Expert answer:Libertarianism
Solved by verified expert:If you recall from the first week, we examined moral matrixes in The Righteous Mind. Within chapter 12 was a liberal matrix, a conservative matrix, and a libertarian matrix. The Libertarian matrix was on page 302. You may want to go back and review this text. Often libertarianism receives the reputation of being cold and heartless since the application of libertarianism is often implemented by politicians heavily funded by the fossil fuel industries. Yet, it is not impossible to imagine that freedom and free markets could work, after all, MTN and Unilever seem to be doing amazing work and they are using the free market to do it. Arguably America came to prosperity with little regulations. Also, it is arguable that the middle class was created with the help of regulations. Perhaps there are two lungs needed to properly breath, freedom and restriction in proper harmony. There are some who claim Bill Gates or Sam Walton have done more to relieve the suffering of the poor than an altruist even as good as Mother Theresa. Does intentionality matter or only the results? Remember, Singer touched on this as well in Doing the Most Good You Can Do. In this discussion, please use the moral matrix to consider if there is moral libertarianism or as Matt Zwolinski, PhD has self identified, a Bleeding Heart Libertarian.Post a half to full page answer by the end of Thursday and two responses by the end on Sunday. Make sure your answers are thoughtful. There is a lot of flexibility with this answer so put your effort into right thinking and thoughtful dialog. Maybe even use some normative theories back up your opinion.
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7
GLOBAL POVERTY
INTRODUCTION
In moving from local to global frameworks the unjust distribution of wealth is perhaps the most pressing
issue of global injustice. What ethical reasons and justifications are there for 10 per cent of the world’s
population holding 90 per cent of the world’s wealth and resources? This chapter will address this unjust
distribution of wealth, with a particular focus on the north–south divide (as always, such terms as “north”,
“south”, “Western”, “non-Western”, “developing” and “developed” can be problematic and should be
regarded as mapping general trends rather than as definitive definitions).
The problem of poverty is to some a perennial problem, and some argue that it is one that is irresolvable.
This said, in the context of globalization the issues of global poverty cannot be dismissed so easily. This is
true both politically, where there are international and national programmes for debt relief and aid, and also
individually, as individuals respond to appeals for aid in huge numbers. The Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD 2010) reports the level of Official Development Assistance (a term
that refers to international aid provided by government institutions) as (in US dollars or equivalent):
•
US$28 billion from the US (0.2 per cent of its gross national income [GNI]);
•
US$11.5 billion from the UK (0.52 per cent GNI);
•
US$6.4 billion from the Netherlands (0.8 per cent GNI); and
•
US$2.7 billion from Australia (0.29 per cent GNI).
As for charitable donations from the public: according to a 2010 report by Global Humanitarian Assistance,
in 2008 the US donated on average per citizen $14; the UK $14; Saudi Arabia $29; and, most generously,
Luxembourg $114. As images of poverty – from natural and man-made disasters – are beamed on to
television screens, claims of ignorance can no longer excuse inaction. It is impossible for a member of the
rich world (the developed world) not to know of their relative privilege or of the fact that most of the world’s
population is not so privileged. Yet, despite this knowledge and the number of horrific images of famine that
have been watched in homes in the West, the problems of poverty are no less than they were three or four
decades ago. The report Rethinking Poverty by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2009)
opens with the depressing statistic that in 1981, some 820 million people in the world were undernourished,
and that by 2008 the figure had risen to over 950 million.
One standard and “absolute” financial indicator (a flat rate that is not proportional or relative to other material
or social factors) of extreme poverty is the World Bank’s poverty line of an income of US$1.25 per day per
person. The same report shows an overall decrease in the number of people below this line from 1981 to
2005, from 18,000 million to 13,000 million. There are two points to note about this trend. First, while much
of this progress has been made in the East Asia and Pacific region of the developing world, the figure for
Sub-Saharan Africa has steadily increased from 212 million to 388 million. Second, the report notes that the
global financial crisis after 2005 “will in all likelihood erase progress made over the last decade in reducing
extreme poverty”. In addition, remember the point made in Chapter 6 about the problems with income-only
measures, which are unable to take into account other factors that contribute to actual living standards.
This chapter will consider why, despite the obvious needs of the global poor, it is still the case that the
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problem of poverty is largely unaddressed and that disparities in wealth are greater in 2010 than they were a
quarter of a century ago. In 2006, commenting in the Sunday Times on the World Institute for Development
Economics Research report he helped compile for the UN, economist Professor James Davies said: “Income
inequality has been rising for the past 20 to 25 years and we think that is true for inequality in the distribution
of wealth” (Brown 2006). This chapter will explore the global-ethics response to these injustices of poverty
and of global inequalities in wealth, using the ethical toolbox created in Chapter 3, 4 and 5 to apply a
global-ethics framework that incorporates universalist ethical theories, cosmopolitan frameworks and
principles of distributive justice.
GLOBAL POVERTY
Given our discussions in the earlier chapters, at first glance it is difficult to understand why the problem of
extreme poverty has not yet been adequately addressed. If we think about our ethical toolbox, it seems
unlikely that the existence of poverty could ever be justified. What possible argument could be advanced in
defence of global poverty and such stark inequality? None of the moral theories of Chapter 3 could support
such injustices and suffering; in terms of the political theories of Chapter 4, only a thoroughgoing realism
could accept such global injustice, while nationalist and society-of-states theories would support meeting
basic needs beyond their own borders at least to the point where survival was no longer threatened; and
Chapter 5 would suggest that at least some basic rights should be met. If you consider the rights specified in
the UDHR it would seem that even the most basic rights to survival – simply to stay alive – are routinely
violated (or at least fail to be upheld). Article 25 the UDHR states that “everyone has the right to a standard
of living adequate to the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing
and medical care”. Those in extreme poverty clearly do not have these basic rights and, as discussed in detail
in Chapter 5, those who lack basic rights to survival and subsistence are unable to exercise other human
rights. Moreover, the UDHR not only outlines rights, but also stresses that they should be realized (as Pogge
points out). Thus Article 28 continues that “everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized”. Those in poverty do not have these
rights and it would seem that little is being done to uphold the promises about realizing and securing such
rights.
Of course, you might not adopt a rights-based approach and therefore not see poverty as a violation of
rights: however, it is likely that in one way or another you consider massive global inequality and poverty as
bad things. Likewise, you do not have to accept rights to recognize that in the world today, most people do
not have access to the goods listed in Article 25; they do not have an adequate standard of living. This is
recognizable on any theory of ethics or justice, and although it is theoretically possible to deny any and all
duties to others, this is unusual, inhuman and perhaps even sociopathic. It is reasonable to think that extreme
poverty is morally unacceptable and therefore that there are moral and political questions about how
extensive duties to the poor are and how these can be fulfilled.
It is hard to understate the extent of the problem of poverty and for some it is the very size of the problem
that makes it so difficult to address. Quite simply, it is overwhelming. A great number of people in the world
live in abject poverty, while a smaller number enjoy luxuries. The facts about this situation are startling.
Pogge (2005) observes that in today’s world the problems of severe poverty – starvation and malnutrition,
illness and poor health, low life expectancy, dependency, social exclusion and effective slavery – affect
billions of people. In his words, “the annual death toll from poverty-related causes is around 18 million, or
one-third of all human deaths, which adds up to approximately 270 million deaths since the end of the Cold
War”. “Poverty-related causes” can include not only starvation or malnutrition but also diseases preventable
by basic health care and sanitation. The 1999 World Health Report by WHO gives a detailed breakdown of
these causes and numbers of deaths in different parts of the world. Most striking are the summary estimates
of mortality by “Communicable diseases, maternal and perinatal conditions and nutritional deficiencies”:
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these accounted for 34 per cent of deaths in areas defined by WHO as “low income”, but only 6 per cent in
high-income areas. These figures are in spite of the growth of average income worldwide and advances in
technology.
But the ethical problem is perhaps even more drastic than the facts and figures suggest. For as Pogge notes,
this inequality could be largely addressed. Pogge (2005) states that the 44 per cent of the global population
that falls below the World Bank’s “more generous” poverty line of US$2 per day consumes only 1.3 per cent
of global production, and could rise above this line by consuming just 1 per cent more. In contrast, 955
million people in better-off countries use 81 per cent of global production.
We shall look at three ethical responses to the problems in addressing poverty as set out by Singer, O’Neill
and Pogge. These responses show the ethical imperative to address the issue of poverty from any ethical
standpoint. They also highlight the extent to which the issue is not addressed in practice and the fact that this
is partly owing to the dominance of realism and the reliance on states in the global system, as we discussed in
Chapter 4 and 6. So, for example, the lack of a global ethical outlook may be a result of realist assumptions
about the absence of a genuinely global moral order of nations, or nationalist assumptions about the priority
of our own political community and its needs over those that are beyond its borders. (Nationalist systems,
however, do recognize duties of aid in emergencies and basic rights, so those who adopt this approach might
accept global disparities, but are still likely to find extreme poverty unacceptable.)
Singer’s utilitarian approach
We shall look first at Peter Singer, a contemporary utilitarian working in this field, and his argument that
there is a duty to provide famine relief, and then at O’Neill’s Kantian approach about duties to feed the poor.
Both of these thinkers, using supposedly conflicting moral theories, conclude that there is a strong moral duty
to give to the poor, and that this is a mandatory “duty of justice” and not an optional “duty of charity”. While
not all ethicists would agree with Singer and O’Neill, if you take seriously the principles of impartiality and
universalism that we discussed in Chapter 3 then it is hard to deny these conclusions. It might be possible to
limit the duty in some way; however, good reasons would have to be given for not taking the implications of
these principles to their logical conclusions. Thus, although perhaps uncomfortable for the privileged if you
adopt either a utilitarian or Kantian approach, these conclusions are difficult to refute on moral grounds. It is
very difficult to come up with moral arguments in defence of global poverty or, conversely, for the holding
of vast wealth.
At the time of famine in East Bengal, Singer wrote a now famous article, “Famine, Affluence, and
Morality” (1972), in which he criticized the response of both affluent individuals and affluent countries.
Although his argument takes as its starting-point the emergency of this particular famine, it applies equally to
all circumstances of poverty. Indeed, he states clearly that the argument is equally applicable to poverty
whether or not it is brought about by an emergency situation (such as a famine). Singer argues that the
traditional assumptions of moral thinking – which regard meeting the needs of those in distant countries as
issues of charity rather than obligations of justice – are wrong.
He begins with what he considers to be two relatively uncontroversial premises:
(i) “Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter and medical care are bad.”
(ii) “If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of
comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.”
To illustrate the logic of this second principle Singer uses the following example: “If I am walking past a
shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting
my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad
thing.” Taken together, Singer suggests, these relatively uncontroversial premises lead to a startling
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conclusion: just as there is a duty to rescue the child from the pond there is a duty to relieve famine, poverty
and inequality. If this is true then two generally held moral assumptions, which we shall now examine, have
been overturned.
To illustrate the logic of this second principle Singer uses the following example: “If I am walking past a
shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out. Th is will mean getting
my clothes muddy, but this is insignifi cant, while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad
thing.” Taken together, Singer suggests, these relatively uncontroversial premises lead to a startling
conclusion: just as there is a duty to rescue the child from the pond there is a duty to relieve famine, poverty
and inequality. If this is true then two generally held moral assumptions, which we shall now examine, have
been overturned.
The first assumption Singer denies is that geographical closeness is morally significant. That is, he denies
that there is any moral difference if the child is a neighbour’s drowning child or an Indian child dying of
starvation. In arguing against this assumption, Singer claims that while being near to someone in need of help
might make it more likely that we can and will assist, this does not show that we ought to prioritize the needs
of someone nearer over someone further away. At one time in history, argues Singer, it may have been that
people were in a position to help the needy in their own village or town, whereas trying to help those further
afield would have been futile or impossible. In this case, locality might have been a justification for helping
some and not others owing to the limits of travel and communication. However, this is simply not the case
today. The reality of, for example, famine and its effects are visible across the world through news and other
media, and the ability to assist is evident: physically in the work of international aid agencies and financially
in the form of giving to famine-relief charities. Given these facts (and Singer wrote several decades ago,
since which time mobility and global communication has increased), there is, according to Singer, no
justification for discriminating on geographical grounds. There is no moral difference between the near and
the far away.
This argument makes a direct appeal to the universal moral principles of utilitarianism: those of impartially
and equality. This is in keeping with Mill’s summary of Bentham’s principle “everybody to count for one,
nobody for more than one”. Singer regards this first argument as morally uncontroversial (although
non-universalists, such as the cultural relativists we discussed in Chapter 3, would disagree).
The second assumption that Singer strongly resists is that a person’s duty to help another person is
lessened if there are millions of other people who also could help. So, in the case of global famine, the fact
that many other people are in a position to help starving people on the other side of the world – for example
in the country itself or in bordering countries – would not lessen your moral duty to help. In this case he
claims that the only significant difference is a psychological one: people are likely to feel less guilty if many
others in a similar situation have also failed to save the child. But there is, for Singer (1972), no difference in
moral responsibility. He also argues that the duty to attempt to save the drowning child from the pond is clear
even if there are other people in a position to save that child. Thus he suggests that the obligation to help the
world’s poor is equally shared, and not lessened for any one person by virtue of its being shared. He argues
that “most of the major evils – poverty, overpopulation, pollution – are problems in which everyone is almost
equally involved”.
So Singer’s two conclusions are that:
•
Proximity or distance are morally insignificant.
•
The number of people who could perform the saving action is morally insignificant.
Singer derives from this his final conclusion that there is a moral duty to give to famine relief at least to the
point at which nothing morally significant has been sacrificed, or, in other words, to the point where giving
more would cause suffering to oneself or one’s dependants. To give to this level is not being “good”,
“charitable” or “generous”, but simply doing your moral duty.
Singer’s argument appears radical. It upsets traditional moral assumptions: that to give in this way is not
worthy of praise, but is just your required moral duty. Conversely, not to give is to be failing morally and
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worthy of censure and condemnation. He argues that not to give to famine relief while you spend money on
anything beyond necessity is morally unjustifiable. Singer claims that, for example, when we buy clothes in
order to “look good” and update our unfashionable wardrobe rather than give to the poor, we are doing
something wrong. To carry on wearing unfashionable – although still warm and serviceable – clothing and
give the money saved to famine relief would not be any great sacrifice. For Singer, making such insignificant
sacrifices in order to prevent another person from starving is, simply, what we ought morally to do.
Box 7.1 Utilitarian elements of Singer’s argument
•
It is universal.
•
It follows principles of impartiality and equity.
•
Morality is determined in terms of maximizing social utility.
•
Mora …
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