Expert answer:Assignment Instructions
Expert answer:Using the weekly lesson readings in week 1 summarized the key point or points most critical to the intelligence cycle.Also, using the supplemental reading assignment located in eReserves for this course CMRJ320 i.e.,
Sorg, E. T., Haberman, C. P.,
Ratcliffe, J. H., & Groff, E. R. (2013). Foot patrol in violent crime hot
spots: The longitudinal impact of deterrence and post treatment effects of
displacement. Criminology, 51(1), 65-101 ; summarize the most important aspects of the article that can be
applied to crime reduction as it relates to Intelligence Led Policing. APA format is required of all Summary Paper assignments, including a cover page, in-text citations, and a full reference list. If tables, charts or images are used an Appendix is required. 2-3 pages of content maximum
intelligence_led__bureau_of__justice_assistance___policing__the_new__intelligence__architecture_.pdf
intelligence_led_policing_and_change_in_state_law_enforcement_agencies.pdf
rubricwritingassignments_level_300_400_cmrj320.docx
the_integration_of_crime_analysis_into_police_patrol_work__results_from_a_national_survey_of_law_enforcement_agencies.pdf
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U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
Law Enforcement in the Post9/11 Era
NEW REALITIES
Bureau of Justice Assistance
Intelligence-Led
Policing: The New
Intelligence
Architecture
Bureau of
Justice Assistance
U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
810 Seventh Street NW.
Washington, DC 20531
Alberto R. Gonzales
Attorney General
Regina B. Schofield
Assistant Attorney General
Domingo S. Herraiz
Director, Bureau of Justice Assistance
Office of Justice Programs
Partnerships for Safer Communities
www.ojp.usdoj.gov
Bureau of Justice Assistance
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA
NCJ 210681
Written by Marilyn Peterson
This document was prepared by the International Association of Chiefs of Police under
cooperative agreement number 2003–DD–BX–K002 awarded by the Bureau of Justice
Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions, findings,
and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this document are those of the authors
and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of
Justice.
The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also
includes the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.
Intelligence-Led
Policing: The New
Intelligence
Architecture
September 2005
NCJ 210681
Bureau of
Justice Assistance
Acknowledgments
Post9/11 Policing Project Staff
The Post-9/11 Policing Project is the work of the
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP),
National Sheriffs’ Association (NSA), National
Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives
(NOBLE), Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA), and
Police Foundation. Jerry Needle, Director of Programs
and Research, IACP, provided overall project direction.
■
Dr. Ellen Scrivner, Deputy Superintendent,
Bureau of Administrative Services, Chicago
Police Department, contributed to all phases of
project design and cofacilitated the Post-9/11
Roundtables with Jerry Needle. Marilyn
Peterson, Management Specialist–Intelligence,
New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice,
authored this monograph—Intelligence-Led
Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture.
National Sheriffs’ Association
Fred Wilson, Director of Training, directed
NSA project activities, organized and managed
Post-9/11 Roundtables, and worked closely with
IACP staff throughout the course of the project.
NSA project consultants included Chris Tutko,
Director of NSA’s Neighborhood Watch Project;
John Matthews; and Dr. Jeff Walker, University
of Arkansas, Little Rock.
National Organization of Black Law
Enforcement Executives
Jessie Lee, Executive Director, served as
NOBLE’s Project Director and conducted most
staff work.
■
Major Cities Chiefs Association
Dr. Phyllis McDonald, Division of Public Safety
Leadership, Johns Hopkins University, directed
the work of the Major Cities Chiefs Association.
The MCCA team included Denis O’Keefe,
Consultant; Corinne Martin, Program
Coordinator; and Shannon Feldpush.
International Association of Chiefs of Police
Phil Lynn served as IACP’s Project Director,
managed development and publication of the
four Promising Practices Briefs, and authored
Mutual Aid: Multijurisdictional Partnerships for
Meeting Regional Threats. Andrew Morabito
coauthored Engaging the Private Sector To
Promote Homeland Security: Law EnforcementPrivate Security Partnerships, and analyzed
Post-9/11 survey data. Col. Joel Leson, Director,
IACP Center for Police Leadership, authored
Assessing and Managing the Terrorism Threat.
Walter Tangel served as initial Project Director.
■
■
Dr. Sheldon Greenberg, Director of the Division
of Public Safety Leadership, coauthored
Engaging the Private Sector To Promote
Homeland Security: Law Enforcement-Private
Security Partnerships.
■
The Police Foundation
Edwin Hamilton directed Police Foundation
project activities and managed Post-9/11 survey
formatting and analysis, assisted by Rob Davis.
Foundation consultants included Inspector Garth
den Heyer of the New Zealand Police and Steve
Johnson of the Washington State Patrol.
Promising Practices Reviews
Promising Practices drafts were critiqued and enriched
by a series of practitioners/content experts, including
Richard Cashdollar, Executive Director of Public
Safety, City of Mobile, AL; George Franscell,
Attorney-at-Law, Franscell, Strickland, Roberts and
Lawrence, Los Angeles, CA; Mary Beth Michos, State
Mutual Aid Coordinator, Prince William County, VA;
David Bostrom, Manager, Community Policing
Consortium, IACP; John P. Chase, Chief of Staff,
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection,
Department of Homeland Security; John M. Clark,
iii
Assistant Vice President/Chief of Police, Burlington
Northern Santa Fe Railroad; John A. LeCours,
Director/Intelligence, Transport Canada; Ronald W.
Olin, Chief of Police, Lawrence, KS;
Ed Jopeck, Analyst, Veridian; Jerry Marynik,
Administrator, State Terrorism Threat Assessment
Center, California Department of Justice; and Bart
Johnson, Office of Counter-Terrorism, New York
State Police.
Thomas N. Faust, Executive Director, National
Sheriffs’ Association
■
Jessie Lee, Executive Director, National
Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives
■
Thomas C. Frazier, Executive Director, Major
Cities Chiefs Association
■
Hubert Williams, President, The Police Foundation
Executive Oversight
Bureau of Justice Assistance Guidance
The Post-9/11 Policing Project was initially
conceptualized by the Office of Justice Programs,
U.S. Department of Justice. Since its inception, the
project has been guided throughout by the chief
executive officers of the partner associations:
We gratefully acknowledge the technical guidance
and patient cooperation of executives and program
managers who helped fashion project work: James H.
Burch II, Deputy Director; Michelle Shaw, Policy
Advisor; and Steven Edwards, Ph.D., Senior Policy
Advisor for Law Enforcement.
■
iv
■
Daniel N. Rosenblatt, Executive Director,
International Association of Chiefs of Police
Contents
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iii
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
Intelligence Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
How We Got Where We Are Today: An Overview of Intelligence History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Where We Stand Today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
What We Need To Do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Appendix A: Information Sharing and Information Technology Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . .25
Appendix B: Sources of Intelligence Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29
Appendix C: Intelligence Training and Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35
Appendix D: Criminal Intelligence Model Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39
Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49
v
Executive Summary
T
he terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 revealed
the life-and-death importance of enhancing U.S.
intelligence operations. Since that day, a tremendous
amount of attention has been focused on the need for
constructive changes in law enforcement intelligence.
Intelligence operations have been reviewed, studied,
and slowly but steadily transformed. Most efforts have
focused on reorganizing intelligence infrastructures at
the federal level; however, corresponding efforts have
been made to enhance state and local law enforcement
intelligence operations. Such enhancements make it
possible for state and local law enforcement agencies
to play a role in homeland security. Perhaps more
important, improvements to intelligence operations
help local law enforcement respond to “traditional”
crimes more effectively.
Because effective intelligence operations can be
applied equally well to terrorist threats and crimes in
the community, homeland security and local crime
prevention are not mutually exclusive. Officers “on
the beat” are an excellent resource for gathering
information on all kinds of potential threats and
vulnerabilities. However, the intelligence operations
of state and local law enforcement agencies often are
plagued by a lack of policies, procedures, and training
for gathering and assessing essential information.
To correct this problem, fundamental changes are
needed in the way information is gathered, assessed,
and redistributed. Traditional, hierarchical intelligence
functions need to be reexamined and replaced with
cooperative, fluid structures that can collect information
and move intelligence to end users more quickly.
Intelligence in today’s policing environment must
adapt to the new realities presented by terrorism and
conventional crimes.
These new realities require increased collaboration in
information gathering and intelligence sharing. Critical
community infrastructures such as those related to
food, agriculture, public health, telecommunications,
energy, transportation, and banking are now seen as
potential terrorist targets. As a result, parts of the
community that previously did not receive much
notice from state and local law enforcement agencies
now require keen attention. Personnel who work in
these and other key industries are now partners in
terrorism prevention and crime control. Similarly,
community- and problem-oriented policing must
be integrated into intelligence operations to address
conventional crime issues. Engaging and collaborating
with the community at all levels are essential.
Intelligence-led policing is a collaborative enterprise
based on improved intelligence operations and
community-oriented policing and problem solving,
which the field has considered beneficial for many
years. To implement intelligence-led policing, police
organizations need to reevaluate their current policies
and protocols. Intelligence must be incorporated into
the planning process to reflect community problems
and issues. Information sharing must become a policy,
not an informal practice. Most important, intelligence
must be contingent on quality analysis of data. The
development of analytical techniques, training, and
technical assistance needs to be supported.
Because of size and limited budgets, not all agencies
can employ intelligence analysts or intelligence officers.
Nonetheless, all law enforcement agencies have a role
in the transformation of national intelligence operations.
This document identifies four levels of intelligence
capabilities for state and local agencies. At each
level, steps can be taken to help agencies incorporate
intelligence-led policing strategies. These steps include
adopting mission statements, writing intelligence
policies and procedures, participating in information
sharing, establishing appropriate security, and adopting
legal safeguards to protect the public’s privacy and
civil liberties.
vii
More than 20 years ago, some in law enforcement
argued for similar changes and an expanded
application of intelligence operations. A national
catastrophe was required to confirm the wisdom of
viii
their call. Their plea, espoused years ago, is even more
urgent today. “Law enforcement administrators,” they
said, “can no longer afford to respond to contemporary
and future problems with the ‘solutions’ of yesterday.”1
Introduction
A
critical lesson taken from the tragedy of
September 11, 2001 is that intelligence is
everyone’s job. A culture of intelligence and
collaboration is necessary to protect the United
States from crimes of all types. Likewise, for
intelligence to be effective, it should support an
agency’s entire operation. Crime prevention and
deterrence must be based on all-source information
gathering and analysis.
However, not all agencies have the resources to mount
full-scale intelligence operations. The average city
police department in the United States had 41 sworn
personnel in 20012 and would not be expected to
have intelligence analysts on staff. How then can an
intelligence model be established that will provide
support for all agencies?
The needs of agencies—from the very small to the
very large—must be considered if intelligence-led
policing is to be established in the United States.
This document examines how law enforcement
agencies can enhance their intelligence operations for
homeland security and traditional enforcement and
crime prevention, regardless of how sophisticated
their intelligence operations are. It explores the
meaning and uses of intelligence, provides examples
of intelligence practices, and explores how to
establish and maintain an intelligence capability.
1
Intelligence Issues
I
ntroducing intelligence-led policing into U.S. law
enforcement agencies is problematic for several
reasons. First, many agencies do not understand what
intelligence is or how to manage it. Second, agencies
must work to prevent and respond to day-to-day crime
at the same time they are working to prevent terrorism.
Third, the realities of funding and personnel resources
are often obstacles to intelligence-led policing.
Although the current intelligence operations of most
law enforcement agencies prevent them from
becoming active participants in the intelligence
infrastructure, this problem is not insurmountable.
However, analysis requires thoughtful contemplation
that results in conclusions and recommendations.
Thus, computers may assist with analysis by compiling
large amounts of data into an easily accessible format,
but this is only collated data; it is not analyzed data or
information, and it falls far short of intelligence. For
information to be useful, it must be analyzed by a
trained intelligence professional. In other words,
intelligence tells officials everything they need to
know before they knowledgeably choose a course of
action. For example, intelligence provides law
enforcement executives with facts and alternatives that
can inform critical decisions.
What Is Intelligence?
Because of misuse, the word “intelligence” means
different things to different people. The most common
mistake is to consider “intelligence” as synonymous
with “information.” Information is not intelligence.
Misuse also has led to the phrase “collecting
intelligence” instead of “collecting information.”
Although intelligence may be collected by and shared
with intelligence agencies and bureaus, field
operations generally collect information (or data).
Despite the many definitions of “intelligence” that
have been promulgated over the years, the simplest
and clearest of these is “information plus analysis
equals intelligence.”
The formula above clarifies the distinction between
collected information and produced intelligence. It
notes that without analysis, there is no intelligence.
Intelligence is not what is collected; it is what is
produced after collected data is evaluated and analyzed.
Intelligence is not what is collected; it is what is
produced after collected data is evaluated and analyzed.
Tactical Intelligence Versus
Strategic Intelligence
The distinction between tactical and strategic
intelligence is often misconstrued. Tactical intelligence
contributes directly to the success of specific
investigations. Strategic intelligence deals with
“big-picture” issues, such as planning and manpower
allocation.3 Tactical intelligence directs immediate
action, whereas strategic intelligence evolves over time
and explores long-term, large-scope solutions.
Some professionals refer to “evidential intelligence,”
in which certain pieces of evidence indicate where
other evidence may be found.4 Evidential intelligence
can help prove a criminal violation or provide leads
for investigators to follow.5
The term “operational intelligence” is sometimes used
to refer to intelligence that supports long-term
investigations into multiple, similar targets. Operational
intelligence is concerned primarily with identifying,
targeting, detecting, and intervening in criminal activity.6
Why Intelligence Is Critical
If intelligence is analyzed information, what is
analysis? Some agencies contend that computer
software can perform analysis for them; thus, they
invest in technology rather than in trained analysts.
Intelligence is critical for decisionmaking, planning,
strategic targeting, and crime prevention. Law
enforcement agencies depend on intelligence operations
3
on all levels; they cannot function effectively without
collecting, processing, and using intelligence.
■
an accurate picture of the business,
■
what is actually happening on the ground,
■
the nature and extent of the problem,
■
the trends, and
■
where the main threats lie.7
Decisionmaking
Gathering information and deciding what to do with
it are common occurrences in law enforcement
operations. Law enforcement officers and managers are
beset by large quantities of information, yet decisions
are often based on information that may be incomplete,
inaccurate, or misdirected. The move from information
gathering to informed decisionmaking depends on the
intelligence/analytic process, and results in a best
estimate of what has happened or will happen.
Questions have been asked about the extent to which
substantive analysis was performed prior to September
11 to test hypotheses of attacks by foreign terrorist
groups against the United States, and whether
domestic agencies were told to assess these threats
or to develop a plan of action and present it to
decisionmakers. It appears that decisionmakers relied
on raw intelligence reports that may have raised
concerns but did not guide informed decisions.
Experience shows that intelligence and analysis must
be strengthened to meet the threat of terrorism against
the United States. Law enforcement personnel have a
key role to play in making this happen.
Planning
Intelligence is critical to effective planning and
subsequent action. In many law enforcement agencies,
planning is performed without an understanding of the
crime problems facing the jurisdiction and without
sufficient operational input. In these instances,
strategic planning bears no resemblance to strategic
analysis or strategic intelligence. Instead, it relates
only to funding issues and operational constraints.
Essentially a budget exercise, this type of planning
suffers from a disconnect between the major issues
facing a community and the manner in which funds
are spent to address those needs.
Law enforcement executives are being encouraged to view
policing as a business.
By adhering to these principles, commanders can
create responsive enforcement plans that meet the
needs of the community. This cannot be done through
sheer managerial vision. It must be embedded in
critical thinking based on intelligence and analysis.
Strategic Targeting
Strategic targeting and prioritization are other critical
roles of intelligence. Law enforcement agencies with
tight budgets and personnel reductions or shortages …
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