Expert answer:Reflection Paper
Solved by verified expert:Please read the three articles attached. They examine how colleges and universities are organized, as well as how they are regulated in the United States and Canada. Your reflection paper should demonstrate that you understand each article and have thought about how the articles raise similar or different perspectives on the issue. Reflection paper should be double-spaced and be at a minimum two pages.
birnbaum_how_colleges_work_chapter_1.pdf
lowry__2009_.pdf
vergari__2013_.pdf
Unformatted Attachment Preview
CSF Associates Inc.
Reauthorization of the Federal Higher Education Act and Accountability for Student Learning:
The Dog That Didn’t Bark
Author(s): Robert C. Lowry
Source: Publius, Vol. 39, No. 3, The State of American Federalism 2008-2009 (Summer, 2009), pp.
506-526
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40272221
Accessed: 05-04-2015 17:09 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Oxford University Press and CSF Associates Inc. are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Publius.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 204.235.148.80 on Sun, 05 Apr 2015 17:09:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Reauthorizationof the FederalHigher
EducationAct and Accountabilityfor
Student Learning:The Dog that Didn’t Bark
Robert C. Lowry*
An important feature of President George W. Bush’s education policy was the promotion of
accountability by requiringthe collection and dissemination of data on student learning outcomes.
Inthe case of primary-secondary education, this resulted in the No Child Left Behind act. When the
Department of Education sought to initiate a rulemaking on measuring student achievement in
postsecondary institutions, this was rebuffed by Congress in 2007 and then further precluded in
the 2008 reauthorization of the Higher Education Act. This difference in outcomes reflects
differences in policy issues, institutional relationships between federal, state and private actors,
and interest group communities. As a result, explanations for the expansion of federal authority
under No Child Left Behind do not necessarily transfer to postsecondary education.
For much of the nation’s history, education policy in the United States has been
the domain of state and local governments. The Constitution does not list
providing or promoting education as among the functions of the national
government, and the Tenth Amendment by implication reserves this function to
the states. Over time, however, the national government has assumed a role in
education policy in much the same way as it has in many other areas:by offering
money with strings attached.In the case of postsecondaryeducation, this took the
form of the MorrillActs, various researchgrant programs,the G.I. Bill, and then a
variety of federalfinancialaid and student loan programsthrough the 1965 Higher
EducationAct (HEA). Also in 1965, Congresspassed the Elementaryand Secondary
EducationAct which distributedfunds to local public school districtsbased on the
percentageof low income children attending schools in each district (Wong 2008).
Once these programs are in place, additional strings are sometimes attached over
the objections of state and local governmentsand other institutions that have come
to rely on the money.
*University of Texas at Dallas, robert.lowry@utdallas.edu
Publius:TheJournalof Federalismvolume 39 number 3, pp. 506-526
doi:10.1093/publius/pjp010
AdvanceAccess publication28 April2009
© The Author 2009. Publishedby Oxford UniversityPress on behalf of CSFAssociates: Publius,Inc.
All rights reserved. Forpermissions, please email:journals,permissions@oxfordiournals.orq.
This content downloaded from 204.235.148.80 on Sun, 05 Apr 2015 17:09:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Federal Higher Education Act and Student Learning
507
By the beginning of President George W. Bush’s administration, the federal
government provided roughly seven percent of revenues for public primary and
secondary schools (Rudalevige 2003), as well as a majority of financial aid for
undergraduatesat both degree-granting and nondegree-grantingpostsecondary
institutions (U.S. Department of Education 2004).* The Bush administration
sought to use this as leverageto increasethe accountabilityof schools, colleges and
universitiesfor student learning. In the case of primary and secondary education,
the result was No Child Left Behind, one of the most important federal education
statutes in recent decades. This act established a regime of annual testing to
measure student achievement, coupled with dissemination of the results and
sanctions for low performing schools (Rudalevige 2003). In the case of
postsecondaryeducation, the result was a single, aborted rulemaking,followed by
language in the 2008 reauthorizationof the HEA forbidding the Department of
Education from adopting regulations that would tie accreditation to measures
of student achievement.
This articleaskswhy the outcomes with regardto federallymandatedmeasuresof
student achievementwere so differentfor primaryand secondaryeducation on the
one hand and postsecondaryeducation on the other hand. It arguesthat, despite the
superficialsimilarityof the issues, there are many important differencessuch that
the difference in outcomes may actually be over determined. These differences
include (1) differencesin the justificationfor regulationand the difficultyof devising
acceptable measures of student achievement; (2) differences in the institutional
relationshipsbetween federal, state and local governments, as well as public and
private sector education institutions; and (3) differencesin the organized interests
representingprimary-secondaryor postsecondary education in Washington, DC.
As a result, the explanationsfor the expansion of federalauthorityunder No Child
Left Behind do not necessarilytransferto postsecondaryeducation.
The 2008 reauthorization of the HEA (known as the “Higher Education
OpportunityAct”) is actually several hundred pages long and contains numerous
provisions relating to financial aid programs and the cost of attending
postsecondary institutions. Because my focus is on the contrast between federal
mandatesto measurestudent achievementin primary-secondaryand postsecondary
education, I have relatively little to say about these other provisions. Rather,
my focus is on the dog that didn’t bark.
The next section summarizesthe main innovations of No Child Left Behind and
the explanationsfor this increasein federalinvolvement in education found in the
literature on federalism. Next, I describe the HEA reauthorization and the
proposalsby the Departmentof Educationto initiate a rulemakingthat would lead
to collection and disseminationof data on student learning outcomes at individual
institutions. Followingthat, I analyzethe differencesbetween No Child Left Behind
and the HEA in terms of the three factors mentioned above. The final section
This content downloaded from 204.235.148.80 on Sun, 05 Apr 2015 17:09:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
508
R. C. Lowry
discusses future prospects for the development and use of student achievement
measuresin postsecondaryeducation. While it is likely that some measureswill be
developedand used by many postsecondaryinstitutions,this is more likely to result
from state government mandates or voluntary responses to incentives and market
pressuresthan federal mandates.
No Child Left Behind
Scholarsdiffer about the extent to which No Child Left Behind (NCLB)represented
a new paradigm in federal-state relations on education (McGuinn 2005, 2006;
Wong and Sunderman2007), or simply the next step in a gradual evolution that
began with the original Elementary and Secondary Education Act in 1965
(McDonnell 2005).2 At a minimum, NCLB was the first federal statute to tie
eligibility for federalfunds to mandatorystudent testing at all public schools, with
significant sanctions for low-performing schools. It also required public
dissemination of test results disaggregatedin a variety of ways, so as to allow for
tracking of the progress made by certain subpopulations (McGuinn 2006;
Rudalevige2003).
Education reform had been one of the major themes of President Bush’s 2000
campaign,and the bill that eventuallybecame NCLBwas introduced in the House
as H.R. 1. The original bill also included provisions for vouchers for students in
low-performing schools, but President Bush let it be known even before his
inauguration that he would be willing to abandon vouchers in exchange for
Democratic support for annual testing and increasedlocal flexibilityin the use of
federalfunds (Godwin and Sheard2001; Rudalevige2003). This is essentiallywhat
happened, and the bill passed with bipartisan support and no strong opposition
from the unions. The American Federationof Teachersactually called it “a good
step in the right direction.” (Johnson 2002). The National Education Association
was less enthusiastic,but its president said with respect to the testing provisions,
“the way that the bill came out, I think they’ve crafted a piece of legislation that
certainly is acceptable.” (Hotakainen 2001) NCLB also received strong support
from the business community (Manna 2006). Not all organizedinterestssupported
the bill, however. The National Conferenceof State Legislaturesand the American
Association of School Administrators were openly opposed. The National
Governors Association remained neutral, but individual governors from both
parties expressedconcerns (Manna 2006).
Scholarsthat view NCLB as a significantbreak from past policy differ as to how
that break was achieved.Manna (2006) presents a generaltheory of agenda setting
in a federal system, in which policy entrepreneursat both the federal and state
levels may “borrow strength” from each other on two dimensions: license, or
“the strength of the argumentsavailableto justify governmentaction” (p. 14) and
This content downloaded from 204.235.148.80 on Sun, 05 Apr 2015 17:09:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Federal Higher Education Act and Student Learning
509
capacity, or “the ability to act once policy makers have decided they want to act.”
(pp. 14-15) The justification for policy action is greater if entrepreneurs can point
to a past track record, including past actions in other jurisdictions within the
federal system. Similarly, entrepreneurs at different levels of government can
borrow capacity from another level in the form of financial resources or
bureaucratic structures that make implementation possible. Manna claims that
NCLB resulted from an iterative process in which leaders at both the federal and
state levels borrowed license and capacity from each other.
McGuinn (2005, 2006) argues that understanding the particular policy outcomes
that emerged requires a more top-down view. He notes that a number of the
specific provisions of NCLB were opposed by the states, and argues that the final
bill was actually the result of a shift by Republicans away from their traditional
position on the federal role in education, combined with Democrats’ frustration
with the lack of improvement in public schools. The electoral politics of 1996-2000
created a policy window (Kingdon 1984) that allowed for a “grand bargain of
greater federal investment in education in exchange for increased accountability”
(McGuinn 2005: 55). McGuinn argued further in a 2005 article that bipartisan
support for the accountability provisions of NCLB remains strong and that “there
appears to be strong support in Congress for applying it to Head Start and the
Higher Education Act.” (2005: 64).
HEA Reauthorization and Accountability
The HEA, like the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, was first passed in
1965. Its primary purpose was to increase access to postsecondary education for
economically disadvantaged students through federally funded financial aid (Title
IV). The Act requires periodic reauthorization, which took place roughly every five
years through 1998. The 1998 version of the Act expired in 2003, and debates over
reauthorization stretched out over the next five years. The reauthorization was
finally passed in the House by 380-49 and the Senate by 83-8 on July 31, 2008. It
was signed into law by President Bush on August 14, and is good through
September 30, 2014. Federal student loan programs were separately reauthorized
by the 2007 College Cost Reduction and Access Act (American Council on
Education 2008).
The HEA reauthorization contains many provisions regarding student loans and
other financial aid programs, but its major innovation over previous versions is a
focus on cost control and making information on price increases and the true cost
of attending colleges readily available. Several provisions were controversial,
including a requirement that states maintain funding levels for public universities
3
in order to remain eligible for certain grants (Khadaroo 2008). It also imposes
many new reporting requirements, causing Senator and former Secretary of
This content downloaded from 204.235.148.80 on Sun, 05 Apr 2015 17:09:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
510
R. C. Lowry
Education Lamar Alexander to argue that “[t]he greatest threat to higher education
isn’t underfunding – it’s over-regulation.” (Kane 2008)
My main focus, however, is on the absence of requirements to collect data on
student learning outcomes which would be made publicly available. The push to
measure student learning outcomes in higher education came from the
Commission on the Future of Higher Education appointed in 2005 by Secretary
of Education Margaret Spellings (the Spellings Commission) (U.S. Department of
Education 2006). The Commission’s report noted that perceptions of institutional
quality in higher education tend to be based on subjective reputation and measures
of inputs, rather than outputs. In addition to providing an imperfect measure of
quality, this creates disincentives for higher education administrators to control
costs (Clotfelter 1996). The Commission therefore recommended that
Student achievement, which is inextricably connected to institutional success,
must be measured by institutions on a “value-added” basis that takes into
account students’ academic baseline when assessing their results. This
information should be made available to students, and reported publicly in
aggregate form to provide consumers and policymakers an accessible,
understandable way to measure the relative effectiveness of different colleges
and universities. (U.S. Department of Education 2006: 4).
Following the release of this report, the Department of Education established a
negotiated rulemaking committee4 for the purpose of developing proposed
regulations that would require accreditation agencies to collect data on student
achievement at postsecondary institutions (U.S. Department of Education 2007a).
The negotiations were halted after the Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human
Services of the House Appropriations Committee included a provision in a
spending bill that would prohibit the Department from using any funds to
“promulgate, implement or enforce” new federal regulations related to
accreditation (Lederman 2007), and members of the Senate from both parties
sent a letter asking Secretary Spellings to hold off on any new regulations until after
the reauthorization bill passed (State News Service 2007).
The final legislation does include many new reporting requirements, including a
requirement that colleges with teacher-training programs report scores on teacher
licensing and certification tests scaled to allow easy comparison across tests (Field
2008). Aside from this, however, there are no requirements to collect or report data
on student learning outcomes and even for teacher-training programs there are no
requirements to develop standards for success or penalties for programs that
perform poorly. In addition, the section dealing with accreditation states:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit the Secretary [of
Education] to establish any criteria that specifies, defines, or prescribes the
This content downloaded from 204.235.148.80 on Sun, 05 Apr 2015 17:09:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Federal Higher Education Act and Student Learning
511
standards that accrediting agencies or associations shall use to assess any
institution’s success with respect to student achievement. (Public Law 110315, section 496)
The next section discusses several reasons why this outcome is so dramatically
different from the requirements for primary and secondary schools imposed by
No Child Left Behind.
Comparing HEA Reauthorization to No Child Left Behind
The political context in which reauthorization of the HEA took place was quite
different from No Child Left Behind. In 2001, President Bush had just been elected,
Republicans controlled the House of Representatives, and the Senate was evenly
split.5 By the time the HEA was reauthorized in 2008, Democrats controlled both
chambers of Congress and President Bush was an unpopular lame duck with little
political capital. Moreover, while public opinion data show that confidence in
public primary and secondary schools had been declining for decades before NCLB
(Wong and Sunderman 2007), confidence in colleges and universities remained
strong (Immerwahr 2004) .6 A survey conducted for the Educational Testing Service
(2003: 10) found that 84 per cent of respondents agreed the federal government
should have a significant role in higher education, but only 46 per cent said that
role should include holding colleges and universities accountable for how well they
educate students. For business leaders, the percentages were 71 and 23 per cent,
respectively. It is therefore not surprising that the focus of the reauthorization bill
as introduced and debated in Congress was on cost control and student access.
While these differences in context alone may be sufficient to explain differences
in outcomes, there are also a number of more structural differences between
primary-secondary education and postsecondary education regarding the nature of
the issues, institutional relations, and organized interests, such that outcomes may
have been different even without differences in political context.
Nature of the Public Policy Issue
At first blush, it may appear that the policy issues regarding accountability for
student learning are essentially the same for primary-secondary and postsecondary
education. If so, then Manna’s (2006) theory of agenda setting would suggest that
Secretary Spellings should have been able to “borrow strength” from NCLB to
promote federal requirements to measure student learning in the HEA. A closer
examination of the issues, however, suggests that there are important differences.
In the case of No Child Left Behind, the perceived problem was insufficient quality in the education provided by public schools that operate as
local monopolies and do not charge tuition (Moe 2003; Rudalevige 2003).
This content downloaded from 204.235.148.80 on Sun, 05 Apr 2015 17:09:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
512
R. C. Lowry
President Bush drew particular attention to the plight of students in economically
disadvantaged districts with low quality schools (McGuinn 2006). Standard
economic solutions to this market failure include stimulating competition, for
example by creating a voucher system, or direct regulation of processes or outputs.
Political resistance by the Democrats and the public school teachers’ unions made
the voucher option relatively untenable, and it was jettisoned early on by President
Bush (Manna 2006; Moe 2003). The alternative approach taken by No Child Left
Behind is direct regulation through a system of regular testing, public reporting,
and sanctions. Performance standards and sanctions for failure to meet those
standards are required due to the monopoly …
Purchase answer to see full
attachment
How it works
- Paste your instructions in the instructions box. You can also attach an instructions file
- Select the writer category, deadline, education level and review the instructions
- Make a payment for the order to be assignment to a writer
- Download the paper after the writer uploads it
Will the writer plagiarize my essay?
You will get a plagiarism-free paper and you can get an originality report upon request.
Is this service safe?
All the personal information is confidential and we have 100% safe payment methods. We also guarantee good grades