Expert answer:Research Paper
Solved by verified expert:Looking for a research paper on Topic: Operation Anaconda Narrowed Topic: “Training Management”apa level 1 version 6 with 6 reference I have one attached one source looking for 3-5 pages with reference sheet. Need a conclusion on even thought the mission was a success the training management almost lead to mission failure. References need to be sited in the paper appropriately with 3 body ideas.Current Thesis: Poor training management almost lead to mission failure because training management failed to be managed properly almost resulting in mission failure.
mlc_operation_anaconda_base_document.pdf
operation_anaconda_base_document.pdf
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United States Army Sergeants Major Academy
Master Leader Course (MLC)
OPERATION ANACONDA CASE STUDY
13 November 2003
Written By:
Major Edgar Fleri, USAF
Colonel Ernest Howard, USAF
Jeffrey Hukill, Doctrine Analyst
Thomas R. Searle, Military Defense Analyst
Published By:
College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education
Maxwell AFB Alabama
1
Organization Before Anaconda
The rapid evolution of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan resulted in
unusual organizational structures. The CENTCOM commander was designated the overall
supported commander and coalition/joint force commander for Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM on September 12, 2001. Due to various political issues, CENTCOM maintained its
headquarters at MacDill AFB, FL. On September 11, 2001, CENTCOM’s Air Force component
already had a forward deployed headquarters at Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia led by the
Combined Force Air Component Commander (CFACC), and CENTCOM’s Naval component
had its headquarters in Bahrain so as ENDURING FREEDOM developed, these two components
already had the infrastructure to play their roles in accordance with joint doctrine. However, the
Land Component and the SOF component were not already deployed into CENTCOM’s Area of
Responsibility (AOR.) CENTCOM’s Army component deployed into Kuwait from Egypt
(Bright Star) in November but by the time they were up and running, the main conventional
force on the ground in Afghanistan was TF 58 from the USMC and combat had already tapered
off. The SOF component did not suffer from a lack of forces, but the early insertion of SOF
forces and the extremely high visibility of their operations meant that CENTCOM and the
CAOC quickly grew accustomed to bypassing the Joint Force Special Operations Component
Commander (JFSOCC) and talking directly to the JSOTFs. JFSOCC deployed forward into
Qatar in early November (See Chart 2). However, JFSOCC took some time taking over its
doctrinal role because of the shortcuts everyone had gotten used to using, and the use of the
2
JSOTFJSOTF-N (Oct 2001)
KarshiKarshi-Khanabad, UZ
CFMCC
Bahrain
CFLCC
Camp Doha, KU
(19 Nov 2001)
Kazakhstan
CAOC operational at
Prince Sultan AB, KSA
CFACC (FWD) in place
19 Sep 2001
Uzbekistan
Turkmenistan
Iraq
Jordan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Afghanistan
Iran
CFLCC (fwd)
Bagram Airbase, Afg
(20 Feb 2002)
Kuwait
Bahrain
Qatar
Saudi
Arabia
Egypt
Sudan
10th MTN/CFLCC (fwd)
KarshiKarshi-Khanabad, UZ
(Dec 20012001-Feb 2002)
Eritrea
Pakistan
U.A.E.
Oman
JSOTFJSOTF-S
FOB Rhino/
Kandahar,
Kandahar, Afg
(27 Nov 2001)
Yemen
Djibouti
Somalia
Ethiopia
JFSOCC
As Saliyah,
Saliyah, Qatar
(5 Nov 2001)
Kenya
Chart 2: Theater Arrival Dates for Key Service and
Joint Headquarters Involved in Operation ANACONDA
JFSOCC commander for various special missions on behalf of the theater commander. By the
time the Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) and JFSOCC were able to
take control of their operations in Afghanistan, the focus was on SSE missions. These missions
worked best under decentralized planning and decentralized execution and ran quite smoothly
with little planning effort by the CFLCC or JFSOCC staff. This planning style worked
effectively for the SSE missions, but is contrary to doctrinal planning concepts taught in other
services, such as the USAF. Instead of detailed functional component planning, JFSOCC relied
heavily on its JSOTFs, and CFLCC established a CFLCC forward element in Uzbekistan
commanded by the, 10th Mountain Division Commander and consisting of some elements of his
division staff (the bulk of the division staff was in the Balkans supporting operations there). The
initial focus of the CFLCC forward was getting logistical activities in Afghanistan under control.
3
Nevertheless, by January, there was very little for the CFLCC forward to do and there was talk
about rotating them back to the U.S.
The key to success in early combat operations in Afghanistan was the lash-up between
U.S. SOF on the ground with friendly Afghan forces and U.S. air and space power. Initially this
was a challenge. Due to the non-linear, unconventional battlespace the routinely practiced
standard joint fires concept of operations was not followed. Without the presence of designated
maneuver forces, classic forward line of own troops (FLOT) deconfliction measures were rarely
used to define ground commander’s area of influence.1
In Joint doctrine, SOF as a stand-alone force is not as well integrated into the Theater Air
Control System (TACS)/Army Air Ground System (AAGS) as are conventional forces. SOF
units have Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs) but no Air Liaison Officers (ALO) and nothing
comparable to the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC.) The SOF representative at the
CAOC, the Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE), is typically much smaller than the
Army’s Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) that would coordinate conventional ground
and air operations.
The non-linear battlespace issue and doctrinal weakness of the SOF/TACS lashup was
solved fairly quickly. SOF units attached Ground Forward Air Controllers (GFACs) to virtually
every unit operating in Afghanistan. In addition, the 18th Air Support Operations Group (ASOG)
commander established an Air Control Element (ACE) at each SOF Task Force with forces
mainly drawn from personnel normally assigned to work with 10th Mountain Division. Finally,
the SOLE at the CAOC was reinforced until it became a very robust organization with over forty
1
Operation SWIFT FREEDOM, the seizure of forward operating base Rhino by TF 58 was a notable exception due
to the conventional nature of this operation.
4
personnel. This GFAC to ACE to SOLE/CAOC air request structure worked extremely well for
these types of small geographically dispersed operations (See Figure 1.)
JFC
MISSING
JOC
TF
CFACC
CFSOCC
SOLE
LNO
AOC
BCD
CFLCC
COIC
ACC
CFMCC
MARLO
NALE
Command and Control
Execution
CJSOTF-S
CJSOTF-N
ACE
ACE
DIV / CFLCC FWD
A2C2
MEF
DASC
FSE
ODA
ODA
GFAC
GFAC
ASOC
BDE
FSE
TACP
MEB
FAC
BN
FSE
MEU
FAC
TACP
ELEMENT
GFAC
Figure 1: Ad hoc Theater Air Ground System (TAGS) January 1, 2002
The Marines of TF 58 came in with their doctrinal air to ground command and control
structure. 2 When TF Rakkasan replaced TF 58 at Kandahar, they brought the doctrinal air
liaison elements that normally accompany an Army brigade, but these liaison elements are
designed on the assumption that brigades only operate under a Division, which in turn only
operates under a Corps. Without the Air Liaison of a Division and the ASOC of a Corps, the
brigade (TF Rakkasan) had plenty of GFACs but lacked the higher staff personnel and
equipment to prioritize and coordinate all the requests that those GFACs could generate.
When the 1-87 IN and elements of 10th Mtn Div staff deployed into the CENTCOM
AOR, they requested to deploy their air liaison elements. These requests for forces were denied
by CENTCOM in an effort to keep down the number of personnel deployed and likely due to the
5
fact that the force protection and headquarters missions assigned to the units did not seem to
require air liaisons.3 Since 10th Mtn Division did not have its Air Liaison element and no part of
the 101st Abn Div structure was present, CFLCC Forward and TF Rakkasan utilized the ACEs
established with the northern and southern JSOTFs, respectively (See Figure 2.)4 This setup was
JFC
MISSING
JOC
TF
CFACC
CFSOCC
SOLE
LNO
CFLCC
COIC
ACC
AOC
BCD
CFMCC
ASOC
Command and Control
Execution
CJSOTF-S
CJSOTF-N
ACE
ACE
DIV / CFLCC FWD
A2C2
FSE
ODA
GFAC
ASOC
ODA
GFAC
BDE
FSE
TACP
ELEMENT
GFAC TF-58
REPLACED BY 101ST
AT KANDAHAR
BDE
FSE
TACP
BN
FSE
TACP
BN
FSE
TACP
Figure 2: Theater Air Ground System as of February 1, 2002
not a hindrance as long as the type of operations being conducted was support of small
geographically separated SOF teams. However, it would prove to be a challenge in a normal
conventional ground operation in a small geographic area.
2
Forward Air Controllers at Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) level and
a Direct Air Support Center (DASC) at the task force level reporting up to the Marine Liaison (MARLO) at the
CAOC.
3
1-87 IN was assigned force protection of air base at Karshi-Khanabad, Uzbekistan and elements of 10th Mtn Div
staff created CFLCC forward headquarters.
4
18th ASOG Commander who supports both the 10th Mtn Div and the 101st Abn Div was aggressive in getting his
personnel deployed into the AOR despite CENTCOM’s denial during the request for forces process. This effort
resulted in many of the USAF personnel normally associated with 10th Mtn Div being in the AOR even though they
had not been able to deploy with the 1-87 IN or the elements of the division staff.
6
ANACONDA Planning:
In early January 2002, the CFLCC reported that the largest concentration of al Qaeda and
Taliban forces in Afghanistan appeared to be in the area between the towns of Kowst and Gardez
in southeastern Afghanistan (See Map 3.) On further study it appeared that the Shahi Kot Valley,
Balkh
Konduz
Mazar-e
Sharif
Bagram
Kabul
Jalalabad
Tora
Tora Bora
Bora
Herat
Gardez
OBJ
OBJ
REMINGTON
REMINGTON
Khowst
Kandahar
Map 3: Shahi Kot Valley Area of Afghanistan
an area about 9 kilometers long and 5 kilometers wide, was the hub of enemy activity with a
significant number of hard-core enemy fighters hiding in caves and among the civilians in the
villages of Marzak, Babukhel, and Serkhankhel (See Map 4.)
5 km
UPPER SHAHI
KOT VALLEY
9 km
MARZAK
SERKHANKHEL
BABUKHEL
LOWER SHAHI
KOT VALLEY
“THE WHALE”
Map 4: View of Shahi Kot Valley
7
Over time, intelligence estimates of actual enemy strength varied significantly and the
numbers did not seem to be adjudicated during planning. Like the Tora Bora region, the Shahi
Kot area was one where the Afghan guerrillas enjoyed significant success against the Soviets
back in the 1980s, and it was still dotted with improved caves, bunkers and entrenchments.
Based on the above considerations, JSOTF DAGGER was working to develop friendly Afghan
forces.
In keeping with the U.S. intention to keep the footprint in Afghanistan small and allow
the Afghans to do as much of the fighting as possible, TF DAGGER was directed to develop
plans for an operation to clear out the Shahi Kot valley. TF DAGGER developed a plan that
used General Zia Lodin’s Afghan forces as the main offensive punch driving into the valley
supported by preparatory air strikes and significant CAS. This attack would force the enemy
forces to flee the valley and friendly Afghan troops, led by Kamal Khan and Zakin Khan, along
with U.S. conventional infantry forces would hold key blocking positions.
In early February JSOTF DAGGER began holding planning meetings with other task
forces and CFLCC Forward to coordinate the details of the plan. As the plan grew to include the
conventional U.S. Infantry of TF Rakkasan, U.S. and Coalition SOF from TF K-BAR, and
Australian SOF from TF 64, CFLCC decided that it was too big for the TF DAGGER planning
staff and instead put CFLCC Forward and his staff in charge of the operation around 13 Feb.
(See Appendix A for complete planning timeline)
Initially Task Force Mountain was not designated a joint task force which led to joint
planning problems. This lack of detailed joint service development of the CONOPS was evident
by the late involvement of the CFACC/CAOC who were notified 20 Feb by email OPORD. A
further indicator was the departure of one of the Navy’s carriers. This reduction in carrier
8
coverage (which was the first time only one carrier was available to support OEF operations)
lasted for several days of the heaviest fighting until the new carrier and its air wing arrived on
station around the 9th of March. In addition, after Operation ANACONDA had begun, a request
was made for the Marine helicopter carrier the USS BonHomme Richard to change its current
mission and support the ongoing operation. After several days into the battle, the 13th Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) gave Operational Control (OPCON) of 5 AH-1s and 3 CH-53s from
the USS BonHomme Richard to the CFLCC to support Operation ANACONDA.
To better exercise command and control of the operation, CJTF Mountain headquarters
moved down from Uzbekistan to Bagram Airbase outside Kabul. This move was accomplished
between 13-20 February 2002 and disrupted planning. On 20 February 2002 the BCD at the
CAOC received the OPORD for what was now called Operation ANACONDA along with
further elaboration in the form of a lengthy Power Point presentation. Based on what he knew
about the upcoming operation, the 18th ASOG Commander, who was an Air Force liaison on the
CFLCC’s staff, saw that CJTF Mountain would need an air planning and deconfliction element.
He dispatched a small team from the CFLCC staff at Camp Doha in Kuwait and the CAOC in
Saudi Arabia to link up with CJTF Mountain at Bagram. The team, led by a USAF Major who
normally worked with 10th Mtn Div, was working with the CJTF Mountain Fire Support Element
(FSE) by the time the move to Bagram was complete on 20 February 2002 (See Figure 3.)
9
JFC
MISSING
JOC
TF
CFSOCC
LNO
CFACC
AOC
BCD
SOLE
CFLCC
COIC
ACC
CFMCC
Command and Control
CJTF-MTN
ELEMENT
GFAC
FSE
CJSOTF-S
ACE
Execution
A2C2
CJSOTF-N
ACE
ACE
BDE
FSE
TACP
TACP
ODA
GFAC
ODA
STS
ODA
GFAC
BN
FSE
TACP
TACP
ODA
STS
Figure 3: Theater Air Ground System as of February 20, 2002
CJTF Mountain’s plan was based on several key assumptions. The first key assumption
was that the enemy forces in the Shahi Kot valley consisted of only several hundred personnel.
Second, enemy forces could be warned by the local population or even by agents within the
friendly Afghan forces so details of the actual operation were kept close hold from friendly
Afghan forces. Finally, the CJTF Mountain plan was designed for the enemy to flee the area
through the mountain passes in front of the friendly Afghan troops where U.S. and coalition
forces would be waiting to catch them.
These beliefs about enemy strength and likely enemy course of action later proved to be
incorrect. Throughout the Afghan campaign, U.S. forces received numerous reports concerning
“thousands” of enemy troops in a wide variety of locations throughout Afghanistan, but they
turned out to be grossly exaggerated when friendly forces investigated. Flagrant exaggerations
of this nature had made commanders and staffs at all levels highly skeptical of all reports of very
large enemy forces. In addition, no enemy force had tried to stand and fight for several months.
10
CJTF Mountain’s plan for trapping and destroying enemy forces in the Shahi Kot valley,
now designated as Objective Remington, was to infiltrate small special reconnaissance (SR)
teams two days prior to the attack (See Map 5.) Teams from TF K-Bar would take up positions
CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION
K-Khan
UPPER SHAHI
KOT VALLEY
“BETTY”
“AMY”
2-187 IN
Z-Khan
TF
TF K-Bar
K-Bar
“DIANE”
“CINDY”
2-187 IN
2-187 IN
2-187 IN
“EVE”
“HEATHER”
1-87 IN “GINGER” 1-87 IN
1-87 IN
MARZAK
SERKHANKHEL
BDE TAC
BABUKHEL
TF
TF 64
64
LOWER SHAHI
KOT VALLEY
“THE WHALE”
37 ETACS
ZIA
in this AO
ZIA
Map 5: Anaconda Plan that was executed
in the mountains east of the valley and teams from TF 64 would establish positions south of the
valley in order to enhance situational awareness before the attack began. The task forces’
additional responsibility was to direct air strikes against enemy elements that might attempt to
flee before the attack began. On D-Day, General Zia’s forces accompanied by SOF teams from
TF DAGGER would attack enemy forces in the valley from the north and south in a classic
double envelopment maneuver. Meanwhile, TF Rakkasan would air-assault its tactical
headquarters (the Brigade TAC) and U.S. conventional infantry forces into blocking positions in
the mountains on the east side of the valley to prevent any possibility of escape. Further east,
behind the blocking positions established by the U.S. infantry, friendly Afghan forces under
11
Zakim-Khan (Z-Khan) and Kamal Khan (K-Khan) would attempt to catch any “leakers” before
they could escape and evade into Pakistan.
At the time of Operation ANACONDA there was no U.S. artillery or armored vehicles in
Afghanistan. U.S. firepower consisted of the small-arms and mortars the infantry brought with
them, TF Rakkasan’s eight AH-64 Apache helicopters, and CAS/Interdiction by fixed-wing
aircraft. Due to the lack of artillery, both the small ACE at CJTF Mountain and the CFACC
recommended that extensive airstrikes begin hitting the valley well before the attack began.
Based on previous experience, the CJTF Mountain Commander and his staff, however, were
more worried about the enemy escaping, as the enemy had repeatedly done, than about
encountering stiff enemy resistance, which had not been seen for months. To achieve tactical
surprise, CJTF Mountain insisted that the pre-infiltration airstrikes begin as late as possible.
There was also concern that heavy strikes on caves would destroy documents that could
otherwise be exploited to facilitate the capture of other terrorists. To preserve these caves for
later SSE missions and to maintain tactical surprise, CJTF Mountain was reluctant to strike any
more caves than was absolutely necessary. The compromise CJTF Mountain worked out with the
CFACC called for less than 20 targets to be hit beginning about thirty minutes before the
helicopters landed.5
Overall the final organizational structure designated for Operation ANACONDA
addressed most command authority issues (See Figure 4 below.) For ANACONDA, CJTF
Mountain had Tactical Control (TACON) of JSOTFs DAGGER, K BAR, and TF 64 and
5
Briefing by Col. Longario at Maxwell AFB, AL, Jan 2003 and OPORD 02-001, 201930ZFEB02, COMCJTF
AFGHANISTAN.
12
US FORCES OP ANACONDA
CFLCC
AFGHAN FORCES OP ANACONDA
CJTF MOUNTAIN
ISAF
JMC
JSOTF
HQ
(TACON)
3
(TACON)
ZK
KK
2xPLT/A/1-87 IN
B/1-87 IN
C/2-187 IN
JCMOTF
(KABUL)
(K2)
(TACON)
(TACON)
(OPCON)
PPCLI BN
TF 7-101 AV
5 X AH-1
B/159
(-)
A/2-187 IN
C/1-187 IN
A/1-87 IN (-)
530
ooo
C/1-87 IN
B/1-187 IN
C/4-31 IN
4 MEB
(TACON)
202
C-326 ENG
TF
K- BAR
D/311 MI
519
C/501 SIG
626 FSB
92
79
EN
(KHAN)
(TACON)
PLT/B/159 AVN
(TACON)
MI
(TACON)
(KHAN)
(BAG)
BSB
TF
MES
(KHAN)
(TACON)
3/101 MP
TF
BAG
MP
(-)
(TACON)
507
TF 2-187 IN
TF 1-87 IN
CSG
TF 64
101
(OPCON)
TF 1-187 IN
TF
DAGGER
ZIA
2-10
Black
SOF
(KABUL)
COORDINATION
COORDINATION
86
EOD
(TACON)
(K2)
SIG
(TACON)
JOR IN CO
JOR HOSPITAL
(TACON)
(K2)
Figure 4: Anaconda Organizational Structure
FLE / 507TH (DS)
050453ZMAR
OPCON of TF Rakkasan (mainly 1-87 IN, 1-187 IN, 2-187 IN, and 7-101 AVN). However,
several issues still caused unity of command confusion during execution.
First, like most operations, there was a separate command chain for black SOF and interagency operations. CJTF Mountain did not have TACON or any control at all of these
organizations, which reported directly to the CENTCOM Commander and even he did not
command other U.S. government agencies. Black SOF had differing priorities and authority to
request and receive support from a variety of the same assets that also supported CJTF Mountain
operations, such as the AC-130s. These competing command structures utilizing the same
assets in the same operating area led to confusion and frustration during the execution phase of
the operation.
13
Second, based upon the command relationships established prior to ANACONDA and
the command relationships designated in OPORD 02-001, it was clear that TF-DAGGER and
TF-K BAR retained OPCON of their associated aviation assets. However, there was confusion
as to who actually had TACON of the AC-130s. The ANACONDA task organization chart did
n …
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