Expert answer:Applying Nature Ethic
Solved by verified expert:In roughly 2 pages, please apply your principles from the discussion in this week to Singer’s book Ethics of What We Eat. You already read this chapter in week 4 so you will just need to review it again. When you are applying your discussion principles, you do not need to cover every industry in Singer’s book; however, you may need to do more than one section to best demonstrate your principles. Since you will be receiving feedback from your classmates on your principles in the discussion, you are able to modify your list during this phase. Please include a concise introduction and conclusion. In the body, dedicate one paragraph per principle where you briefly introduce it and then apply the principle to an example from Ethics of What We Eat. At the end or in the conclusion you can evaluate how effective you believe this normative theory to be.
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10
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE ETHICS
INTRODUCTION
Environmental ethics is a key branch of contemporary global ethics and one that is increasingly important.
Environmental ethics has expanded dramatically in recent years and, like global ethics, as discussed in
Chapter 1, it is a response to emerging problems and crises. For some, the environmental crisis is the
overarching global-ethics issue that needs to be addressed because human survival itself is threatened. In
attempting to respond to the environmental crisis we can see very clearly the logic of global ethics at work. It
makes little sense to construct a less-than-global ethical community when considering how to address global
threats such as climate change. No nation or region can address climate change alone. Only a shared
response, where everyone takes the actions necessary, will be sufficient to deal with this problem. Climate
change is no respecter of national borders and the behaviour of one nation or region affects others. Hence
responses to climate change are always “global in scope”; even those who endorse regional protections (such
as the strengthening of national borders to protect national resources) cannot but think of the global causes
and effects. The second two criteria of global ethics are also clearly met: responses to climate change are
necessarily multidisciplinary – scientific knowledge is crucial to legal, moral and political responses; and
theory and practice are linked as ethicists struggle to propose just and effective practical solutions (something
evident in the work of Caney and Moellendorf, discussed towards the end of this chapter).
In addition to being of obvious global-ethics concern, environmental issues are interrelated with the other
global-ethics issues we have considered. In particular, climate change compounds other injustices. For
instance, those who are already living a subsistence existence have no spare resources with which to cushion
themselves from the effects of severe weather events caused by climate change, such as drought or flood. Nor
do they have the means to attain scarce natural resources, such as water and productive land. Moreover, as
weather patterns change and land that was once fertile becomes uninhabitable, the total resources available
diminish. As well as exacerbating economic injustice, other forms of injustice also increase in an
environmentally unstable context and accessing basic health and security becomes more difficult. As natural
resources – of fertile land, energy, water and food – become increasingly scarce, the likelihood that there will
be conflict to secure them increases. Again, those who are most vulnerable will suffer most: they might suffer
from insecurity during periods of conflict; be on the losing side and suffer retribution; their land and lives
might be threatened; or they might become refugees and suffer loss of status, property and even citizenship.
Environmental issues are clearly fundamental to resolving global-ethics issues; they are not separate but
intimately connected. Again, as in Chapter 9, we are reminded that if we wish to address injustice then we
must not consider issues in isolation but adopt holistic models that recognize the interconnections of these
issues.
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ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS AND CLIMATE ETHICS
Environmental ethics covers a large area and one that has expanded dramatically over the past few decades. It
represents developments in ethical thinking that are not just responses to the current environmental crisis, but
are responses to increasing ethical concerns and uneasiness about human duties to the non-human world. For
instance, environmental ethics includes questions about the scope of duties and asks what duties, if any,
humans have to non-human species and to the environment more broadly.
In fact, a primary issue of environmental ethics is whether rights should be extended beyond human
agents. The moral theories we discussed in Chapter 3 were human-centric or anthropocentric; moral duties
were limited to how human beings should treat other human beings. Likewise, the political theories of
Chapter 4 were concerned with human governance, and Chapter 5 was overtly about human rights. In
Chapter 9 we saw how ethical frameworks are beginning to be developed that respect groups and common
goods and that allot some rights to groups as groups, rather than just to individuals. Parallel arguments are
made in environmental ethics about the rights of animals; here there is considerable overlap with bioethics,
because much of the focus of this debate has been on whether or not research on animals is justified to
produce medicine and other products for humans.
Animal rights
The most prominent thinker in this debate is Peter Singer (1975), whose arguments about the duties of justice
we discussed in Chapter 7. Singer argues that the principle of equality applies not just to humans, but also to
animals. Therefore, according to Singer, if you accept that equality and impartiality are sound moral
principles for governing human relations then you should accept that they are also sound when it comes to
governing relations between humans and animals. Not to see this is unjustly to discriminate, without reason
to do so: a prejudice Singer terms “speciesism”. Singer argues that just as being a member of a different race
does not justify exploitation, being a member of a different species does not justify exploitation. Likewise, he
argues, the fact that animals may be less intelligent than we are does not justify disregarding their interests
any more than we would be justified in disregarding interests of less-intelligent human beings.
For Singer, animals have interests that deserve to be protected because they can suffer, and this suffering
should be taken into moral consideration. Beings capable of suffering, happiness or enjoyment have interests
that entitle them to moral status and enable us to distinguish moral beings from things. Singer does not
propose that the interests of all animals are the same and accepts that there are differences in levels of
suffering. He also recognizes that there are difficulties in making comparisons between human and animal
suffering. However, he argues that precision is not necessary to make judgements and, in cases where human
suffering is less than animal suffering, animal interests should be respected over and above human interests.
Singer applies this reasoning to all aspects of human relationships with animals, from eating animals to
animal experimentation. Ascribing respect for animals’ interests has implications for many aspects of
contemporary living. For instance, is it acceptable to eat animals at all, and, if so, in what circumstances?
How much does human need count compared to animal suffering? Likewise, is experimentation on animals
justified when the need is great?
Environmental value
In addition to the rights of animals, there are also questions about how nature itself should be treated in
general. Are there duties to preserve and protect our environment that extend beyond the need to preserve
what is necessary for human survival? For instance, is the extinction of species intrinsically bad or is it just
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instrumentally bad in that in losing a species humans might be losing useful resources (such as medical or
food sources)? Likewise, should biodiversity be protected, and, if so, why?
The traditional model of ethics excludes the non-human sphere and regards it as having value only as far as
it is of use to humans. Thus any duties to nature are instrumental: nature should be protected because it is
useful to humanity. Over the past few decades other models of the relation between human beings and the
planet have emerged and are gaining prominence as “green approaches” become central to public and policy
debates.
Stewardship model
One possible model, which has its basis in Judaeo-Christian thinking, is the “stewardship model”. This model
– which is now promoted as a secular as well as religious model, for instance by Robin Attfield (2006) –
suggests that humans are the stewards or trustees of nature. Thus the ways in which human beings can act
towards nature is limited; they cannot do whatever they wish and do not have dominion over nature. This
model offers a conception of the duties that human beings have not only to animals to prevent suffering, but
also to nature more broadly: for instance, to prevent species extinction and to preserve biodiversity. In the
current environmental crisis it suggests that there are not just duties to protect humans but additional duties to
protect animals, species and habitats as well as biological and ecological systems.
Deep ecology
Another model that moves beyond instrumental models is that of deep ecology. The principles of deep
ecology were set out by Arne Naess and George Sessions (Naess & Sessions 1984; Sessions 1995). They
assert the intrinsic value – value in and of itself – of non-human life. The flourishing of eco-systems and
natural objects is regarded as important independently of being instrumentally valuable to human beings. The
deep ecology model argues that diversity is valuable in itself and that humans, as one form of life among all
the others, have no right to reduce the richness and diversity of the natural world except to support vital
needs. Hence, deep ecology roundly rejects any anthropocentric perspective: any view that puts humans at
the centre of our concerns.
Beyond instrumental value
This brief look into the developing movements in environmental thinking shows that models are emerging
that go beyond ascribing instrumental value to the environment. How you view these models and the status
you ascribe to animals and the non-human world in general will change your ethical framework, and you will
need to revise the frameworks of Chapters 2, 3 and 4 to incorporate such concerns. This is easier to do when
you adopt some theories rather than others: for instance, if you are a utilitarian how can the environment (if
you exclude animals) be valued intrinsically in a calculation about happiness? Similarly, can a human-rights
-based model be extended to animals and the environment more broadly?
In addition to these questions about the scope of rights and duties beyond the human sphere, environmental
ethics is increasingly dominated by climate change and how this should be responded to. For the most part
this is an anthropocentric debate and one that is concerned only instrumentally with the environment; it is the
threat to human survival and flourishing that is driving the concern with climate ethics rather than concerns
about whether we should be respecting the environment as valuable in itself. However, these wider debates
about environmental ethics are not irrelevant to climate ethics. For instance, more holistic and sustainable
approaches to nature, such as those promoted by deep ecology and the stewardship model, offer motivation to
make some of the difficult changes that are required if the environmental crisis is to be addressed.
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THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS
Given the dominance of climate ethics in current environmental ethics, the rest of the chapter will focus on
this issue of ethical response to the environmental crisis and the suggestions that are being put forward to
address current challenges of climate change. Climate change is generally agreed to be something brought
about by human actions: anthropocentric climate change. It is primarily caused by the emission of
greenhouse gases (GHG) through the burning of fossil fuels, deforestation, aerosol gases, CFCs in
refrigeration systems and from animals, manure processing and paddy-field farming. Although the science
remains disputed by some, by far the majority of the scientific community agree that climate change is
happening and that its effect on the environment and human beings’ ability to sustain current standards of
living – and even to survive – will be catastrophic.
So for example, the latest report from the IPCC (2007a) predicts that “very large sea-level rises that would
result from widespread deglaciation of Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets imply major changes in
coastlines and ecosystems, and inundation of low-lying areas, with the greatest effects in river deltas”. And
the IPCC has produced a statement on the melting of Himalayan glaciers, which notes:
[W]idespread mass losses from glaciers and reductions in snow cover over recent decades are
projected to accelerate throughout the 21st century, reducing water availability, hydropower potential,
and changing seasonality of flows in regions supplied by meltwater from major mountain ranges (e.g.
Hindu-Kush, Himalaya, Andes), where more than one-sixth of the world population currently lives.
(2010)
These are just two of the predictions of climate change. More information can be found from the IPCC.
The task of this chapter is not to lay out the science – which is easily available – but to focus on the ethical
responses to the predictions.
These effects of climate change are already being felt; and, importantly, these effects will increase no
matter what actions are taken. The effects of the emissions that have already been produced will continue to
be felt for a long time into the future. In addition to the already dangerous changes listed in Box 10.1, there
are a number of possible events that, if they occurred, would result in even more catastrophic climate
changes. For instance, it is also possible that climate change could result in the failure of the Gulf Stream,
which would in turn result in the cooling of northern Europe, making another region of the world potentially
uninhabitable.
The effects of climate change will fall disproportionately on the poor, as with so many other issues in
global ethics. The already vulnerable – through poverty or ill health – will be more vulnerable to
environmental catastrophes and less able to mitigate their effects. For instance, sea-level rises will affect
low-lying and low-income states – such as Bangladesh, small island states and the Nile Delta – harder and
more immediately than other countries. In part this is purely a geographical accident. However, it is also
because they are not able to afford the adaptations that richer, similarly low-lying states – such as the
Netherlands – employ. (It is worth noting that even in the Netherlands, according to a report from the
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (2006), it is unlikely that current approaches will suffice:
“The second half of the century may see serious problems arising from climate change, in particular in the
low-lying areas of the country. A sea level rise of several to many metres is expected in the very long term [a
few hundred years]. It is questionable whether conventional techniques can be used to maintain the current
level of safety.“) Likewise, rises in temperature are more easily managed by countries with agriculture
infrastructure that can deal with droughts; earthquakes and tidal waves are more easily managed by those
who live in appropriate housing rather than shanty towns; floods are more easily managed by rich countries
that can bear the cost of immediate aid and that have health-care systems that can quickly address the threats
of emergency diseases; and so the list goes on. Thus one form of injustice compounds other injustices and the
result is further disadvantage and injustice for those already at the bottom of the heap.
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Box 10.1 Effects of climate change
•
Temperature rise.
•
Sea-level rise.
•
Extreme weather events, e.g. heatwaves.
•
Increased floods, hurricanes, droughts.
•
Large regions of the world becoming uninhabitable.
•
Large-scale displacement of human communities.
•
Species extinction.
•
Ocean acidification.
•
Destruction of land and sea infrastructures.
Such compounding of injustices is, without doubt, a serious ethical issue. Yet because the injustice is so
clear and the need to address it so striking, in a strange way climate change is a less controversial issue –
when it comes to ethics – than some of the other issues we have addressed. For instance, if we think back to
Chapter 9, there are strong disagreements between ethicists; they profoundly disagree on issues such as
whether individuals should be able to sell their organs if they choose or whether sex selection should be
permitted. When it comes to climate change there is little ethical disagreement. In short, climate change is an
extreme threat to human survival and flourishing and therefore it is imperative that it is addressed. This is
true whatever moral theories one adopts from Chapter 3: for utilitarians the greatest good requires that
climate change is addressed because the consequences for not doing so will be a vast increase in human
suffering; for deontologists human dignity and rights require that climate change be addressed; and for virtue
ethicists, if human beings are to flourish and be able to exercise the virtues, climate change must be
addressed. The political differences of Chapter 4 are also less pronounced; even realists, who seek only
national advantage, have to engage in global negotiation to produce treaties and agreements that will lead to
the necessary practical solutions. As discussed above, this is an issue that no nation can hope to influence
alone.
Addressing climate change
However, simply because all agree about the ends does not mean that there is agreement about the means.
Thus the ethical debate in climate ethics is primarily about what measures can be put in place and whether
they can be justified. Is the situation so severe that draconian measures are needed? Would it be permissible
to coerce individuals and communities to reduce their emissions, even if it required a dramatic reduction in
standards of living for the wealthy and denied the poor rights of development? Are enforced
population-control measures permissible, for instance negative measures such as penalties for reproduction or
positive measures such as payment for sterilization? And who should bear the cost of managing the effects of
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