Expert answer:Reflection of Slumming It
Solved by verified expert:In a 2 -3 page essay, please use the theories of Nozick and Rawls to analyze the documentary Slumming It. In particular, what would be the analytical process for evaluating the possible housing towers that some people in Mumbai proposed for the slums? Show me Nozick and Rawl’s analysis.There should be an introduction and conclusion. The body of the essay should include the defining and describing the principles of both Nozick and Rawls. In addition, you need to apply these principles to Dharavi with specificity. Give me a paragraph per principle. In a special way, demonstrate to me that you understand the theory of Rawls who uses his own vocabulary at times. You will need to include the Maximin Rule, Original Position, and the Veil of Ignorance. If you are still unclear about these theories from the text book, see the additional resource I listed from the book Business Ethics. Submit the assignment below using Turnitin.
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Poverty, Famine, and Rawls
1.
2.
Goals:
Understand the concepts of
egalitarianism
Be able to apply the egalitarian
analysis to globalization
To Do:
1.
2.
3.
Read the required texts
Apply a Rawls and Nozick analysis
to Dharavi in a 2-3 page essay
Complete the course evaluation
Ludwig Deutsch, The Sahleb Vendor,
Cairo (1886)
If the concept of the human rights is of relatively recent origin, just
the opposite could be said about the concept of justice: It is a moral concept
with a rich and long history, stretching back before the time of Plato and
Aristotle and running as a constant thread from ancient thought to the
twenty-first century. No one in the twentieth century stated the
importance of justice more eloquently than JohnRawls in the famous
opening paragraph of his 1971 classic, A Theory of Justice:
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of
thought. A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or
revised if it is untrue; likewise, laws and institutions no matter how efficient
and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust. Each
person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of
society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the
loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It
does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the
larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many. Therefore, in a just society the
liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by
justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social
interests. The only thing that permits us to acquiesce in an erroneous theory
is the lack of a better one; analogously, an injustice is tolerable only when it
is necessary to avoid an even greater injustice. Being first virtues of human
activities, truth and justice are uncompromising. These propositions seem to
express our intuitive conviction of the primacy of justice.
Justice, Rawls is telling us, is fundamental to social institutions and the laws that
govern institutions and people. But what exactly is justice? This is a long-debated
question by philosophers and jurists and political leaders, and our consideration
of justice. Rawls has had a profound impact on contemporary moral and political
philosophy. His most important work, A Theory of Justice, was first
published in 1971, but parts of it had already been in circulation in
preliminary drafts and in journal articles for several years earlier. After
publication, it established the conceptual landscape within which
discussions of justice were to occur, at least in the English-speaking
literature. You could agree with Rawls or you could disagree with him, but
you couldn’t ignore him. He like Nozick taught at Harvard and died the same
year in 2002.
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law.
4
POLITICAL THEORY FOR GLOBAL ETHICS
INTRODUCTION
Many, but not all, global ethicists and proponents of global understandings of ethics and justice are
“cosmopolitans”. Essentially this means that they reject positions in international relations or moral theory
that limit the scope of duty and obligations to a particular community or geographical location and that they
regard all individuals as equal members of the global moral community. There are global ethicists who do not
regard all individuals as equal members of the global community: for instance they might make distinctions
in terms of nationality, culture or gender, or they might regard the global community as less important than
national communities. Thinkers like this may still be global ethicists in terms of being able to “do” global
ethics, if they still consider all global actors in their moral decision-making (even if they do not accord all
persons the same weight in their reasoning). In other words, if thinkers apply the “global in scope” criterion
outlined in Chapter 1 then they can contribute to the global-ethics debate.
In Chapter 3 we considered universalism and the moral theories we can use to address the issues of global
ethics. The moral theories we considered – ultilitarianism, Kantianism and virtue ethics – originate from the
disciplines of ethics and moral philosophy. These provide the background you need to do global ethics; they
are the first tools of your “ethical toolbox”. This chapter adds to that toolbox theories of justice and draws not
only on moral philosophy, but also on political philosophy and theories of international relations.
We discovered in Chapter 3 that which moral theory you use changes the way you see the facts, both in
terms of what facts you can see and with regard to the priority you give them, and this is no less true of which
political approach you adopt. Just as your moral theory has an impact on what you believe to be morally
important and what you deem good or right moral conduct, so the political theory you adopt provides the
framework within which you conceive of what is just and the limits of justice. In other words, the political
framework influences the scope within which you apply your moral theory, and together the moral and
political theories you adopt will determine whether you are a global ethicist or not and what type of global
ethicist you are.
The main question when considering global ethics from this political perspective is: what are the bounds of
justice and morality? For example, do political borders, such as state, regional or national borders, have
bearings on our moral duties? Do we have more duties to those whom we have more in common with, for
instance, fellow nationals? If moral duties are influenced by political structures and boundaries, then are
current systems fit for purpose? In short, what, if any, is the ethical significance of borders? This chapter will
explore the different ways political theorists answer these questions and whether or not such answers are
compatible with global ethics. We shall not only consider cosmopolitanism (the view most closely associated
with global ethics), but also a range of competitor views. It is also important to remember that while the
cosmopolitan voice may be very strong in global ethics (and it is likely that all cosmopolitans would be
happy to call themselves “global ethicists”), you do not have to be a cosmopolitan to claim to be a global
ethicist and certainly not to add to the global-ethics debate. For instance, some global ethicists hold society of
states perspectives and nationalist perspectives, and yet still endorse some global duties. Some of these views
might be considered “mixed” views or “weak cosmopolitanism”, because they subscribe to cosmopolitan
views in some areas (say perhaps, in terms of meeting basic needs or a duty to respond to disasters or
emergency situations) but not in others. The only view that is completely incompatible with any global-ethics
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law.
approach, however weak that view might be, is the realist view. The realist denies any conception of a global
moral community and any global duties of justice and it is hard to imagine how a global ethicist could take
this position without being self-contradictory.
The theories presented here and in Chapter 3 provide the key theoretical tools the ethicist employs to
address the pressing concerns of contemporary global ethics (Box 4.1). This is not to say that once you
understand these moral and political theories you have all you need to “do” global ethics. On the contrary,
you will need to keep adding to your toolbox – you will need more theoretical tools: for instance, those
provided in the next chapter on human rights; more empirical knowledge about the world (e.g. that provided
in Chapter 6 on the actual functioning of the systems of global governance); and most importantly, as you
progress in global ethics, you will add to your toolbox your real experience about how these theories work in
practice and how practical cases of global ethics influence how you interpret your theories. This said, when
you combine the theories of Chapter 3 and those of this chapter you will have the basic tools you need to
begin to do global ethics. These theories are your starting-point. What the rest of the book does, particularly
the later chapters, is to consider in more detail the core topics of global ethics, and in these chapters you will
begin to see how these global-ethics tools are used in practice in relation to poverty, hunger, health and war.
More importantly, as you study such issues and find your own examples of global injustice, you will come to
see, not only how others have used these theories, but how you could use them to put together your own
arguments and actually do global ethics (rather than merely read, write or talk about other writers doing
global ethics).
Box 4.1 The global-ethics toolbox
•
Moral, political and rights theories.
•
Understandings of global governance and global institutions.
•
Practical experience.
This chapter introduces cosmopolitanism and analyses current cosmopolitan approaches. It considers
criticisms of the cosmopolitan position, including realism, nationalism and internationalism, and the
difficulties in applying cosmopolitan approaches to current global institutions. It also considers the nature of
justice and, in particular, how broad the “scope of justice” is. As discussed in Chapter 1, to do global ethics at
all, one must believe that the scope of justice is global, in that all global actors must be considered in moral
decision-making. There are various ways in which this criterion can be met: for instance, strong
cosmopolitans believe that all individuals (irrespective of race, nationality, gender and class) should be taken
into account in exactly the same way; weak cosmopolitans consider all actors, but believe that there are
differences in how individuals should be taken into account. For example, they might think that although
there are some duties of global justice, states are still important.
COSMOPOLITANISM
We shall begin by considering cosmopolitanism, which, as its name suggests, holds that there is a “moral
sphere” that transcends national or cultural boundaries, and hence that moral obligations are global in scope.
We shall look at versions of cosmopolitanism and some views opposed to it, and place these views in the
context of the debate about global justice.
Just as there are many different types of utilitarianism, Kantianism and virtue theory, so there are many
types of cosmopolitanism (many of which we shall come across as we explore the application these theories
in later chapters). The term “cosmopolitan” has been used in general terms both positively and negatively: to
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denote a well-travelled, multiculturally aware, worldly and experienced person – a good thing; and to insult
foreigners and dangerous outsiders (as it was used of Jews and Bolsheviks by the Nazis) – a bad thing. The
term “cosmopolitan” originates with the Stoics and is derived from “cosmos” meaning “world” and “polis”
meaning “state” or “city”. The Stoics, from whom the term “stoical” is derived, were a school of ancient
Athenian philosophers founded in the third century bce, who argued for the universal reason of nature (logos
). In keeping with this view of nature and humans’ part in it, the Stoics claimed that they were citizens of the
world, and identified themselves with, and owed allegiance to, all humanity, not just their local geographical,
religious, ethnic or cultural group. The Stoics’ conviction that they were “citizens of the world” still captures
the essence of contemporary cosmopolitanism. While there are many different versions of cosmopolitanism,
they all consider the moral sphere to be the global sphere in that their community is in some sense the global
community and that there are at least some duties of justice that extend beyond national or state boundaries.
The first defining feature of cosmopolitanism is that the moral sphere is global for at least some
obligations: that there are some duties that go beyond national borders (and for some strong cosmopolitans all
duties of justice are global). The second is the emphasis on the individual: the conviction that it is the
individual that has moral worth, rather than entities such as family, ethnic, cultural, religious or national
groups (or at least that these are only morally significant in that they are made up of individuals who have
individual moral worth). The third feature of cosmopolitanism is equality: all individuals have equal moral
worth. These three elements are standard in different definitions of cosmopolitanism. A commonly cited
definition is that of Pogge, one of the foremost contemporary global ethicists (Box 4.2).
Not surprisingly there are similarities between the universalism we looked at in Chapter 3 and
cosmopolitan theories, because all are concerned with the global scope of morality and affirm the moral
worth of all individuals. Indeed, Kant’s thinking was highly influential for contemporary cosmopolitans, who
are often considered to be putting Kant’s notions of universalizability and rationality into the theory and
practice of the political arena. Consider also Kant’s imperative that we should never treat persons only as
means, but always as “ends in themselves”, which clearly affirms the moral status of each individual.
Likewise, the impartiality of utilitarianism fits well with the second criterion of cosmopolitanism. When we
come to Chapter 7 we shall see how utilitarianism and strong cosmopolitanism combine in the work of
Singer, and his arguments that we all have global duties to act to alleviate poverty.
Box 4.2 Cosmopolitanism according to Thomas Pogge
According to Pogge, cosmopolitanism comprises:
“First, individualism: the ultimate units of concern are human beings, or persons … Second, universality: the status
of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living human being equally – not merely to some sub-set, such as men,
aristocrats, Aryans, whites, or Muslims. Third, generality: this special status has global force. Persons are ultimate
units of concern for everyone – not only for their compatriots, fellow religionists, or such like.”
(Pogge 1994a: 89–90)
Despite these similarities, it is important to note that the moral theories of Chapter 3 and these political
theories are not directly parallel. For example, cosmopolitans do not focus on issues of impartiality and its
requirements in quite the same way that moral theorists (of whatever variety, whether utilitarian, Kantian or
virtue theorists) do. For instance, the debate about partiality and impartiality in moral philosophy focuses on
whether or not you can have special obligations by virtue of the nature of your particular and often personal
relationships. Prominent in these discussions are family relations, for instance duties to your children or
parents, and professional relationships, for instance duties of teachers to their students and doctors to their
patients. When cosmopolitans argue that all individuals should be treated as morally equal they are not
denying such special relationships (as someone defending impartiality in moral theory would). But the focus
of cosmopolitans is political, rather than personal, and therefore personal relationships are not their primary
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concern. Cosmopolitan theorists focus on the content and weight of obligations across state boundaries. Thus,
while parallel in some ways, these debates are not the same. In moral discourse the focus is on duties of
individual agents to other individual agents (as we shall see in detail when we look at Singer’s utilitarian
approach to addressing global poverty), whereas in political discourse obligations are seen primarily in terms
of political structures.
CASE STUDY 4.1 Cosmopolitanism and the sale of body parts
In order to explore how cosmopolitanism and its competitors function we shall now use the example of selling body
parts (see Chapter 2, pp. 19–23).
Moral and political reasoning in relation to the sale of body parts
In order to consider cosmopolitan responses to the sale of body parts, a brief comment on the relation between moral
and political approaches and between the theories of this chapter and Chapter 3 is useful. It is important to
remember that the “cosmopolitan” aspect of the response is only part of the response. How global ethicists will
address the sale of body parts will depend on their moral, as well as political theoretical, convictions. For instance, if
we think back to Chapter 3, whether a cosmopolitan thinker is utilitarian, deontological or a virtue ethicist will
affect his or her final position. Kantians will either accept or oppose the sale of body parts according to whether they
believe that the action is intrinsically right, asking questions such as “Is this treating human beings as ends in
themselves?” or “Is this universalizable?” A utilitarian will consider whether selling body parts leads to more or less
overall happiness. Either of these moral philosophical approaches could be relevant to the global debate and – as
discussed in Chapter 3 – if one takes the universalizablity criterion of Kantianism or the impartiality criterion of
utilitarianism seriously then both should be making global claims. However, these moral theories begin with the
actions of individual moral agents: is it right for individuals to sell their kidneys? While such reasoning should
always take account of all persons, the starting-point is focused on the individual. By contrast, because of the third
and fourth criteria of cosmopolitanism – that it is global in scope and considers political structures and institutions –
the cosmopolitan approach is different, in that it is overtly concerned to address the relationships of groups and
institutions as well as individuals, and in addition it focuses on structural networks and frameworks of governance
as well as individual duties. Therefore, as well as focusing on the rightness and wrongness of individual actions,
cosmopolitanism considers the political and practical aspects of carrying out such actions. For example,
cosmopolitans (and political philosophers in general) will often consider how rights are best attained and how duties
can be fulfilled and needs met as well as what those rights and duties might be. Accordingly, it is no surprise that
cosmopolitans concern themselves primarily with the institutions that are responsible for ensuring moral practice …
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