35W bridge collapse in Minneapolis. (2008). Retrieved from U.S. Fire Administration Web site: http://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publication…
tr_166.pdf
Unformatted Attachment Preview
U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
I-35W Bridge Collapse
and Response
Minneapolis, Minnesota
USFA-TR-166/August 2007
U.S. Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program
T
he U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) develops reports on selected major fires throughout the
country. The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property, but the primary
criterion for deciding to write a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.”
In some cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire—the effect of building construction or contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new, but are
serious enough to highlight once again because of another fire tragedy. In some cases, special reports
are developed to discuss events, drills, or new technologies or tactics that are of interest to the fire
service.
The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at national and regional fire meetings. The
reports are available on request from USFA. Announcements of their availability are published widely
in fire journals and newsletters.
This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers
who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within
the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building
technology, and other related areas.
The USFA, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities to ensure that
USFA’s assistance and presence would be supportive and would in no way interfere with any review
of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive during the event or even
immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and objective review of all the
important aspects of the incident can be made. Local authorities review USFA’s report while it is in
draft form. The USFA investigator or team is available to local authorities should they wish to request
technical assistance for their own investigation.
For additional copies of this report write to the U.S. Fire Administration, 16825 South Seton Avenue,
Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727 or via http://www.usfa.dhs.gov
I-35W Bridge Collapse and Response
Minneapolis, Minnesota
August 1, 2007
Reported by: Hollis Stambaugh
Harold Cohen
This is Report 166 of Investigation and Analysis of Major Fire Incidents
and USFA’s Technical Report Series Project conducted by TriData,
a Division of System Planning Corporation under Contract (GS-10F0350M/HSFEEM-05-A-0363) to the DHS/U.S. Fire Administration
(USFA), and is available from the USFA Web site at http://www.usfa.
dhs.gov
Department of Homeland Security
United States Fire Administration
National Fire Programs Division
U.S. Fire Administration
Mission Statement
As an entity of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), the mission
of the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) is to
reduce life and economic losses due to fire
and related emergencies, through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support.
We serve the Nation independently, in coordination with other Federal agencies, and in
partnership with fire protection and emergency service communities. With a commitment to excellence, we provide public
education, training, technology, and data
initiatives.
Acknowledgments
The information for this report was derived in large part from individuals who were interviewed in
the Twin Cities area on site and via videoconference over a period of 3 days. The U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) provided videoconferencing capabilities for those interviews and linked
into the system made available by the State of Minnesota. Additional interviews were conducted by
telephone. The names of the people who were interviewed are provided in Table 1 below.
We also reviewed hundreds of pages of documentation on the response and recovery activities,
including situation reports from the Minneapolis and State of Minnesota Emergency Operations
Centers (EOCs), internal after-action analyses, maps, articles, and presentations that provided additional insight and details. The authors are grateful for the tremendous support offered by all, especially key Minneapolis emergency preparedness personnel, Rocco Forté and Bill Anderson, and Robert
Berg from Minnesota Homeland Security and Emergency Management.
Table 1: Individuals Interviewed for Report
City of Minneapolis
Allen, Rob
Police Department
Anderson, Bill
Emergency Preparedness
Blixt, Pam, Manager
Health and Family Support Preparedness
Bundt, Jonathan
Police Department, Consultant/Hospital Compact Group
Dejung, John
9-1-1/3-1-1
Dietrich, Sara
Communications
Dressler, Lisa
Emergency Preparedness
Eicklenberg, Laura
Emergency Preparedness
Forté, Rocco, Director
Emergency Preparedness
Fruetel, John
Fire Department
Hermanson, Stacy
Emergency Preparedness
Johnston, Heather
Finance Department
Kennedy, Mike
Public Works
Laible, Matt
Communications
Martin, Mike
Police Department
Musicant, Gretchen
Health Department
Rollwagen, Kristi
Emergency Preparedness
Sobania, Don
Public Works
continued on next page
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Stewart, Dr. Jeffrey, Chaplain
Police Department
Velasco-Thompson, Ellen
Risk Management and Crisis
Wagenpfeil, Otto
Police Department
Hennepin County
Chandler, Bill
Sheriff’s Office
Geisehardt, Roberta
Medical Examiner
Turnbull, Tim
Emergency Preparedness
Van Buren, Martin
Emergency Medical Services
Ward, Tom
Emergency Medical Services
State Homeland Security and Emergency Management
Berg, Robert M.
Berrisford, David
Eide, Kris
Hendrickson, Gary
Ketterhagen, Kim
Lokken, Garry
U.S. Coast Guard, Upper Mississippi River Sector
Epperson, Todd
Richey, Sharon, Captain
Tab
CHAPTER I. OVERVIEW OF THE EVENT and Minneapolis’s preparedness. . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter II. Fire and Emergency Medical Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Initial Fire and Rescue Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Emergency Medical Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
chapter iIi. law enforcement and the Family Assistance Center. . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Chapter IV. Recovery Operations and the Medical Examiner’s Office. . . . . . . . 22
Medical Examiner’s Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Fatalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Antemortem and Postmortem Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Respect and Sensitivity to Victims’ Families . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Chapter V. Minneapolis Emergency Management System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Minneapolis Emergency Operations Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Roles and Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Emergency Operations Center Oversight. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Safety. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Public Information Officer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Liaison. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Logistics and Public Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
9-1-1 Center. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Finance and Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Minnesota Security and Emergency Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Chapter VI. hazmat and Environmental Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
CHAPTER VII. LESSONS LEARNED and Best Practices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Problem Areas and Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Best Practices: Notable Successes in the Response to Bridge Collapse. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
CHAPteR I. oVeRVIeW oF tHe eVent And
MInneAPolIS’S PRePARedneSS
I
n 1967, the Interstate 35W Mississippi River Bridge in Minneapolis opened to traffic. The bridge
was 1,907 feet long, had 14 spans, and by 2007 carried a daily average of 140,000 total vehicles
north and south over four lanes between University Avenue and Washington Avenue. The vehicle
count made it one of the busiest bridges in the country over the Mississippi River, and one of three
principal arteries into downtown Minneapolis, a city with one of the highest population densities
in the Midwest.
Just after 6 p.m. on the evening of August 1, 2007, the 40-year old bridge collapsed into the river
and its banks without warning, killing 13 and injuring 121 others. At the time, there were approximately 120 vehicles, carrying 160 people, on the bridge. The impact of the fall broke the span into
multiple planes of broken steel and crushed concrete—cars, buses, and trucks all resting precariously
along guardrails or suddenly unprotected edges, crashed into other vehicles, partially embedded in
the muddy river bank, or dropped precipitously into the river (Figure 1).
Figure 1. scene of the Collapse.
The most urgent task was rescuing people from the water and from their vehicles, conducting triage
on the injured, and providing transport to area hospitals. Several vehicles were on fire, making firefighting operations a parallel priority. Local and State staff and officials from fire, law enforcement,
emergency management, and public works received immediate alerts and, having trained together
in classroom settings and through field exercises, knew what to do and with whom they needed
to coordinate their response. Years of investing time and money into identifying gaps in the city’s
disaster preparedness capabilities; acquiring radios for an interagency, linked 800 MHz system; and
participating in training on the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and on the organizational basis for that system (the Incident Command System (ICS) and Unified Command) paid off
substantially during response and recovery operations.
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U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
The bridge collapse tested the area’s ability to handle a complicated mix of tactical and strategic
problems effectively. People and vehicles fell into the water, onto the river banks, and onto the
multiple surfaces of the broken bridge (Figure 2). It was a dangerous multilevel accident site,
located in the river gorge, that had the ever-present potential for secondary collapse. The fires on
the deck; the presence of certain hazardous materials and the prospect of others; steep banks; and
collapse debris complicated access, among other difficulties (Figure 3). The bridge was owned by
the Federal government, and was operated and maintained by the State of Minnesota. After the
collapse, the bridge was lodged in the river where, under Minnesota statute, the Hennepin County
Sheriff’s Office Water Patrol has jurisdiction; and along the river banks, which are under the jurisdiction of the City of Minneapolis.
Figure 2. One section of Collapsed Bridge.
The City of Minneapolis and the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office were assisted by a multitude of
mutual-aid resources from adjacent counties and cities, and by State and Federal agencies. Federal
assets soon at the scene included the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the
U.S. Navy.
The excellent working relationships that had been developed through joint interagency training,
planning, and previous emergency incidents was one of the primary reasons that response and
recovery operations went as smoothly as they did. As one leader commented “We didn’t view it as a
Minneapolis incident; it was a city/county/State incident.”
USFA-TR-166/August 2007
3
Figure 3. Another View of the Bridge Collapse.
The local response to the bridge disaster—and the coordination with metro, State, and Federal
partners—demonstrated the extraordinary value of comprehensive disaster planning and training.
The City of Minneapolis was as well prepared as any local jurisdiction could be to handle a major
incident. The city’s ability to respond had evolved over several years of investing heavily and widely
in all the elements that make a crucial difference when disaster strikes. Their investment covered
widespread training on the NIMS that extended beyond city department heads and into all employee
levels. Over half of the city’s 4,000 employees have received NIMS training.
In 2002, Minneapolis elected officials and key staff took a hard look at its state of preparedness following an intensive, 1-week Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) offsite training course
at Mt. Weather in Virginia, and conducted a risk assessment that identified areas where improvements
were needed. The city wasted no time in resolving the gaps, aggressively pursuing Federal grant
dollars, e.g., the Urban Area Security Initiative, and general fund dollars to pay for radio and communications upgrades, equipment, and training that together elevated its level of preparedness.
Minneapolis is part of what now is identified as the Twin Cities Urban Area (TCUA) for the purpose of Federal homeland security grant programs. The TCUA includes all the jurisdictions that provided mutual aid in some capacity to Minneapolis and Hennepin County when the bridge disaster
occurred. Ramsey, Hennepin, and Dakota Counties along with the City of Saint Paul and Minneapolis
make up the TCUA. Within this metropolitan region of three million people are two bomb squads,
two chemical assessment teams, a heavy and medium collapsed-structure rescue team, a type three
and type four all-hazard incident management team and the State’s only statewide hazardous materials emergency response team.
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U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
Federal grants from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to the TCUA have benefited both
Minneapolis and the region as a whole. Those grants have supported the development of the special
capabilities teams mentioned above, as well as training, planning, and resources for transit and port
security, a metropolitan medical response team, Continuity of Operations (COOP) and Continuity of
Government (COG) planning, incident command, NIMS training, and more.
As was mentioned before, in March of 2002, 80 top officials from Minneapolis, Hennepin County,
and the State of Minnesota attended a 4-day Integrated Emergency Management course. The purpose
of the course was to test the city’s Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) and identify weaknesses. Using
multiple scenarios, the EOP that existed at the time was put through its paces and exercised by the
entire group of city stakeholders. Following this experience, the city set up work teams under police,
fire, public works, and communications to address the shortcomings they identified during training.
Following are some of the specific actions they took relative to some weak areas:
1. Communications—Minneapolis earmarked $20 million to purchase new 800 MHz radios. Not
surprisingly, Minneapolis was ranked as one of six leading cities in tactical interoperability communications, according to a recent Federal report.
2. Emergency Dispatch—The city spent $5.2 million on a state-of-the-art computer‑aided dispatch (CAD) system that has the capability to map the location of all emergency response vehicles equipped with Global Positioning Systems (GPS).
3. Special Operations Teams—The exercises from training led to the realization that Minneapolis
needed specialized teams with technical skills that would be used in various disaster situations.
The city created three special response teams: the fire department’s hazardous materials and collapse structure teams, and the police department’s bomb squad, at a cost of $8 million.
4. Pharmaceutical Stockpile—Minneapolis now has a comprehensive plan for storing and distributing pharmaceuticals in the event of widespread disease.
The city made progress on infrastructure protection—hardening soft targets—and training. All city
employees were given the opportunity for training on the ICS and how that structure functions in
the field and in the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Employees’ awareness of the main elements
of ICS contributed to smoother response and recovery than would otherwise have been the case.
When key personnel from the primary response agencies were asked to what they attributed their
excellent response, without exception they answered, “relationships.” Those relationships were
developed as a result of all the planning, training, and exercises that multiple agencies and levels of
government shared in recent years. Responders knew whom to call for what resources. They knew to
work through the established chain of command. They knew each other’s names and faces and had
built a level of trust that made it possible to move quickly through channels and procedures.
The main task that remains is to locate adequate space and fully equip a new EOC so that all the players on the emergency management support team can operate physically from the same location.
This report documents how Minneapolis used the many resources at its disposal, managed firefighting and rescue operations, controlled perimeters and maintained security, recovered fatalities from
the river, and handled hazardous materials concerns and safety overall. The report also discusses the
support provided to the families of the dead and describes how the emergency management system
worked at the city’s EOC. Several best practices are described at the end of the report. The U.S. Fire
Administration (USFA) also believes there are important lessons to be learned from some problems
that occurred. These are discussed in the final chapter as well.
CHAPteR II. FIRe And eMeRgenCy MedICAl SeRVICeS
T
his chapter discusses the onscene fire, rescue, and emergency medical services (EMS) operations and how the Incident Command System (ICS) was used. While the incident was complex,
with recovery and debris management activities that extended for weeks, the rescue phase was
completed in a relatively short time. Emergency responders were able to assess the situation quickly,
determine priorities, and perform needed rescue and emergency care.
All responders had received prior training in the MnNIMS, Minnesota’s version of the National
Incident Management System (NIMS). Operational leaders, administrators, and responders had completed required training according to their levels of responsibility.1
The biggest challenge facing emergency responders was the need to b …
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