Expert answer:Moral Justification for Terrorism
Solved by verified expert:Post a critical and thoughtful response of 200 words or
more. These remarks can be of opinion based on experience and prior learning.
Use this exercise to converse with fellow colleagues and discuss issues that
are important to the field.
discussion_read.docx
Unformatted Attachment Preview
Legal Theory, 12 (2006), 19–69. Printed in the United States of America
Published by Cambridge University Press 0361-6843/06 $12.00 + 00
TERRORISM AND SEVERAL MORAL
DISTINCTIONS
Frances M. Kamm∗
HarvardUniversity
In this article, I examine several distinctions that may be relevant to the morality (and
conceptual characterization) of terrorism: (1) the state/nonstate agent distinction,
(2) the combatant/noncombatant distinction, (3) the intention/foresight distinction, (4)
the means/side-effect distinction, (5) the interrelated necessary/nonnecessary means
and produce/sustain distinctions, (6) the mechanical/nonmechanical use distinction, (7)
the military/political distinction, (8) the harm/terror distinction, and (9) the harm-forterror/terror-for-goal distinction. I conclude that some of these factors (though not those
most commonly cited) account for the prima facie wrongness of terrorism and that the
nondistinctive properties of terrorism (which it shares with some nonterrorist acts) are
what make it most seriously wrong. I also provide a conceptual examination of terrorism
as we commonly think of it and its relation to torture. In the course of discussing the
distinctions and also in concluding the article, I consider why terrorism may sometimes
be morally permissible.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this article, I examine several distinctions that may be relevant to the morality
(and conceptual characterization) of terrorism. Some of these distinctions are
commonly thought to be relevant; others are not: (1) the state/nonstate agent
distinction, (2) the combatant/noncombatant distinction, (3) the
intention/foresight distinction, (4) the means/side effect distinction, (5) the
interrelated necessary/nonnecessary means and produce/sustain distinctions, (6)
the mechanical/nonmechanical use distinction, (7) the military/political
distinction, (8) the harm/terror distinction, and (9) the harm-for-terror/terror-forgoal distinction. Before considering these distinctions, I shall begin with a
conceptual examination of terrorism
∗This article began as an invited presentation at a conference on terrorism organized by Prof. Joseph
Raz at Columbia Law School. I have benefited from comments on earlier versions of this article by L.
Alexander, E. Harman, J. Heale, J. McMahan, D. Parfit, L. Temkin, S. Kagan, R. Chang, J. Raz, S.
Scheffler, an anonymous reviewer for Legal Theory, and members of seminars, conferences, and
colloquia at Columbia Law School, the University of California at Berkeley Law School,
20
FRANCES M. KAMM
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the London School of Economics, and the Cambridge
University Moral Sciences Club.
19
as we commonly think of it. I shall conclude by considering why terrorism might
sometimes be permissible.
II. CONCEPTUAL EXAMINATION OF STANDARD TERRORISM
A.
This is not intended to be a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, but only
characteristics of terrorism that we tend to focus on. In standard terrorism (ST),
the victim is a noncombatant (NC). I shall take this to mean not only that he or
she is not a fighting agent but also that he is innocent in the sense of not presenting
a threat to anyone, not even as a nonresponsible human missile. The victim is
typically a random member of the group that the terrorist agent is against and
someone who is not otherwise shortly to die. The bad (broadly construed) that is
done to the NCs in ST is (1) harm to some NCs of a severe sort, such as death or
grave injury; and (2) terror in other NCs (due to [1]) put in fear of death or grave
injury to themselves or to yet others.
This understanding of what goes on in ST implies that a community could not
discover years afterward that some of its members were victims of ST, because if
it did, this would imply that the community had not been terrorized at the time
(assuming constant population). This is in contrast to a form of nonstandard
terrorism (NST)—which is still terrorism—where the victim who is harmed is
himself also terrorized and others can discover this later; it also contrasts with just
random killing of NCs that does not terrorize anyone.
The agent in ST is a nonstate agent and is not engaged in standard war between
nation-states. I shall leave it open that the nonstate agent receives support from a
state but is not merely a subpart of it. This agent intends rather than merely
foresees the harm and terror to his victims, either as a means or as an end in itself. 1
His actions are also thought through rather than impulsive.
Furthermore, all of this harm and terror is supposed to be bad for the NCs, at
least in the sense of being against their prudential interests. This contrasts with a
painful means of doing what is in their self-interest (as when we terrorize someone
to get him to escape a flood). However, this
1. What if agents deliberately, with the intention of terrorizing people, damage only property? For
example, people who dislike modern architecture might bomb certain modern buildings. They could
aim to create the fear in people that if they build modern architecture, their buildings will be destroyed.
These agents would then be engaged in NST. Suppose that people are killed as a mere side effect of
these attacks and that people come to have fear of death rather than of having their new buildings
destroyed, though this would not have been the intention of these terrorists. It seems that the agents
are terrorists in virtue of aiming to terrorize people into not building modern architecture, but the fear
of death they actually create does not account for why they are terrorists.
is consistent with the harm and terror being thought to serve the NCs’ moral
interests if it is taken to be a way of preventing their being too passive with respect
TerrorismandSeveralMoralDistinctions
21
to moral wrongs that their country is committing.2 For example, suppose that
German NCs had been bombed to awaken them to the existence of Nazi
extermination camps. Even if such means were impermissible, the goal of setting
people on the right moral track is in some sense in those people’s interest.
The further aims of the terrorist agent could be various. For example, he might
have political or religious goals and be trying to draw attention to his cause or
aiming to eliminate what he sees as injustice. he might simply be aiming to show
the mighty that they are vulnerable and also thereby create some equality between
himself and his opponent. (It is unfortunate but often true that respect for an
opponent may be greater when he shows that he has the ability and will to harm
you. And respect may lead to negotiations.) He might be punishing the opponent
for wrongs he believes have been done to his side. Or he might be trying to create
political pressure by the populace on its government or directly create pressure on
the opponent government in order to change its policies.
A famous example of such ST—as odd as it sounds—is the God of the Old
Testament sending plagues on the Egyptians.
It is left open by my characterization of ST that it might be justified sometimes,
though it is prima facie wrong in the sense of being prima facie impermissible.
That is, it might always have negative properties that count against its
permissibility but other moral considerations might override or efface these. My
characterization contrasts with what has become a common use of the term
“terrorism” to imply that such an act is always ultimately impermissible. On this
common use, if the act is not wrong in the sense of being ultimately
impermissible, then it cannot be terrorism. I think that we should rather use the
term to designate a type of behavior that is prima facie wrong without implying
any final moral judgment of impermissibility. We might still argue to the
conclusion that terrorism is always impermissible, but this question should remain
open for now.
B.
1.
Let us compare ST with Standard Murder (SM). The murderer in SM is typically
an individual rather than a group. He also intends death, but not necessarily to
terrorize others. Standardly, he has something against the particular person he
would kill, rather than selecting him at random. The killing could be impulsive
rather than thought through. It is typically done for personal (or perhaps, if done
by the Mafia, for business) reasons.
2. Luc Bovens reminded me of this point.
It might be thought that SM is by definition morally wrong. But possibly, even
murder is only prima facie wrong.3 For imagine that I kill a ninetyyear-old person
who will die in 30 seconds anyway but who wishes not to die before then, in order
to save the life of a twenty-year-old person who will then live a normal life span.
This may be murder and yet be justified.
22
FRANCES M. KAMM
Is it possible that in the case of ST and SM the person harmed/terrorized is
always wronged even if we wrong him in the course of doing an act that, all things
considered, is not wrong? (Often a sign of someone being wronged is that he may
permissibly resist what is being done to him even if this interferes with the goals
of the agent that justify his acting.) Consider a variant of the possibly justified
murder case described above: If I do not kill the elderly person, someone else will
torture him in the last 30 seconds of his life. Suppose that he knows the details of
his prospects but refuses to consent to being killed by me 30 seconds earlier. It
seems that in this case, if I kill the man, I would murder someone in his own best
interests. Do I also wrong him? Perhaps not. If not, then someone need not always
be wronged in being murdered. By contrast, ST as described above is never in the
prudential interests of those harmed/terrorized. On these grounds one might think
that it, but not SM, always wrongs its victim, even if the act is ultimately right.
But what if it were in the moral interests of at least those who are only terrorized
to be jolted from passivity in the face of the crimes of their government? Must we
always be wronging these people if we put their moral interests before some of
their strong prudential interests?
C.
1.
Let us consider possible implications of some of the differences to which I have
pointed between ST and SM. Do the differences bear on the issue of whether
stopping terrorists is a “war” rather than merely a “policing of (prima facie)
criminal activity”? I have suggested that ST is not SM. But this does not mean
that ST could not be criminal activity of any sort. If ST is a form of criminal
activity, then might it be better to think of policing it rather than of being at war
with it?
We should examine the war model. If we are at war with those who use
terrorism, then this will be a war against the use of (let us suppose) improper
means per se. This is a deontologist’s dream, in a sense. But is not a war against
improper means just policing the activity of criminals rather than a war? No,
because there is a sense of “war” in which it seems appropriate to speak of a war
against crime. This is when we do not go piecemeal after criminals. Rather, we
go all out and try to extirpate criminal activity. So it may be the metaphorical
sense of “war” that is used by those who speak
3. Jeff McMahan believes that this is so.
of a war on terrorism (or a war on poverty). Terrorists, of course, do not think of
themselves as engaged in a metaphorical war; they have declared real war on
certain countries. But if white-supremacists in the United States have also
declared real war on the United States, this does not mean that fighting them is
any more than policing criminal activity and metaphorical war at most.
Consider another possibility. Perhaps terrorists are war criminals, and this is
why it is appropriate to speak of being at war with them? But that suggests that
TerrorismandSeveralMoralDistinctions
23
there is a real war ongoing about something besides the use of improper means of
fighting, for example, about the forms of government that should exist in the
Middle East. In that real war, there are those who use means that are ruled out by
the rules of just war, and they are the war criminals. But going after war criminals
is itself usually a policing activity rather than a war. We might, however, make it
a metaphorical war by adopting the all-out, extirpating approach discussed above.
Then there would be two sorts of wars going on simultaneously.
Employing the second model of war, in which we are at war over issues besides
improper means, we could say that we are at war with people over a particular
substantive issue (e.g., the nature of political arrangements in the Middle East). It
happens that all of the warriors on the other side use (seemingly) improper means
in pursuing the war. If they are really unjustified in using those means, then they
are war criminals. This model, unlike the first war-against-crime model, does not
allow us to ignore the political/ religious aims of the opponents and the differences
between us and them over a particular substantive issue as well as over the means
used in fighting.
Neither sort of war I have described implies by itself that there is a national
emergency in a country at war (nor does an attack on one’s home ground always
imply a national emergency). It is the presence of an emergency rather than
merely real or metaphorical war that might permit useful infringement of civil
liberties and constitutional protections in order to stop terrorism.
2.
The second model of war—involving substantive disagreement—brings us to a
possible implication of the difference made by the political/religious motivation
of the terrorists. Suppose that we came to see merit in some of their views about
the very important issues that divide us (e.g., political arrangements in the Middle
East) and also recognized that we would never have changed our views in this
crucial way but for their terrorist acts. Then we might think that it is not morally
inappropriate to forgive their use of improper means rather than punish the
terrorists as criminals. This seems to have happened with Menachem Begin of
Israel and Yasser Arafat of Palestine, who were terrorists but became recognized
leaders of their national groups. Forgiving or even excusing such terrorists may
require them to forswear ST means but not necessarily apologize for past
behavior.
By contrast, if Begin had been found to be an ordinary murderer and user of terror
(e.g., he killed his wife to terrorize women in his family), then he would probably
have been put on trial and told to resign his premiership. This raises the possibility
that even planners of the 9/11 disaster could theoretically come to be seen neither
as mere criminals nor even as war criminals. But this could be so only if it turned
out that they had been in the right while we had been seriously deluded (and
resistant to change except by terrorism) about crucial issues that divide us.
24
FRANCES M. KAMM
III. SOME MORALLY RELEVANT CHARACTERISTICS OF ST
What makes ST at least prima facie wrong in the sense of prima facie
impermissible? The obvious answer is that it involves killing, for all killing is
prima facie wrong and requires justification. But those who ask about ST in
particular are really concerned with why it may be prima facie wrong even when
other forms of killing, such as killing in self-defense, have been justified. In
discussing this question, we should keep in mind the possibility that what
distinguishes ST conceptually from other forms of killing is not what is primarily
responsible for its wrongness. What accounts for its prima facie wrongness could
be something it shares with some other killings. We should also keep in mind that
factors may make ST prima facie wrong singly, added together, or in interaction
with each other. Furthermore, even if ST were permissible in order to achieve a
very important end, it is not just the absence of such an end or the nonnecessity
of ST to achieve it that makes terrorism prima facie wrong. Properties of the act
itself or how it brings about consequences help make it prima facie wrong and
nonproportional to many ends.
Suggestions as to what might make ST prima facie wrong include the nature of
the agent and/or victims, the fact that harm and terror are intended, the positions
of the victims (e.g., harm and terror to them are causally useful means), and the
type of bad that occurs to people. Let us investigate some proposals related to
these factors.
A. The State/Nonstate Agent Distinction
One proposal is that ST is prima facie wrong because of the nature of the agent.
The agent is not a legitimate state but a self-appointed group. Terrorism, it is said,
would be at least somewhat improved morally if it were done by a legitimate state,
other things being equal. (This would make it NST, not ST, of course.) This is
one way to emphasize the state-versusnonstate agent distinction.
Some might want to rule out this position by declaring terrorism to be by
definition an act of either a nonstate or a nonlegitimate state agent (such as rogue
states); the same type of act done by a legitimate state would not be terrorism.
This position would not be correct, however. For suppose that someone blew
himself up in a crowded area in order to kill NCs and terrorize others. We could
know that this was a terrorist act without knowing whether it was a nonstate agent
or a state as legitimate as France that directed the occurrence of this event. Hence
I shall assume that it is possible for even a legitimate state to be the agent of
terrorism and consider only whether this could change the act’s moral status.
I do not believe that terrorism would always be morally improved if done by a
legitimate state whenever other things are equal. For other properties of the act
could make it wrong to such a degree that who carried out the act would be a
morally irrelevant consideration. Nevertheless, there could be cases in which
other properties of the act, including a justifying goal, create a context in which it
is morally permissible for a politically legitimate state to act but not for a self-
TerrorismandSeveralMoralDistinctions
25
appointed group to do so. For not just anyone may permissibly carry out acts that
are justified when a politically legitimate state carries them out. But of course,
things other than whether there is a state or nonstate agent are not always equal.
For example, a state may be nonrepresentative of its people even while being
politically legitimate, while a nonstate agent may (arguably) be representative of
people. Possibly a state may be morally illegitimate even if it is politically
legitimate, and even a nonrepresentative nonstate agent could be morally
legitimate. This would be true, for example, of a resistance group fighting a Nazi
state when that state represents a supermajority of the population. These
differences might count in favor of a nonstate rather than state agent as the morally
preferred perpetrator of terrorism.
I think we should conclude that being a nonstate agent is not necessary for the
prima facie wrongness of terrorism nor is it sufficient for the prima facie
wrongness of ST, though sometimes the fact that a legitimate state acts could be
morally relevant.
B. The Combatant/Noncombatant Distinction
A second proposal is that it is the nature of the victim that contributes to the prima
facie wrongness of ST. The victim is an NC who, it is imagined, has not, does not,
and will not threaten to harm to others, unlike combatants. By contrast, it is not
prima facie wrong to intend harm to combatants for the purpose of creating terror
in other combatants in order to get them to surrender; this is an example of
permissible NST. (I also believe that it is permissible to intend harm and terror to
those who are serious threats more generally in order to stop their threats.)
To consider whether NCs are always immune to attack, suppose t …
Purchase answer to see full
attachment
How it works
- Paste your instructions in the instructions box. You can also attach an instructions file
- Select the writer category, deadline, education level and review the instructions
- Make a payment for the order to be assignment to a writer
- Download the paper after the writer uploads it
Will the writer plagiarize my essay?
You will get a plagiarism-free paper and you can get an originality report upon request.
Is this service safe?
All the personal information is confidential and we have 100% safe payment methods. We also guarantee good grades