Expert answer:Process Theology
Solved by verified expert:MLA Format: 2 pages with Works CitedProvide your definition of Process Theology using any of the readings we have used all semester, and provide what you think is the appropriate explanation and an example to backup your claim.1) Own definition of Process Theology.2) Use all articles provided. (Barbour and Howe)3) Thus, what you think is the appropriate explanation and an example to backup your claim.Make sure that in providing your answer that you use the articles I provide and you must provide page numbers from the article if you quote or if you paraphrase.
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Religion Compass 3/6 (2009): 961–970, 10.1111/j.1749-8171.2009.00183.x
Science and Process Theology
J. Thomas Howe*
Regis University and the Iliff School of Theology, Colorado
Abstract
This essay offers an account of the relationship between science and Christian theology from the
perspective of process theology. I show that the idea that science and Christian theology are in
conflict is due to the ‘classical’ understanding of God and to scientific materialism. The classical
understanding of God is supernaturalistic and denies a fully naturalistic account of the world. Scientific materialism rules out, in principle, the possibility of God’s existence. Process theology
offers amendments and corrections to both of these sides and provides a naturalistic theism that
can provide for a relationship of mutuality between science and theology.
What is the relationship between science and Christianity? Are Christianity and science,
as many suggest, in conflict with each other, thereby making it difficult to be a Christian
and one who accepts the worldview presented by the scientific disciplines? In this case, it
might be assumed that science negates or makes dubious the claims of Christianity. For
example, take the account of human origins from the perspective of evolutionary biology
and compare it with the description of the creation of the world and human beings by
God in the first three chapters of Genesis. On the face, they give different accounts. The
claim that human beings appeared on the scene only after an immensely long history of
cosmic, planetary, and biological evolution cannot be true if one accepts that God created
the world with a word in 6 days and that human beings are different in kind from other
creatures. Of course, Christians need not read Genesis literally or as a text in biology
and ⁄ or geology. As such, perhaps there is little conflict between what science describes of
the physical world and what Christians take to be true about the ultimate reality of God
and human nature. Between this either ⁄ or there exists a good number of other possibilities.
To be sure, the nature of the relationship depends on just what we mean by ‘science’
and ‘Christianity.’ In ‘Can a Darwinian Be a Christian,’ Gregory Dawes shows how Darwin’s theory of natural selection (updated by contemporary understandings of DNA and
population genetics) presents substantive philosophical challenges to Christian belief, thus
displaying a real conflict (Dawes 2007). But Dawes qualifies these claims by making clear
that much of this conflict arises from a particular understanding of the Christian God. This
God is thought to be perfect in all respects, omnipotent, and has created the world out
of nothing, or ex nihilo (Dawes 2007, p. 712). He suggests that alternative understandings
of God might avoid this conflict. One of those alternatives comes from process theology,
which is greatly influenced by the philosophical and religious thought of Alfred North
Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne. The purpose of this essay is to offer one account of
this view in regards to how it can lead to an understanding of the relationship between
Christianity and science that is not one of conflict, but one of mutuality. In short, this
mutuality is made possible by a doctrine of God that avoids the trappings of conflict
caused by what we can call the ‘classical’ understanding, the same as the one identified by
ª 2009 The Author
Journal Compilation ª 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
962 J. Thomas Howe
Dawes. But amendments are also made on the side of science, with the main one being a
richer naturalism that does not rule out, in principal, the possibility of God’s existence.
The resources within process thought are rich and, by no means, are the results monolithic. Here, I offer a sketch and develop one particular trajectory of process thought.
For Whitehead, the question of the relationship between science and religion is one of
great importance.1 ‘When we consider what religion is for mankind, and what science is,
it is no exaggeration to say that the future course of history depends upon the decision of
this generation as to the relations between them’ (Whitehead 1953, p. 181). The great
importance of how the relationship is understood stems from Whitehead’s conviction that
science and religion provide the most powerful influences on our lives and values
(Whitehead 1953, pp. 181–2). Our beliefs and worldviews are grounded in our religious
intuitions and our observations of the natural world. Therefore, if something is askew in
our understanding of one, the other, or both it is possible that our worldview is deficient
and unnecessarily impoverished or exaggerated and illusory.
From the late 19th century through the first quarter of the 20th (when Whitehead was
writing) the relationship between science and religion had mostly been understood to be
one of conflict. And for practitioners of both disciplines, the proper reaction seemed to
be that one should be abandoned to embrace the other (see Whitehead 1953, p. 181).
Whitehead cautions that it is not always the case that competing ideas necessarily
require one to be true and the other false. Often times, as Whitehead notices, ideas that
appear to be contradictory might actually be indicative of partial truths that can only be
appreciated from wider perspectives. Some conflicts, therefore, are generated from limited
perspectives and an inability to find or see a wider view. An example of this, says Whitehead, is the apparent conflict between Newton’s theory of light as particles and Huyghens’s claim that light consists ‘of very minute waves of trembling in an all-pervading
ether’ (Whitehead 1953, p. 184). These theories seem to contradict each other, yet both
have panned out to contain at least partial truths. ‘Scientists,’ Whitehead writes, ‘have to
leave it at that, and wait for the future, in the hope of attaining some wider vision which
reconciles both’ (Whitehead 1953, p. 184). The same thing can be said about possible
conflicts between the truth claims of science and religion. One should not be so quick to
conclude that the claims of one trump the other. Thus, it might be the case that ‘the
clash is a sign that there are wider truths and finer perspectives within which a reconciliation of a deeper religion and a more subtle science will be found’ (Whitehead 1953,
p. 185). Whitehead’s thought provides the resources for these ‘wider truths’ and ‘finer
perspectives.’
An initial step toward these wider truths is made by seeing that science and religion
have different modes and areas of inquiry. Science, Whitehead says, is concerned with
observable phenomena and religion is ‘wholly wrapped up in the contemplation of moral
and aesthetic values’ (Whitehead 1953, p. 185). Here Whitehead is pointing toward a
way of understanding the relationship between science and religion that has come to be
known as ‘contrast’ (Haught 1995, pp. 12–7) or ‘independence’ (Barbour 1997, pp. 84–
9). In this case, religion and science divide up the territory, creating a kind of treaty, giving one jurisdiction to science (empirical facts) and another to religion (values and ethics).
Science and religion have clear, defined, and separate concerns (see Haught 1995, p. 12).
For example, following the lines of Whitehead’s suggestion, science entertains questions
having to do with the ‘how’ of things, discerned through empirical and reasonable means.
Religion pursues ‘limit’ questions unapproachable by science. ‘Science answers specific
questions about the workings of nature, whereas religion expresses concern about the ultimate ground of nature’ (Haught 1995, p. 15).
ª 2009 The Author
Journal Compilation ª 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Religion Compass 3/6 (2009): 961–970, 10.1111/j.1749-8171.2009.00183.x
Science and Process Theology
963
This has been a common strategy and many, from both disciplines, have been content
with it. But it is not without its shortcomings, nor is it Whitehead’s final position. Most
importantly, it leaves us with the undesirable conclusion that truth is not one (Griffin
2000, p. 6). In this model, science and religion make truth claims independent of one
another. Each is protected from criticism by the other on the grounds that they are independent ways of understanding reality wherein the rules and standards of the one do not
apply to the other (see Haught 1995, p. 13).
In some cases, this treaty simply embodies the conflict, but in more polite terms. Science is said to deal with facts and religion tells us about values and ethics. Notice that in
this scheme our values bear no essential relationship to the physical reality in which we
live, for such reality is the domain of science. Consider Stephen Jay Gould’s well known
concept of Non-Overlapping Magisteria or NOMA. ‘Science covers the empirical realm:
what is the universe made of (fact) and why does it work this way (theory). The magisterium of religion extends over questions of ultimate meaning and moral value. These two
magisteria do not overlap, nor do they encompass all inquiry’ (Gould 1999, p. 6; emphasis
added). That they do not overlap means that how we derive our values need have nothing to do with the scientific world of fact. Gould agrees with Darwin that ‘nature offers
no moral instruction at all’ (Gould 1999, p. 196). One of the chief principles of NOMA
is that ‘factual truth, however constituted, cannot dictate, or even imply, moral truth.’
(Gould 1999, p. 162). Gould has many good reasons to think these things and he cheers
the freedom of finding our morals and meanings in ourselves (Gould 1999, p. 197).
Surely it is difficult and perverse to think that there is a grand moral purpose to birth
defects, tsunamis, and the distribution of lottery winnings (see Gould 1999, p. 201). As
such, we realize that discerning and creating our personal and societal values is tough
business, full of ambiguities and conflicting choices (Gould 1999, p. 204).
To be sure, religion enjoys a certain peace in this model, but it is given little chance
of real success as a significant force. It is science that tells us about the world; not religion. Religion has territory that has no real significance in terms of having something
to say about the real world in which we live. Is it really possible that our senses of
‘ultimate meaning’ bear no relation to the facts and theories composed out of empirical
evidence? Is it not thoroughly difficult to impart a sense of gravity and obligation to
our values if we think them to be untrue in the sense of having no correspondence to
the way reality really is? If they do not, if they are untrue in this sense, then surely
Freud is right in labeling religious beliefs illusions, meaning that they are connected to
wish fulfillment (Freud 1961, p. 38). In opposition to this, Whitehead writes ‘religion
is the longing of the spirit that the facts of existence should find their justification in
the nature of existence’ (Whitehead 1996, p. 85). It is not enough, Whitehead is saying, that religion rests on its pragmatic offerings and consolations. If it does so, religion
‘admits that its dogmas are merely pleasing ideas for the purpose of stimulating its emotions’ (Whitehead 1996, p. 85). In the end, one longs for some correspondence
between facts and values. ‘Religion is the longing for justification’ (Whitehead 1996, p.
85). It is the longing that the values one lives by and that one’s ultimate concerns are
in some way woven within the fabric of things. For Whitehead, religion includes the
sense that disallows the exclusion of the qualitative aspects of existence, with its prehension of purpose and value, from the facts of life (see Whitehead 1996, p. 80). We
feel and act as if we live in a world of purpose and value. Yet if such qualities do not
inhere in fact than such longings and feelings are useless. Although Whitehead did indicate an endorsement of a separation between religion and science, he really envisions a
greater integration between them.
ª 2009 The Author
Journal Compilation ª 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Religion Compass 3/6 (2009): 961–970, 10.1111/j.1749-8171.2009.00183.x
964 J. Thomas Howe
Whitehead sees the need for a more comprehensive account of reality, namely one that
is able to harmonize our religious, aesthetic, and ethical intuitions with science (see
Whitehead 1953, p. 87, 1978, p. 15). One of the primary means by which this is to
come about is to show how our ethical, religious, and aesthetic intuitions and experiences
can have a cognitive status, by which I mean that they can be experiences of things actually going on in the world of fact. So if we are operating in a scientific environment that
rules out, in principle, aesthetic, religious, and ethical intuitions then it becomes the job
of philosophy to correct this wrongful elimination. One of the reasons we should not be
content with the ‘contrast’ or ‘independence’ model of the relationship between science
and religion is that it allows us to gloss over or ignore those aspects of science and religion that seem to have real relevance to one another. Religious experiences often include
the intuition that we live in a world of purpose. Science often excludes dimensions of
teleology and purpose from its purview. If religious experience is seen as real in the sense
that through it one prehends, possibly, something going on in the world, then science is
wrong to exclude purpose from its account of reality. This discussion moves both ways.
As we will see later, evolutionary biology shows a world of immense suffering and waste
on the part of sentient creatures. While this is no original revelation, it does present, over
and over, a question about the nature of God insofar as one believes that God creates the
world. Throughout his writings, Whitehead often explicitly pointed a way toward a deeper and richer integration of science and religion. He did not, though, fully develop the
details of how it is to come about.2 With the resources of Whitehead’s process thought
and his explicit views on the nature of God, epistemology, and metaphysics other thinkers have developed these ideas. For the most part, I rely on the work of David Ray
Griffin.
By and large, the proposal for integrating science and Christianity from the perspective
of Whiteheadian process thought that I describe here calls, first, for identifying the conceptual commitments on the parts of both science and Christian theology that promote
the appearance of conflict. Second, revisions to these conflict-causing commitments are
made. It is important to show that these revisions do not impoverish either one’s religious
world or science. It is not the case that this is some lame attempt at having one’s cake
and also eating it by means of simply eating half and saving half. Rather, it is the claim of
those who propose this type of integration that the result is a fully adequate science and
fully adequate Christian theology.
From the side of science, conflict with Christian theology is caused by a commitment
to both scientific materialism and an epistemology that purports that our experience of
entities outside of our minds is solely by means of sense experience. As such, the only
experiences that we have of reality outside of our minds are of physical–material things.
Both of these assumptions lead, eventually, to atheism.
Throughout his writings, Whitehead spends significant time criticizing and showing
the shortcomings of ‘scientific’ or ‘mechanistic materialism,’ which comes to shape in the
17th century and continues in its influence through Whitehead’s time and our own. In
Science and the Modern World, he offers a summary of its main assumptions: ‘The ultimate
fact of an irreducible brute matter, or material, spread throughout space in a flux of configurations. In itself such a material is senseless, valueless, purposeless. It just does what it
does do, following a fixed routine imposed by external relations which do not spring
from the nature of its being’ (Whitehead 1953, p. 17). These bits of matter are related
only externally to one another and they have no capacity for spontaneity or novelty.
They are ‘vacuous actualities,’ meaning that they have no ‘subjective immediacy’ (Whitehead 1978, p. 29). There is much to Whitehead’s criticism and the facet that is of most
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Journal Compilation ª 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Religion Compass 3/6 (2009): 961–970, 10.1111/j.1749-8171.2009.00183.x
Science and Process Theology
965
interest here is that scientific materialism leads one to the conclusion that the world in
which we live is bleak, purposeless, and valueless (see Whitehead 1966, p. 132). There is
nothing going on in nature; it is simply a place of brute and valueless bits of matter. Ultimately, this worldview is not only largely opposed to a religious interpretation of reality,
but is one of outright nihilism. In it, we have a great difficulty in connecting our value
experience, our experience of purpose and the like to something going on ‘out there’ in
a reality separate from our subjective experience.
There is a significant irony to all of this given the historical fact that those who first
put forth this materialist view of the natural world (e.g., Galileo, Mersenne, Descartes,
and Boyle) did so with an eye toward bolstering their own Christian worldviews. A
mechanistic natural world wherein bits of matter blindly follow, or are simply compelled,
by the laws of nature, thus exerting no power of their own, lends support to the idea that
the natural world is entirely subservient to the omnipotent power of God. Newton,
Whitehead writes, ‘definitely stated that the correlated modes of behaviour of the bodies
forming the solar system required God for the imposition of the principles on which all
depended’ (Whitehead 1967, p. 113).
David Ray Griffin shows how theistic scientific materialism eventually leads to atheism.
The early modern proponents of this view conjoined their mechanistic natural world to
two dualisms, one cosmological and the other anthropological. Above the natural world,
with its bits of vacuous and valueless matter, was a supernatural deity. And attached to
the material human body was a soul, mind, or spirit (see Griffin 2000, p. 25). With these
additional elements one can avoid the nihilism inherent in scientific materialism by locating value in some non-physical, immaterial realm. Souls and God are immaterial. They
have subjectivity and exercise purpose and aim. But the persuasiveness of this scheme
waned when some began to realize that the dualistic additions of God and soul were
superfluous. Furthermore, it was difficult to see how they could be related to their counterparts – bodies. Enlightenment thinkers seized on the idea that the world was mechanistically determined, but they found the idea attractive because there seemed no reason
why the universe could not run by itself (see Brooke 1991, p. 118; Griffin 2004, p. 18).
Although mechanistic materialism was originally intended to support the idea of a God
that imposes the laws of nature, while occasionally intervening in a supernatural manner,
it soon became clear that that one could either move God back to the beginning of time
and keep God only there (Deism) or do away with the creator altogether (Diderot, NeoDarwinism, etc.).
God’s departure from the scene is soon accompanied by the removal of the ‘mind’ or
‘soul’ and toward a full-blown materialism wherein all phenomenon are accounted for on
the basis of matter alone. It is the notorious and knotty difficulty of relating minds and
bodies and the dubious nature of all proposed solutions that brings about this full-blown
materialism. …
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