Expert answer:Issues on Appeal review and study U.S. Supreme Cou
Expert answer:This written assignment focuses on the procedural steps and requirements in a criminal case from the time of trial to appeal.For this assignment, review and study U.S. Supreme Court opinion, Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 783 (2014).Click here for a link to the U.S. Supreme Court opinion.***Note – the “syllabus” of the case is only a summary of the case and it is NOT the actual opinion. Be sure to read the full opinions.For this assignment, be sure to rely on information from the “Opinion” part of the document and not from the “syllabus”.After you have reviewed and studied the opinion, prepare a paper that answers the following questions: –Do not prepare your information in a list. Write your paper in proper paragraphs.Give a summary of the facts of the alleged crime, including city and state where the crime occurred.What crime was the suspect arrested for? (state or federal crime?)What crime was the suspect charged with? (state or federal crime?)Did the suspect have a prior criminal history?Was there a jury trial?What was the outcome of the jury trial?What happened after the suspect was convicted?Did he appeal?How did the case get to the U.S. Supreme Court?Identify and discuss the legal issue(s) discussed in the Supreme Court opinion.Give detailed discussion of the Constitutional issues raised on appeal.For example, was there a Fifth Amendment Miranda issue?Was evidence excluded?What was the outcome of the case on appeal?What was the Court’s analysis of the Constitutional issue?Was the conviction affirmed, reversed, remanded?In detail, describe the impact that this case had on criminal procedure and/or the authority of law enforcement officers to obtain to conduct a search or seizure.Please be sure to prepare your assignment following APA citation and format requirements. You must include proper citations to any source you relied on for information that you include in your paper.
syllabus.pdf
Unformatted Attachment Preview
(Slip Opinion)
OCTOBER TERM, 2013
1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
RILEY v. CALIFORNIA
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA,
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION ONE
No. 13–132.
Argued April 29, 2014—Decided June 25, 2014*
In No. 13–132, petitioner Riley was stopped for a traffic violation,
which eventually led to his arrest on weapons charges. An officer
searching Riley incident to the arrest seized a cell phone from Riley’s
pants pocket. The officer accessed information on the phone and noticed the repeated use of a term associated with a street gang. At the
police station two hours later, a detective specializing in gangs further examined the phone’s digital contents. Based in part on photographs and videos that the detective found, the State charged Riley
in connection with a shooting that had occurred a few weeks earlier
and sought an enhanced sentence based on Riley’s gang membership.
Riley moved to suppress all evidence that the police had obtained
from his cell phone. The trial court denied the motion, and Riley was
convicted. The California Court of Appeal affirmed.
In No. 13–212, respondent Wurie was arrested after police observed him participate in an apparent drug sale. At the police station, the officers seized a cell phone from Wurie’s person and noticed
that the phone was receiving multiple calls from a source identified
as “my house” on its external screen. The officers opened the phone,
accessed its call log, determined the number associated with the “my
house” label, and traced that number to what they suspected was
Wurie’s apartment. They secured a search warrant and found drugs,
a firearm and ammunition, and cash in the ensuing search. Wurie
was then charged with drug and firearm offenses. He moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of the apartment. The
District Court denied the motion, and Wurie was convicted. The
——————
* Together with No. 13–212, United States v. Wurie, on certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
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RILEY v. CALIFORNIA
Syllabus
First Circuit reversed the denial of the motion to suppress and vacated the relevant convictions.
Held: The police generally may not, without a warrant, search digital
information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been
arrested. Pp. 5–28.
(a) A warrantless search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. See
Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. ___, ___. The well-established exception
at issue here applies when a warrantless search is conducted incident
to a lawful arrest.
Three related precedents govern the extent to which officers may
search property found on or near an arrestee. Chimel v. California,
395 U. S. 752, requires that a search incident to arrest be limited to
the area within the arrestee’s immediate control, where it is justified
by the interests in officer safety and in preventing evidence destruction. In United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, the Court applied
the Chimel analysis to a search of a cigarette pack found on the arrestee’s person. It held that the risks identified in Chimel are present in all custodial arrests, 414 U. S., at 235, even when there is no
specific concern about the loss of evidence or the threat to officers in a
particular case, id., at 236. The trilogy concludes with Arizona v.
Gant, 556 U. S. 332, which permits searches of a car where the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment, or where it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the
crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle, id., at 343. Pp. 5–8.
(b) The Court declines to extend Robinson’s categorical rule to
searches of data stored on cell phones. Absent more precise guidance
from the founding era, the Court generally determines whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement “by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed
for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U. S. 295, 300. That balance of interests supported
the search incident to arrest exception in Robinson. But a search of
digital information on a cell phone does not further the government
interests identified in Chimel, and implicates substantially greater
individual privacy interests than a brief physical search. Pp. 8–22.
(1) The digital data stored on cell phones does not present either
Chimel risk. Pp. 10–15.
(i) Digital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as a
weapon to harm an arresting officer or to effectuate the arrestee’s escape. Officers may examine the phone’s physical aspects to ensure
that it will not be used as a weapon, but the data on the phone can
endanger no one. To the extent that a search of cell phone data
Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014)
3
Syllabus
might warn officers of an impending danger, e.g., that the arrestee’s
confederates are headed to the scene, such a concern is better addressed through consideration of case-specific exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as exigent circumstances. See, e.g., Warden,
Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 298–299. Pp. 10–12.
(ii) The United States and California raise concerns about the
destruction of evidence, arguing that, even if the cell phone is physically secure, information on the cell phone remains vulnerable to remote wiping and data encryption. As an initial matter, those broad
concerns are distinct from Chimel’s focus on a defendant who responds to arrest by trying to conceal or destroy evidence within his
reach. The briefing also gives little indication that either problem is
prevalent or that the opportunity to perform a search incident to arrest would be an effective solution. And, at least as to remote wiping,
law enforcement currently has some technologies of its own for combatting the loss of evidence. Finally, law enforcement’s remaining
concerns in a particular case might be addressed by responding in a
targeted manner to urgent threats of remote wiping, see Missouri v.
McNeely, 569 U. S. ___, ___, or by taking action to disable a phone’s
locking mechanism in order to secure the scene, see Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U. S. 326, 331–333. Pp. 12–15.
(2) A conclusion that inspecting the contents of an arrestee’s
pockets works no substantial additional intrusion on privacy beyond
the arrest itself may make sense as applied to physical items, but
more substantial privacy interests are at stake when digital data is
involved. Pp. 15–22.
(i) Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative
sense from other objects that might be carried on an arrestee’s person. Notably, modern cell phones have an immense storage capacity.
Before cell phones, a search of a person was limited by physical realities and generally constituted only a narrow intrusion on privacy.
But cell phones can store millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds of videos. This has several interrelated privacy
consequences. First, a cell phone collects in one place many distinct
types of information that reveal much more in combination than any
isolated record. Second, the phone’s capacity allows even just one
type of information to convey far more than previously possible.
Third, data on the phone can date back for years. In addition, an element of pervasiveness characterizes cell phones but not physical
records. A decade ago officers might have occasionally stumbled
across a highly personal item such as a diary, but today many of the
more than 90% of American adults who own cell phones keep on their
person a digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives. Pp. 17–
21.
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RILEY v. CALIFORNIA
Syllabus
(ii) The scope of the privacy interests at stake is further complicated by the fact that the data viewed on many modern cell phones
may in fact be stored on a remote server. Thus, a search may extend
well beyond papers and effects in the physical proximity of an arrestee, a concern that the United States recognizes but cannot definitively foreclose. Pp. 21–22.
(c) Fallback options offered by the United States and California are
flawed and contravene this Court’s general preference to provide
clear guidance to law enforcement through categorical rules. See
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 705, n. 19. One possible rule is
to import the Gant standard from the vehicle context and allow a
warrantless search of an arrestee’s cell phone whenever it is reasonable to believe that the phone contains evidence of the crime of arrest. That proposal is not appropriate in this context, and would
prove no practical limit at all when it comes to cell phone searches.
Another possible rule is to restrict the scope of a cell phone search to
information relevant to the crime, the arrestee’s identity, or officer
safety. That proposal would again impose few meaningful constraints on officers. Finally, California suggests an analogue rule,
under which officers could search cell phone data if they could have
obtained the same information from a pre-digital counterpart. That
proposal would allow law enforcement to search a broad range of
items contained on a phone even though people would be unlikely to
carry such a variety of information in physical form, and would
launch courts on a difficult line-drawing expedition to determine
which digital files are comparable to physical records. Pp. 22–25.
(d) It is true that this decision will have some impact on the ability
of law enforcement to combat crime. But the Court’s holding is not
that the information on a cell phone is immune from search; it is that
a warrant is generally required before a search. The warrant requirement is an important component of the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and warrants may be obtained with increasing
efficiency. In addition, although the search incident to arrest exception does not apply to cell phones, the continued availability of the exigent circumstances exception may give law enforcement a justification for a warrantless search in particular cases. Pp. 25–27.
No. 13–132, reversed and remanded; No. 13–212, 728 F. 3d 1, affirmed.
ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SCALIA,
KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ.,
joined. ALITO, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014)
1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
Nos. 13–132 and 13–212
_________________
13–132
DAVID LEON RILEY, PETITIONER
v.
CALIFORNIA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION ONE
13–212
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
v.
BRIMA WURIE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
[June 25, 2014]
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the
Court.
These two cases raise a common question: whether the
police may, without a warrant, search digital information
on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been
arrested.
I
A
In the first case, petitioner David Riley was stopped by a
police officer for driving with expired registration tags. In
the course of the stop, the officer also learned that Riley’s
license had been suspended. The officer impounded Riley’s car, pursuant to department policy, and another
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RILEY v. CALIFORNIA
Opinion of the Court
officer conducted an inventory search of the car. Riley was
arrested for possession of concealed and loaded firearms
when that search turned up two handguns under the car’s
hood. See Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§12025(a)(1), 12031(a)(1)
(West 2009).
An officer searched Riley incident to the arrest and
found items associated with the “Bloods” street gang. He
also seized a cell phone from Riley’s pants pocket. According to Riley’s uncontradicted assertion, the phone was a
“smart phone,” a cell phone with a broad range of other
functions based on advanced computing capability, large
storage capacity, and Internet connectivity. The officer
accessed information on the phone and noticed that some
words (presumably in text messages or a contacts list)
were preceded by the letters “CK”—a label that, he believed, stood for “Crip Killers,” a slang term for members
of the Bloods gang.
At the police station about two hours after the arrest, a
detective specializing in gangs further examined the contents of the phone. The detective testified that he “went
through” Riley’s phone “looking for evidence, because . . .
gang members will often video themselves with guns or
take pictures of themselves with the guns.” App. in No.
13–132, p. 20. Although there was “a lot of stuff ” on the
phone, particular files that “caught [the detective’s] eye”
included videos of young men sparring while someone
yelled encouragement using the moniker “Blood.” Id., at
11–13. The police also found photographs of Riley standing in front of a car they suspected had been involved in a
shooting a few weeks earlier.
Riley was ultimately charged, in connection with that
earlier shooting, with firing at an occupied vehicle, assault
with a semiautomatic firearm, and attempted murder.
The State alleged that Riley had committed those crimes
for the benefit of a criminal street gang, an aggravating
factor that carries an enhanced sentence. Compare Cal.
Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014)
3
Opinion of the Court
Penal Code Ann. §246 (2008) with §186.22(b)(4)(B) (2014).
Prior to trial, Riley moved to suppress all evidence that
the police had obtained from his cell phone. He contended
that the searches of his phone violated the Fourth
Amendment, because they had been performed without a
warrant and were not otherwise justified by exigent circumstances. The trial court rejected that argument. App.
in No. 13–132, at 24, 26. At Riley’s trial, police officers
testified about the photographs and videos found on the
phone, and some of the photographs were admitted into
evidence. Riley was convicted on all three counts and
received an enhanced sentence of 15 years to life in prison.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed. No. D059840
(Cal. App., Feb. 8, 2013), App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 13–
132, pp. 1a–23a. The court relied on the California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Diaz, 51 Cal. 4th 84,
244 P. 3d 501 (2011), which held that the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless search of cell phone data
incident to an arrest, so long as the cell phone was immediately associated with the arrestee’s person. See id., at
93, 244 P. 3d, at 505–506.
The California Supreme Court denied Riley’s petition for
review, App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 13–132, at 24a, and we
granted certiorari, 571 U. S. ___ (2014).
B
In the second case, a police officer performing routine
surveillance observed respondent Brima Wurie make an
apparent drug sale from a car. Officers subsequently
arrested Wurie and took him to the police station. At the
station, the officers seized two cell phones from Wurie’s
person. The one at issue here was a “flip phone,” a kind of
phone that is flipped open for use and that generally has a
smaller range of features than a smart phone. Five to ten
minutes after arriving at the station, the officers noticed
that the phone was repeatedly receiving calls from a
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RILEY v. CALIFORNIA
Opinion of the Court
source identified as “my house” on the phone’s external
screen. A few minutes later, they opened the phone and
saw a photograph of a woman and a baby set as the
phone’s wallpaper. They pressed one button on the phone
to access its call log, then another button to determine the
phone number associated with the “my house” label. They
next used an online phone directory to trace that phone
number to an apartment building.
When the officers went to the building, they saw Wurie’s
name on a mailbox and observed through a window a
woman who resembled the woman in the photograph on
Wurie’s phone. They secured the apartment while obtaining a search warrant and, upon later executing the warrant, found and seized 215 grams of crack cocaine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a firearm and ammunition, and
cash.
Wurie was charged with distributing crack cocaine,
possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute, and
being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition.
See 18 U. S. C. §922(g); 21 U. S. C. §841(a). He moved to
suppress the evidence obtained from the search of the
apartment, arguing that it was the fruit of an unconstitutional search of his cell phone. The District Court denied
the motion. 612 F. Supp. 2d 104 (Mass. 2009). Wurie was
convicted on all three counts and sentenced to 262 months
in prison.
A divided panel of the First Circuit reversed the denial
of Wurie’s motion to suppress and vacated Wurie’s convictions for possession with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm as a felon. 728 F. 3d 1 (2013). The court
held that cell phones are distinct from other physical
possessions that may be searched incident to arrest without a warrant, because of the amount of personal data cell
phones contain and the negligible threat they pose to law
enforcement interests. See id., at 8–11.
We granted certiorari. 571 U. S. ___ (2014).
Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014)
5
Opinion of the Court
II
The Fourth Amendment provides:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.”
As the text makes clear, “the ultimate touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’ ” Brigham City v.
Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403 (2006). Our cases have determined that “[w]here a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, . . . reasonableness generally requires the obtaining
of a judicial warrant.” Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U. S. 646, 653 (1995). Such a warrant ensures that
the inferences to support a search are “drawn by a neutral
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S.
10, 14 (1948). In the absence of a warrant, a search is
reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the
warrant requirement. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S.
___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 5–6).
The two cases before us concern the reasonableness of a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. In 1914,
this Court first acknowledged in dictum “the right on the
part of the Government, always recognized under English
and American law, to search the person of the accused
when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or
evidences of crime.” Weeks v. United States, 23 …
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