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CO-2: Categorize means of communication and influence they have upon advancing terrorist
narratives.
CO-3: Summarize psychological and behavioral factors within al Qaeda leadership and affiliate
groups.
We have been focusing upon how those in terrorist leadership positions communicate their
agenda to those within their organizations, their affiliates, and to the world at large. Focusing
upon Osama bin Laden, how would you compare and contrast his ability to communicate and
exert influence upon these various audiences from the years preceding 9/11 until his death?
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The body of your report is to be three pages and is to contain the following:
o
A brief introduction, conveying what the report is about
o
A main body, containing the “meat” of the report, where you provide the
requested information
o
A conclusion, summarizing the content of the report clearly and concisely
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A minimum of three (3) academically acceptable sources are to be utilized.
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Freely utilize appropriate sources, summarize in your own words and cite accordingly,
but be mindful of excessive direct quotes, as they should not make up more than 10% of
your report.
Originality of attachments will be verified by Turnitin. Both you and your instructor will receive
the results.
WEEK 6: EVOLUTION OF BIN LADEN AND AL QUEDA
We will now focus on the evolution of al Qaeda as well as Osama bin Laden. While the 9/11
attacks could be considered a tremendous success by the organization itself, in the years that
have followed, al Qaeda has endured numerous setbacks that have placed its effectiveness and
overall objectives in doubt. Simultaneously, psychological and behavioral changes in bin Laden,
after the 9/11 attacks, were also evolving.
Materials recovered by the Navy SEALS the night they raided the compound of bin Laden,
which include personal letters that were drafted by bin Laden and sent to organizational leaders
and associates in al Qaeda, will be discussed in this lesson. The Combating Terrorism Center at
West Point authored a report using 17 de-classified documents recovered during the raid on
Abbotabad as a basis that show how bin Ladin perceived current operations of al Qaeda and
where he felt modifications were needed. It offers a glimpse into the mind of bin Laden and the
changes that took place over time within the global organization he built.
Introduction
In the years following 9/11, every time al Qaeda’s name was mentioned it sent chills down the
spine of all who heard it. Who are they? Where did they come from? What do they want?
Al Qaeda is literally translated as “The Base” or “The Foundation” and it’s leader, Osama bin
Laden, was the “face” of this organization. In Lesson 4, we directed our attention towards this
individual, his background, and his ability to marshal resources in a way that produced the
greatest terrorist attack ever to be committed on American soil. However, as with any
organization, there are growing pains and evolutionary changes that naturally occur.
Altering operations in order to adapt to a changing environment can be positive, however, there
are times when changes and modifications do not produce positive results. There are many
underlying reasons as to why this may happen. In this lesson, we will seek to understand how
these evolutionary issues impacted bin Laden’s ability to communicate with his followers, his
influence on the organization, and to what degree the organization was affected.
The al Qaeda Organization
Many view terrorist groups as a group of “thugs” who have banded together on a whim, void of
any sense of coordination or what they hope to accomplish. Although this may be true in certain
cases, the vast majority of terrorist organizations that pose a serious threat to the United States do
not fit such a description.
Similar to our Nation’s own Incident Command System, “marching orders” for the al Qaeda
network comes from the top down. Not unlike any government, military, or business entities, al
Qaeda recognized that strong and effective leadership was essential to its efficient operation.
Yet, there are differences seen between this terrorist organization and more secular ones; in this
case, leadership is also expected to continually disseminate the ideology of the group in a clear
and effective manner.
When it comes to carrying out these efforts, those occupying such positions within al Qaeda are
expected to monitor and audit the actions of others, provide incentive-based compensation, and
engage in punishment strategies when appropriate (Gunaratna and Oreg 2010, 1045).
The U.S. Department of State maintains a list of designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations
(FTO), where it states “FTO designations play a critical role in our fight against terrorism and
are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get
out of the terrorism business” (U.S. Dept. of State 2014, n.p.).
The al Qaeda Organization was placed on this list October 8, 1999.
The al Qaeda Organizational Structure
To many, individuals who carry out acts of terrorism proceed in an arbitrary manner and give
very little forethought to the planning such activities. However, it is important to understand that
like any organization, effective terrorist groups base their actions on a model that incorporates
the efforts of not only the group as a whole but also the individuals who comprise it. Therefore,
if collective goals are to be carried out in an effective and coordinated manner, an organizational
structure must be developed and employed. Such an arrangement offers numerous benefits that
include the methods to make collective decisions, established leaders in positions of recognized
authority, as well as controlled roles for its’ members.
An example of this type of organization is one that possesses a solid structure that provides it
with the ability to carry out determined missions as well as survive the difficulties it faces. Since
its inception, al Qaeda has advanced into a very strict and unambiguous hierarchy, one that is
clearly depicted in its structured organizational chart. Lines of authority are clearly defined and a
broad-based division of labor has been implemented, allowing its many primary and supporting
efforts to be carried out efficiently and successfully.
Before we address the primary topic of this lesson, a quick review of organizational structure and
hierarchy are in order.
The al Qaeda Organizational Structure
From our review of his background earlier, we know that bin Laden possessed a great deal of
business and organizational savvy. He recognized early on that providing an infrastructure to al
Qaeda was essential for any perceived short- or long-term success.
Through the years, the shift from an internal Jihad to one that is external has resulted in a global
network. This network consists of the central al Qaeda organization, logistical networks,
associated local organizations, as well as a number of offshoots and affiliated initiatives. In fact,
al Qaeda’s organizational structure has been compared to the Hydra, the many-headed serpent of
Greek mythology.
It has been stated that those who seek to destroy the Hydra by chopping off a head will be
disappointed, since the body as a whole remains intact and a new head grows back. Likewise, Al
Qaeda’s signature structure of small autonomous cells, whose exposure or destruction has little
effect on the organization as a whole (Zalman, under “Organization”), can be likened to the
Hydra. To coordinate such varied, yet interrelated efforts, broad-based coordination is needed,
and al Qaeda produced an organizational chart that would be the envy of many corporations.
Al Qaeda and its Growing Pains
It is obvious that al Qaeda has developed a structure to carry out its actions, but has it been
effective in doing so? The short answer is yes, based upon the number of people that have been
recruited and radicalized, as well as the destruction and carnage produced by the attacks for
which this organization is responsible. However, a number of strategic failures have been
recognized as well.
Thomas McCabe, in his report, The Strategic Failures of al Qaeda (2010), identified five critical
mistakes that were made by either al Qaeda itself or its affiliates. Taking a closer look at these
issues sheds light on those areas in which this organization fell short of conveying what it hoped
to achieve on a collective basis. Additionally, the disconnect between al Qaeda leadership and its
subordinates highlights the inability to effectively influence and mold the minds of those it
depends on most.
The next section will explore, in depth, the following critical mistakes made by al Queada:
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Misreading the situation
Misreading the weakness of the U.S.
Expanding the war
Alienating the local population
Killing Muslims
Misreading the Situation
It would seem that a fundamental mistake made by al Qaeda was in considering the United States
as its primary enemy and target. Subsequently, decisions were made to conduct offensive
measures against the United States on American soil.
In past decades, a number of jihadi groups initiated revolutions in various Sunni Muslim nations
with the primary intent of replacing existing governments that would rule according to the
extremists’ interpretation of Muslim religious law. Without question, all of these uprisings failed,
yet al Qaeda and the survivors of these efforts refused to recognize or admit that these failures
were due to their own mistakes.
Instead al Qaeda looked for others to blame, primarily, the United States. They asserted that
governments in the Arab world were nothing more than puppets to the United States, and if
America were forced to withdraw its support, they would collapse. However, such a conclusion
had little to do with reality. Instead, it illustrated a profound and deliberate indifference of the
actual reasons for their failures, as well as a general lack of understanding of their own
governments and the situation in the region as a whole. The strategic implication of all of this
was that al Qaeda misinterpreted the overall political circumstances that existed and simply
underestimated the resolve and capability of Middle Eastern governments to remain in power
and ward off efforts by the jihadis.
The Compound
It was obvious that Osama bin Laden wielded a great deal of influence upon the minds and hearts
others. Through leading by example and clearly communicating a message in a way that
motivated them to carry out his charge, he was able to utilize the resources he possessed in an
effective manner. However, as has been relayed, mistakes from an organizational perspective
were made. What would happen if such situations were to impact his or the overall group
leadership’s ability to maintain this same working relationship with subordinates and affiliates?
Would it have a negative impact upon this group’s overall vision and its ability to be fully
realized? Would such changes have a detrimental effect upon bin Laden’s own self-assessment,
as well as the level of confidence others had in him? Finding answers to such questions would be
next to impossible had insight not been gained into the mind of bin Laden through his own
writings. The raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan, which resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden,
produced a wealth of information. Much of it has proven to be invaluable in helping to reassess
the inner workings of this terrorist group, as well as the man who led it for so many years.
Letters from Abbottabad
Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined? is a review of various letters that were written by
bin Laden between September 2006 and April 2011. What they reveal is a stark contrast between
public statements that direct attention to the injustice inflicted upon Muslims at large, whereas
these private letters focus upon the suffering of Muslims at the hands of their jihadi brothers.
“Bin Laden’s frustration with regional jihadi groups and his seeming inability to exercise control
over their actions and public statements is the most compelling story to be told on the basis of the
17 declassified documents captured during the Abbottabad raid in May 2011” (Lahoud et al.
2012, 4). When looking at this statement, one must ask how he lost the tight rein that he had
previously held. Could it be that the size of the organization had simply become too large and
cumbersome to operate in an efficient manner? Did his self-imposed exile have a negative
impact upon both his psychological and physical capacities? Evidence of Bin Laden’s inability to
centralize all activities of regional jihadi groups are found in a number of areas within these
letters.
The document, Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined? is a study of 17 declassified
documents that were captured during the Abbottabad attack that resulted in the death of Osama
bin Laden. These private letters highlight many of the concerns and frustrations bin Laden had
related to the actions of many al Qaeda members and its affiliates.
Puppet Master or Outdated Jihadist?
“On the basis of the 17 declassified documents, Bin Laden was
not, as many thought, the puppet master pulling the strings that
set in motion jihadi groups around the world.”
Efforts to maintain such tight control even extended to the messages that were to be approved
when dealing with the media. To this point, it was obvious that bin Laden was extremely
frustrated that a television program on al-Jazeera ran an episode littered with factual errors about
him. Although bin Laden did not generally come across as egotistical, in this instance, it is clear
that he was concerned about his legacy (Lahoud et al. 2012, 15). Does this indicate an individual
who was unwilling to delegate authority to others in an appropriate manner, or simply someone
so vain that issues of self-esteem negatively affected the overall message that needed to be
projected?
It was not just issues related to the public statements being released that proved troublesome for
bin Laden. In addition, there was the manner in which members of al Qaeda alienated the local
population as well the many arbitrary attacks carried out against fellow Muslims. Again, it was
obvious that he was struggling to exercise even a minimal degree of influence and control over
those who were carrying out these actions. “On the basis of the 17 declassified documents, bin
Laden was not, as many thought, the puppet master pulling the strings that set in motion jihadi
groups around the world. Far from being pleased with the actions of regional jihadi groups
claiming affiliation with or acting in the name of al-Qaeda, bin Laden was burdened by what he
saw as their incompetence” (Lahoud et al. 2012, 52).
Evolution of bin Laden and al Qaeda
More questions are raised as to why this evolution was seen as related to al Qaeda leadership.
Could it be that the organization no longer subscribed to bin Laden’s ideologies? Was it simply a
generational or geographic issue? Were his followers simply desirous of a “changing of the
guard?” It would appear that there was some semblance of truth in all of these questions.
Information gleaned from bin Laden’s letters illustrate the fact that he came across as an
outdated jihadi who was more interested in carefully structured missions and methodically
planned suicide operations, which was in opposition to indiscriminate jihad proposed and
supported by many regional groups. In addition, these groups were eager to declare “Islamic
states” in their regions, an effort that was tempered by bin Laden’s call for patience. However, it
would seem that many of his former supporters grew impatient of him and the direction he
wanted to take them.
One last issue to be considered correlates with the fundamental issue of our course, and that is
the mind of a terrorist. In this case…the mind of bin Laden. Could it be that the necessity of
isolating himself for security reasons inhibited his ability to more closely communicate and
interact with those he was trying to direct? Did this self-imposed exile produce certain
psychological or behavioral factors that negatively impact his ability to lead?
All of these provide ample opportunity for further discussion as well as offering a number of
benefits for other terrorist organizations to profit from. Some, such as the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS), may have very well benefited from such lessons.
Conclusion
In this lesson, some basic information has been provided which relates to prosperous
organizations as well as certain fundamental components that must be in place. A clear mission,
ample resources, and consistent communication all quickly come to mind. These concepts apply
to successful terrorist organizations as well. Yet behind all of these concepts are the people who
carry out the mission as well as those that lead them in that collaborative effort.
Although al Qaeda can tout a number of strengths, it was far from perfect. Leadership’s inability
to maintain control and direct actions in a coordinated manner led to a number of strategic
failures. However, perhaps more important to our study, was bin Laden’s ability to maintain the
same intense level of communication, motivation, and influence over others throughout his
regime.
The mind of a terrorist is a complex area of study, one that continually evolves based upon a
number of factors. As has been demonstrated, such changes can apply equally to a new, targeted
recruit as well as a seasoned member.
Sources
Lahoud, Nelly, Stuart Caudill, Liam Collins, Gabriel Koehler-Derrick, Don Rassler, and
Muhammad al-‘Ubaydi. 2012. Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined? The Combating
Terrorism Center at West Point, Harmony Program.
McCabe, Thomas R. 2010. The Strategic Failures of al Qaeda. U.S. Army War College 40, no. 1:
60-71.
Gunaratna, Rohan, and Aviv Oreg. 2010. “Al Qaeda’s Organizational Structure and its
Evolution.” Studies In Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 12: 1043-1078.
U.S. Department of State. 2014. Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (accessed July 25, 2014).
Zalman, Amy. Al Qaeda-Profile of Al Qaeda. About News.
http://terrorism.about.com/od/groupsleader1/p/AlQaeda.htm
“Flag-of-Jihad-DSC 0078” by Wouter Engler – Own work. Licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0 via
Wikimedia Commons – https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flag-of-Jihad-
DSC_0078.jpg#/media/File:Flag-of-Jihad-DSC_0078.jpg
“Muslim Prayer Beads” by Muhammad Rehan from Pakistan – Muslim prayer beads. Licensed
under CC BY-SA 2.0 via Wikimedia Commons https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Muslim_Prayer_Beads.jpg#/media/File:Muslim_Praye
r_Beads.jpg
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