Expert answer:Environmental Justice
Solved by verified expert:InstructionsYour task is to write a four (4) page term paper about the issue of environmental justice and the adverse effects of unregulated industrial activities in the United States on the well-being of ethnic minority groups and/or low-income communities. You will use the guiding questions provided to organize your paper. You should consult with the resources posted on Sakai in addition to your own research to aid your analysis of the assigned topic. Specific Task(s): You will need to read, research, evaluate and compose a brief four-page essay about environmental justice. Format: Papers must be word-processed using a 11-point font (Times New Roman or Calibri), with 1.5 spacing. Guiding Questions: Your paper should answer the following guiding questions.What is meant by the term environmental justice? And why is this considered a 21st Century issue?How have different researchers been able to capture and explain why certain socio-economic groups and communities tend to be more at risk from being adversely affected by environmental pollution?Do you think modern-day political leaders are doing enough to address these problems? Here are a few tips:Organize your essay by using the aforementioned questions. Be sure your work answers all the questions, but in essay format.Proofread your essay. If possible, have another person proofread it as well.Correct all grammar, punctuation and spelling errors before submitting your paper.Complete a Works Cited page where you cite sources and / or websites. (This is not counted in the four pages)During your review of the environmental justice literature, you want to select between three and five peer-reviewed articles that highlight a case example of environmental injustice in the US. Read each article thoroughly and make notes summarizing the main problems from each and the steps taken or recommended to address these injustices. This will assist you greatly in your write-up. You should consult the readings posted on Sakai in the Week 5 folder, but you are not limited to just these. Please feel free to do your own independent search of journal articles and online sources, if you like. You are also not restricted to US case studies.
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Policy Sci (2016) 49:505–523
DOI 10.1007/s11077-016-9249-x
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Two effective causal paths that explain the adoption
of US state environmental justice policy
Yushim Kim1 • Stefan Verweij2
Published online: 22 March 2016
Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016
Abstract Over two decades have passed since the federal policy on environmental justice
(EO 12898) was issued. However, empirical evidence indicates that injustice persists and
that US states vary in their adoption of the terms of the environmental justice (EJ) policy.
Moreover, studies of the explanations for the variation in states’ adoption of EJ policy are
rare and have yielded puzzling findings—e.g., environmental interest groups are not
associated with states’ EJ policy adoption, or the severity of problems is associated
inversely with their adoption. We examined the progress and variation in states’ EJ policy
adoption as of 2005 using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis. Our analysis showed
first that a strong environmental interest group presence, combined with high racial
diversity and low problem severity, is sufficient for a high level of EJ policy adoption,
especially in Western states. Second, when environmental interest group presence is weak,
if it is combined, again, with high racial diversity and the presence of a more liberal state
government, a high level of EJ policy adoption also occurs. This is observed in the East
coast, Midwestern, and Southern regions of the USA. Environmental politics and policy
research can benefit from a configurational approach, especially when there is no guiding
theory on the conjunctional effects of key factors.
Keywords Environmental justice policy Policy adoption Configurational comparative
method fsQCA
& Yushim Kim
ykim@asu.edu
Stefan Verweij
stefan.verweij@uni-bamberg.de
1
School of Public Affairs, Arizona State University, 411 N. Central Ave. Ste. 400, Phoenix, AZ,
USA
2
Department of Political Science, University of Bamberg, Bamberg, Germany
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Policy Sci (2016) 49:505–523
Introduction
Approximately two decades have passed since former President Bill Clinton signed an
Executive Order (EO 12898) requiring all federal agencies to work to achieve environmental
justice (Clinton 1994). Nonetheless, empirical evidence indicates that environmental injustice persists (see, e.g., Pastor et al. 2013 for a recent example). Therefore, to mark the 20th
anniversary of EO 12898, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) developed a strategy
to help integrate the EJ policy into the EPA’s daily activities in order to lay a strong foundation for future action (i.e., Plan EJ 2014). One of Plan EJ 2014’s goals is to establish
partnerships with local, state, tribal, and federal organizations to achieve healthy and sustainable communities (Jackson 2011). To achieve this goal, the EPA must partner with other
organizations, especially states, as state agencies set the majority of environmental standards
(Ringquist 2004). However, states vary in their levels of adoption of EJ policy, programs, and
activities (Bonorris 2007, 2010; Ringquist and Clark 2002), which may have contributed to
the slow progress in addressing the problem. Therefore, it is still important to understand what
explains state variation in the adoption of EJ policy. The research question in this paper is as
follows: What are the necessary and/or sufficient (combinations of) conditions that explain
the variation in EJ policy adoption among states?
While building on their theoretical framework, this study is different from Ringquist and
Clark’s (2002). First, this paper focuses on state levels of adoption of the EJ policy a decade
after the EO. This is a substantial timeframe for states to have adopted the policy, which
allows us to update our knowledge. Second, previous research was designed to single out the
conditions that explain states’ adoption of EJ policy. In contrast, this paper takes a more
holistic view, assuming that states’ institutional, policy, and contextual factors (e.g., liberal
state government and high racial diversity) combine in configurations to explain EJ policy
adoption. A comparative analysis of these configurations can lead to the identification of
multiple ‘‘causal paths’’ for a state’s adoption of EJ policy. This approach also allows for a
more contextualized explanation of variations in EJ policy across states.
The results of this research suggested that the full extent of the relationship between key
explanatory factors and states’ EJ policy outcomes is not likely to be understood without considering the conjunctional effect of these factors, and the causal heterogeneity that may operate in
different contexts. Our results help in the formulation of configurational propositions to explain
states’ EJ policy adoption: The combination of strong Democratic control of state government,
high racial diversity, and a weak presence of environmental interest groups is sufficient for a high
level of EJ policy adoption or, the combination of strong environmental interest group presence,
high racial diversity, and low problem severity is sufficient for a high level of EJ policy adoption.
Both causal paths can produce the same outcome, but they depend upon the states’ contexts: The
first path occurs in the East coast, Midwestern, and Southern regions of the USA, and the second
occurs primarily in the Western states. Below, we first review what is known regarding states’
environmental policy adoption and EJ policy adoption in particular.
State environmental justice policy adoption
The environmental justice movement calls for ‘‘equal protection of all people from
environmental harms regardless of race, ethnicity, origin and socioeconomic status’’ (Liu
2000, p. 1). The problem of environmental injustice in the USA has been most salient
among racial and ethnic minorities, a fact that received wide attention after the United
Church of Christ (UCC) report (Chavis and Lee 1987). Since then, empirical evidence has
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507
accumulated regarding the disproportionate collocation of environmental hazards by racial
and ethnic minorities, even when income and many other factors are controlled (Ringquist
2005). Unfortunately, the problem still persists (see Balazs et al. 2012; Pastor et al. 2013).
This is troubling at best, and even more so because problems of environmental injustice
have received substantial attention from policymakers, environmental advocates, and
academics over the past decades (Liu 2000).
One reason for the persistence of the problem may be related to how governments have
approached it. As guided by EO 12898, common governmental actions have included forming
EJ task forces and advisory groups, as well as conducting research on the presence of, rather than
on the elimination of, disparities in EJ (Callahan et al. 2012). These actions thus tend to focus on
ways to prevent government policies and programs from aggravating disparities in environmental risk. This is important, but may not be enough to solve the environmental injustice
problem. Instead, progress may require policies that seek to improve societal distributive justice
proactively. Yet, the effectiveness of existing EJ policies and programs is largely unknown, and
most EJ studies continue to report only societal environmental inequalities (Callahan et al. 2012).
Another point to consider is whether states have adopted EJ policies proactively. States are
one of the most important players in dealing with EJ problems, but their adoption of EJ policy
varies. As of 2005, ten states have been identified as having no or only minimal EJ activities,
and seven states have some activities, but no formal statutes, regulations, or policies (see
Table 1; Bonorris 2007, 2010). Even among states that have some EJ policies, their adoption
Table 1 Defining states’ EJ policy adoption levels a decade after the federal policy was issued
Levels
Description
States (number of states)
8
Established EJ-specific laws, statues, or EO
Arkansasa, Californiab, Hawaiib, Louisianaa,
Marylandc, New Jerseyc, New Mexicob, New
Yorka (8)
7
State environment department issued policies to
create EJ- specific councils, boards, strategic
plans, etc.
Connecticutb, Delaware, Indiana,
Massachusettsb, Minnesotab, Missourib, New
Hampshireb, North Carolinab, Pennsylvaniab,
West Virginiab (10)
6
Integrated EJ as part of normal and all business
processes
Arizonab, Coloradob, Ohiob (3)
5
Have other related laws, statues, and policies
that further EJ principles
Alabama, Floridab, Georgiab, Illinoisc,
Kentucky, Mississippib, Montana, Rhode
Island, Texasb, Virginiab, Washingtonb,
Wyoming (12)
4
Hired staff or coordinator; formed committees;
provided staff training
Idaho, Mainec, South Carolinab, Tennesseeb (4)
3
Developed manuals or tools to aid EJ-related
decisions
Alaska, Michigan, Wisconsinb (3)
2
Discontinued previous EJ efforts
Oregonb (1)
1
Be aware of the importance of EJ
Vermont (1)
0
No action; no information
Iowa, Kansas, Nebraskac, Nevadac, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah (8)
Superscripts next to states show the previous results in Ringquist and Clark (2002, p. 370); states without
superscripts were identified as no EJ action in their article
a
High level of EJ action (3 states)
b
Some EJ action (24 states)
c
Missing (6 states)
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Policy Sci (2016) 49:505–523
levels differ considerably. Thus, as said, working with state agencies is critical for the EPA to
make progress, but that progress seems to be tardy; therefore, this study used a configurational
perspective to explore the variation among states in the adoption of EJ policies following the
EO.
A theory of state policy activities
What explains states’ policy activities is one of the key questions that political and policy
scholars have studied from the outset. By studying the commonalities in and differences
between political systems and their policy outcomes, comparative policy studies have been
designed to improve our understanding of how policies are created and change (Blomquist
1999). A general theory of state policy activity consists of three sets of factors that
contribute to policy change at the state level—external political factors, internal political
factors, and policy-specific factors (see Blomquist 1999; Ringquist and Clark 2002).
Within this framework, Ringquist and Clark (2002) formulated a specific set of theoretical
expectations to explain states’ EJ policy adoption. From their point of view, external
political factors have little ability to explain states’ EJ policy adoption in the USA, because
there were no changes in the general policy mood or public opinion during the late 1990s.
Further, none of the EJ legislation proposals introduced in Congress passed during that
period. Therefore, Ringquist and Clark (2002) framed the state adoption of EJ policy
primarily as a function of internal political factors (i.e., state political institutions, interest
groups and advocacy coalitions, and state political and economic characteristics), as well
as policy-specific factors (i.e., problem severity).
Using this framework and similar ones, however, only a few empirical studies have
explored the conditions that explain the variation in states’ EJ-specific policy adoption
(e.g., Ringquist and Clark 1999, 2002; Sapat 2004). In particular, Ringquist and Clark
(2002) is a rare, but highly relevant study, in that it tests the theoretical expectation of
states’ policy activities in the context of EJ policy. The present study built on their
theoretical framework and key empirical findings from the late 1990s and was designed to
explore the configurations of factors that explain the adoption of EJ policy at the state
level. This exploration, which is based on previous research, contributes to the development of configurational theories of state policy adoption. For reasons discussed further
below, we included four internal political factors (i.e., state’s ideological tendency, interest
group pressure, innovativeness in environmental policy, and racial diversity) and a policyspecific factor (i.e., pollution emission) to construct the configuration of critical conditions
in states.
Frameworks similar to Ringquist and Clark’s have also been applied to explain the
variation in adoption of other environmental policies as well, such as green electricity
policies (Fowler and Breen 2013; Vachon and Menz 2006) and natural resource damage
programs (Ando and Polasub 2009). However, as with the case of EJ policy adoption,
findings from these studies are also inconsistent and sometimes unexpected. This underscores further the importance of taking a more holistic, configurational perspective to the
problem of explaining states’ policy adoption.
Five explanatory factors for states’ EJ policy adoption
In Ringquist and Clark (2002), regardless of how states’ EJ action is measured—that is,
with the binary outcome of ‘‘no action versus taking action,’’ or with the ordered outcome
of ‘‘no action, some action for EJ legislation, versus passing EJ legislation’’—only two
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509
variables have been identified consistently and significantly in two separate models. Their
study predicted that, because EJ policy will benefit members of minority groups, state
racial diversity (i.e., political and social characteristics) is likely to be influential in the
policy area. In fact, higher racial diversity in states was related significantly to a higher
probability that states would adopt any EJ policy (or take any action). Second, they
hypothesized that states’ innovativeness in environmental policy in the past could explain
EJ policy adoption. This variable showed ‘‘the degree to which states have responded to
environmental threats by enacting policy’’1 (p. 373). As expected, it was also related
positively and significantly to EJ policy activity in the late 1990s.
In addition, their study found that Democratic control of state government was related
significantly to EJ policy adoption in at least one of the study’s models. That is, state
governments that are more liberal are more likely to adopt EJ policy than are their conservative counterparts. The role of governmental ideology on policy action has been well
supported by other studies. Republican and Democratic governors react significantly differently in response to legislative action (Alt and Lowry 2000). Democratic partisanship is
correlated positively with environmental policy adoption (Lester 1980) and ‘‘States with
Democratic governors and state legislatures are more likely to favor strong environmental
protection efforts’’ (Konisky and Woods 2012, p. 558).
However, the findings with respect to two other variables—interest group pressure and
problem severity—are surprising. First, both Ringquist and Clark (2002) and Sapat (2004)
found that environmental interest group measures were not related to EJ policy adoption.
Ando and Polasub (2009) also found that interest group pressure had no significant effect
on states’ adoption of natural resource damage programs. On the other hand, Vachon and
Menz (2006) found that the degree of participation by environmental lobbyists was linked
positively to the adoption of green electricity policies. While it is well known that interest
groups are important actors in contemporary public policy processes, these empirical
findings are confusing. In addition, this may indicate that the effect of environmental
interest group strength depends on how it combines with other conditions.
Second, significant environmental problems put pressure on state policymakers to
generate policy responses (Potoski and Woods 2002; Sapat 2004). For example, Sapat
(2004) found that states adopt environmental policy innovation in response to the severity
of a problem, such as ground water contamination. In a different but relevant context,
Ando and Polasub (2009) showed that states with many environmental accidents adopt
natural resource damage programs more rapidly. In contrast, Ringquist and Clark (2002)
found that problem severity was related significantly and inversely to the probability that
states will take policy action: the more severe the EJ problem, the less probable it was that
states would adopt an EJ policy to respond to it. Similarly, Konisky and Woods (2012)
found that problem severity was not a consistent correlate of state environmental policy.
The source of these contradictory findings is unclear. Ringquist and Clark (2002)
speculated that the theoretical expectation of the effect of EJ problem severity depends on
how EJ policy is viewed by policymakers—as a regulatory or redistributive policy. Considering findings from social justice issues, they claimed that problem severity typically
1
Ringquist and Clark (2002) considered state’s innovativeness in environmental policy as one of the
internal political factors that captures state political and economic characteristics. They tested this theoretical idea using the Green Index, which is the aggregated index of cross-sectional programmatic indicators
in the latter half of the 1980s. The Green Index ranks states in terms of their ‘‘green conditions’’ and ‘‘green
policies’’ and has been used widely in environmental politics and policy studies (Konisky and Woods 2012).
Considering Konisky and Woods (2012), we used the ‘‘index of environmental policy portion’’ of the Green
Index to represent state’s innovativeness in environmental policy in the past.
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Policy Sci (2016) 49:505–523
bears little relationship to policy adoption or characteristics and argued that this result
indicates that state policymakers view EJ policy largely as a redistributive policy. However, we cannot infer properly from their article whether this is indeed the case. Second,
this surprising and inconsistent finding could be related to the way in which the scale of the
EJ problem was measured. Although it is not uncommon in EJ research (e.g., Sobotta et al.
2007), Ringquist and Clark (2002) relied on the modeled probability for each state that ‘‘a
community will receive a hazardous waste facility as a function of economic forces, racial
composition, political power and local geological suitability’’ (p. 374). It is also not
possible to determine from the article how the modeled level reflected actual measures of
severity of EJ problems in states. Third, the major EJ regulation (EO 12898) was issued in
1994, and the survey was conducted around 1995–1996. While theoretically possible, it is
empirically unlikely that the enactment of the EO, or even the UCC report in 1987, led to
reduced EJ problems within such a short time. Thus, we can safely rule out the possibility
of a causal loop between the policy and the problem in this case. Nonetheless, the
empirical findings remain puzzling.
In discussing their research on the measurement of state environmental policy, Konisky
and Woods wrote:
…The concerns just discussed raise questions about the conclusions scholars reach
regarding the correlates of state environmental policy. Specifically, assertions made
that factors such as pollution severity, interest group pressures, or partisan control of
government are important intrastate factors of state environmental policy may be at
worst tenuous, and at best specific only to the measure being considered…Our
regression analyses, in fact, suggest that we may know less regarding the intrastate
correlates of state environmental policy than commonly thought… (2012, p. 563).
To advance our current knowledge in the area, their suggestion focused primarily on the
careful choice of the measurement strategy used to examine state environmental politics
and policies. We con …
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