Expert answer:historical lenses response posts
Expert answer:When responding to peers, choose a peer who selected the same topic as you by looking at the title of the discussion posts. In one to two paragraphs, compare and contrast the source you described in your initial post with the one described by your peer. Are the two sources’ theses or arguments compatible? Do they use the same or different primary sources? Is one source more reliable, in your estimation, than the other? How do these two sources, combined, add to what you know about the research topic?
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Response # 1 to William R
The article I am using for this discussion is Miles, R. E., Jr. (1985). Hiroshima: The strange myth
of half a million American lives saved. I had to read through the article several times to truly
figure out what big picture filter (Social, Political, of Economic) that the writer was using. Initially
I was going to settle on that he was using a social filter. My initial reasoning was that he was
talking about interactions between people. As we already know this lens focuses on people and
their interactions with others. I read the article a second and third time and decided that he was
using a Political filter.
There was a lot of talk during the latter part of the article of who said what and who knew what
and when, but overall the idea of the article was government decisions and how they effected
their own people and affiliated military;
“Both men thus presented the issue as if the sole practical alternative to the use of atomic
bombs was an immense, long, and bloody invasion of the heartland of Japan, but neither
provided any support for this belief. They apparently assumed that this premise would be
accepted without question, and it was, even though it was severely flawed. Where the
statements differ is that Churchill pictures a million American deaths, while Stimson had
mentioned a million American casualties, implying, on the basis of Pacific experience, a fifth as
many deaths. (Casualties include injured and temporarily missing.) This discrepancy led me to
search for its origin and, in doing so, to find much more than the careless and imprecise use of
terms and figures.”(1)
Admiral Ernest King, Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet: “[In the final thirty-six days of
the war] the forces under Admiral Halsey’s command had destroyed or damaged 2,804 enemy
planes, sunk or damaged 148 Japanese combat ships, sunk or damaged 1,598 enemy
merchant ships, destroyed 195 locomotives and damaged 109 more. In addition, heavy blows
had been struck at industrial targets and war industries, effectively supplementing the bombings
by B-29’s. This impressive record speaks for itself and helps to explain the sudden collapse of
Japan’s will to resist.”(2)
General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff:” During July the super bombers had
steadily increased the scale of their attacks on the Japanese homeland. From the Marianas
bases the B-29’s averaged 1,200 sorties a week. Okinawa airfields which now occupied almost
all suitable space on the island began to fill with heavy bombers, mediums and fighters which
united in the aerial assault on the Japanese islands, her positions on the Asiatic mainland, and
what was left of her shipping. Fighters from Iwo Jima swept over the Japanese islands, strafed
Japanese dromes and communications and gave the super bombers freedom of operation. The
Third Fleet augmented by British units hammered Japan with planes and guns, sailing boldly
into Japanese coastal waters. The warships repeatedly and effectively shelled industries along
the coasts. . . . These mighty attacks met little opposition.”(3)
All of the above excerpts are about the allied military strategy and its effects on the Japanese
military. By the beginning of 1945 Japan was almost at an ineffective state according to what
this article has stated, and they had been trying to find some means of negotiation with the
Americans to surrender, prior to the atomic bomb even being tested.
(1) Miles, R. E., Jr. (1985). Hiroshima: The strange myth of half a million American lives saved.
International Security, 10(2), 121–140. Retrieved from
http://ezproxy.snhu.edu/login?url=http://muse.jhu.edu/article/446163
(2) The War Reports, p. 243. Retrieved from
http://ezproxy.snhu.edu/login?url=http://muse.jhu.edu/article/446163
(3) Ibid., p. 678. Emphasis added Retrieved from
http://ezproxy.snhu.edu/login?url=http://muse.jhu.edu/article/446163
Response #2 to kayla W
For this discussion I chose the Journal Article: The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb by Louis
Morton. This article is definitely weighed heavily towards, the decision to use the atomic bomb,
being viewed through a Political lens, specifially when it came to the military strategy behind the
decision. In the article, Morton also references some of the alternatives to using the atomic
bomb to end the war, and the leaders involved in making the decision viewing those possible
decisions through the social and economic lenses as well. Morton talks a little about the leaders
that were involved in the decision, being worried about the social repercussions it would have
on the United States, how the U.S. would be seen, and it’s international relations with other
countries affected after it’s use, as well as the economic upset it would cause and how much it
would cost the military on both sides depending on the decision that was made. It has many
different sections, about different possible decisions and events that eventually led to the United
States using the atomic bomb; most of which were debated heavily and weighed against the
varying political outcomes, along with the few social and economic effects that decision would
have on the U.S. after the use this tremendous force to end the war with Japan.
One of the first things I read that proves to view through a political lens the paragraph that
explains that after the death of President Roosevelt, it was the Secretary of War, Henry L.
Stimson’s responsibility to brief the new President, Harry S. Truman, about the nuclear weapon.
Morton goes on to explain that similar to the previous meeting Stimson had with Roosevelt, it
was mostly about the political and diplomatic consequences of using an atomic weapon.
Stimson recommended that President Roosevelt put together a special committee to discuss all
of the questions that came with the possibility of the use a nuclear weapon once one was
produced. This “Interim Committee,” as it was called, played a vital role in the decision to use
the atomic bomb. After the committee was completed, and it sent it’s report to the President, of
it’s recommendations for when, where, and how the atomic bomb should be used, Stimson
wrote that, “The conclusions of the Committee were similar to my own…,” and that “such an
effective shock would save many times the number of lives, both American and Japanese, that
it would cost.” Morton continues to tell of some of scientists working on the Manhattan project,
thought just the opposite of the committee, in that they believed the “wave of horror and
repulsion” that would come with using an atomic bomb would far outweigh it’s military
advantages,” and that “It may be very difficult to persuade the world that a nation which was
capable of secretly preparing and suddenly releasing a new weapon…, is to be trusted in its
proclaimed desire of having such weapons abolished by international agreement.” My
interpretation of that quote, even though the scientists don’t directly say either word, is that they
fear using the atomic bomb might have serious political and social consequences for the U.S.,
specifically losing the trust of other nations, especially our allies.
As you read on Morton continues to talk about the different perspective of scientists working on
the project and other scientists at various place given a poll of they thought the atomic bomb
should be used or “introduced” to the world. The scentists working on the project suggested
testing in in some barren place and use it as ” a preliminary ultimatum” to Japan; if it was
rejected, with esentially the “approval” of the United Nations, “then and only then should the
United States consider using the bomb.” Of all the people weighing the alternatives, they were
split between a preliminary demonstration in a remote area, all-out use, or no use at all.
Secretary Stimson referred these findings to a distinguished scientific panel and they didn’t
know much about the military aspect, whether the Japanese could be made to surrender by
other means or if an invasion was inevitable, but said that they didn’t think the war could be won
by a technical demonstration and that there was “no acceptable alternative to direct military
use.” Morton explains that Stimson wrote, “Nothing would have been more damaging to our
effort than a warning or demonstration followed by a dud-and this was a real possibility.” One of
Truman’s other advisors, James Byrnes expressed his fear in that, as he says, if the Japanese
were warned that an atomic bomb would be exploded over a military target in Japan, as a
demonstration, “they might bring our boys who were prisoners of war to that area.” According to
the article, most of the President’s civillian advisors and others were almost unanimous in their
vote to not demonstrate the use of the atomic bomb, because of the uncertainty of it actually
working and if it didn’t, that would be politically detrimental to the United States. In a later
section of the article, Morton also writes about Secretary of War, Stimson, who Morton explains
was concerned over the cost of the projected invasion of Japan’s homeland, and the political
effects of Soviet intervention…
As I explained above, this article definitely read mostly as being see through a political lense
and some details through social and economic lenses as well. There was so much information
in this article, I tried to get a few good points out of it, but there is definitely a lot more. There are
a few questions about this event that haven’t been answered and might never be answered.
Was it the Soviet intervention in the war that made the Japanese Emperor finally issue the
surrender?, or was it both atomic bombs the U.S. dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Did we
as the United States use the bombs as a show and a defeat of Germany in an arms race?, or
did we really think they could be the thing that ended the war, before their use? We may never
know the answer to those questions, but one thing is for sure there were definitely a few political
and social repercussions for the use of the atomic bomb.
Morton, L. (1957). The decision to use the atomic bomb. Foreign Affairs, 35(2), 334-353.
Retrieved from
http://ezproxy.snhu.edu/login?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/20031230
Running head: HISTORICAL LENSES
1
Historical Lenses
Name
Institution
HISTORICAL LENSES
2
Historical Lenses
Political Lens
In summer 1945 President Truman, as well as his advisers, knew that applying Atomic
bomb was unnecessary to prevent any invasion. Samuel Walker, a chief historian of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, said: “Careful scholarly treatment of the records and manuscripts
opened over the past few years has greatly enhanced our understanding of why the Truman
administration used atomic weapons against Japan.” According to Walker the bomb was
unnecessary and would only bring an invasion of Japan. They were supposed to use other
alternatives instead of a bomb. The U.S.’s strategic bombing Survey after investigating the
military, political and economic situation of Japan concluded that Japan would collapse before
the United States invaded them. Japanese leaders decided to surrender but had to look for a
reason to convince the die-hard Japanese army that it had lost the war. They had to look for allies
to assist them and one of their allies was Russia. At this moment the Japan leaders had to
sufficiently convince the all other leaders that the most vital thing to do was to surrender.
Bernstein opposed their judgment. He called it as a misstatement of fact and also as a
misrepresentation of the many available alternatives. Bernstein suggested that some intelligence
officer should commit himself precisely at the time Japan would surrender. If U.S.S.R. enters the
war, the Japanese would realize that their surrender is inevitable. At this time President Truman
decided in connection with his judgment that information of Hiroshima would be discovered.in
the years to come. President Truman did not care the feeling of his subordinates and also the
tactical nuclear warfare. Knowing the impact of a bomb, Truman decided that the Japan should
surrender before Russia enters the war. Bernstein argument concerning an invasion that was
HISTORICAL LENSES
3
likely following Marshall’s exploration was dismissed. Truman, as well as other higher officials,
had no idea about all Bernstein’s arguments and ideas. A final important point emphasized in
Bernstein’s article concerned Marshall’s role concerning the use a bomb. Marshal did not want
to inject himself into what he considered as a civilian decision-making responsibility. Marshal
was a military consultant but no a member of U.S.’s interim Committee. Initially, the Leaders of
America sought Soviet entry once the atomic bomb is proven. Truman decision was on
unconditional surrender instead of using a bomb.
The entire article is using the political lens. As I have summarized above, the article
concerns war between Japan and the United States. A decision to use a Bomb or not to use it is
debated with President Truman considering the use of unconditional surrender instead of a bomb.
…
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